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Abstract 
 
 
In this thesis I perform a canine-centric reading, within the theoretical frame of Critical 
Animal Studies, of nine ‘dog narratives’ from the last three decades – that is, novels in which 
dogs and human-canine relationships are central to the story. While the novels differ from 
each other in numerous and substantial ways, they share a common trait: a conduciveness to 
the examination of tensions, paradoxes and contradictions inherent to the human-canine bond 
as it exists in Western culture. Each chapter centres on a key motif present in various 
groupings of four of the selected novels: human and canine interspecies communication; the 
socio-cultural categorisation of dogs; and the dual role of the domesticated dog as a device in 
life and literature. Just as Western cultural attitudes, overt and implicit, arise in these dog 
narratives in turn, these dog narratives provide valuable insight into our contradictory 
perceptions and subsequent treatment of dogs bred to serve as companions. Dog narratives 
present us with an opportunity to examine and critique some of the assumptions made about 
dogs – assumptions that result in their paradoxical status in Western culture. While some dog 
narratives reinforce the belief that human language privileges the human species, others 
undermine this claim by privileging canine forms of language and through depicting human 
language as problematic or as overrated as a means of communication. Authors of dog 
narratives utilise conflict stemming from opposing views of dogs’ subject/object 
categorisation in Western culture to challenge the deleterious object status of dogs. Most, if 
not all, dogs depicted in dog narratives are devices to facilitate the conveyance of stories 
primarily concerned with human experiences; nevertheless, authors of dog narratives can and 
do find efficient ways to challenge and question reductive representations of dogs. By 
utilising techniques such as point of view, characterisation and the itinerancy trope, and by 
creatively and effectively imagining their way into the canine mind, many authors of dog 
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narratives bestow a canine identity upon the dogs they depict, which challenges our ability to 
view and treat dogs with detached objectivity and, in doing so, they offer more positive 
representations of the literary canine companion.  
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Introduction 
Genetic evidence suggests Canis familiaris (the domesticated dog) became distinct from 
Canis lupus (wolves) as early as 500,000 BC, while archaeological evidence of dogs living 
alongside humans dates back to 12,000 BC (McHugh 200). Hence, dogs have lived alongside 
humans for (at the very least) fourteen thousand years, and consequently they feature 
prolifically in Western cultural narratives such as visual art, books and film. As Susan 
McHugh observes, “Dogs seem unthinkable outside the context of human culture and, what is 
more, culture as we know it has been inseparable from their presence” (19-20). From 
Homer’s early depiction of Odysseus’ loyal and faithful canine companion Argos in The 
Odyssey (800 B.C.E.) through to Eric Knight’s classic novel Lassie Come-Home (1938), and 
the abundance of fictional narratives focussing on canine characters that have emerged in the 
early twenty-first century, authors have utilised the character and charisma of domesticated 
dogs to embellish stories about human beings. They are, as Erica Fudge writes, “the most 
storied of all pet animals” (10).  
Novels that feature one dog or incorporate a few dogs as central characters could be 
said to belong a sub-genre of fiction that Laura Brown calls the “Dog Narrative” (113). There 
are many famous dog narratives, such as Jack London’s 1903 The Call of the Wild, which is a 
story about a sled dog named Buck; Richard Adams’ 2006 The Plague Dogs, the tale of two 
escaped ‘laboratory dogs’, and Jon Katz’s 2011 Rose in a Storm: A Novel, which is about the 
tribulations of a loyal working farm dog. These works share a number of key traits; primarily, 
a canine character is central to the narrative and, secondly, the dogs are depicted as having a 
‘role’: as sled dog, lab animal and herder, respectively. Of course, one other role that the 
majority of dogs in a Western cultural context perform in life (and literature) is that of the 
‘pet’. The term ‘pet’, while still widely used, is considered by some to be “demeaning” 
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(Herzog 74) and typically associated with a period in which dogs were kept as ‘playthings’, 
‘lapdogs’, and status symbols; since the late twentieth century, therefore, the term 
‘companion animal’ has become more popular in certain discourses as it is thought to 
represent the human-canine relationship in a less trivial, more egalitarian manner (Irvine 57-
8). 
In addition to the roles dogs perform literally and in literature, they often fulfil a more 
practical purpose in novels. Authors of dog narratives often utilise canine characters to 
examine some aspect of human experience: that is, dogs are useful as devices to explore or 
provide insight into human lives. The usefulness of the canine character as a literary device 
can be observed in Fred Gipson’s 1956 illustrated novel Old Yeller. In the story, young 
Travis Coates learns about judgement and acceptance, loving others, loss and sacrifice as a 
direct result of a stray dog entering his life. Another example is Stephen King’s 1981 novel 
Cujo, in which a rabid St Bernard becomes the metaphoric vehicle for delivering a dire 
warning about the consequences of marital infidelity (Williams; Scholtmeijer). A more recent 
example is found in Michelle de Kretser’s 2007 novel The Lost Dog in which character Tom 
Loxley struggles to deal with his mother’s aging and his lack of human connection through 
the lens of searching for his lost dog. In each of these novels, the canine character – Old 
Yeller, Cujo and Tom Loxley’s dog, whose name is not revealed in the novel – acts as a 
device. These dogs are supplementary to the human protagonist and his or her journey.   
While Western dog narratives more often than not focus on the human experience in 
favour of exploring the experiences of being a dog, they also, inevitably, provide insight into 
how humans relate to dogs. Over the last few decades, a growing body of scholars, including 
many from within the academic field of Critical Animal Studies, have critiqued 
representations of nonhuman animals in fiction to gain insight into how these depictions 
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reflect societal attitudes about nonhuman animals, and to ascertain what literary depictions of 
animals might reveal about the animals themselves. Sociologist Nik Taylor explains that 
those who choose a Critical Animal Studies theoretical approach to examining animal 
depictions in literature seek to go beyond the use of animals “simply as analytical tools”, and 
she argues that there is a way to read these texts so that “embodied animals [remain] at the 
forefront” of the analysis (158). Marion Copeland explains that the task of animal-centric 
criticism is to “examine works of literature from the point of view of how animals are treated 
therein, looking to reconstruct the standpoint of the animals in question” (359). The nine 
primary novels selected for analysis in this thesis will be examined by adopting a Critical 
Animal Studies theoretical perspective because this will enable a canine-centric critique, 
meaning that the canine characters will always remain at the forefront of the analysis. 
Reading the novels in this way exposes some of the explicit and implicit assumptions that 
humans make about dogs and reveals the many paradoxes associated with Western society’s 
treatment of the ubiquitous canine companion.   
The novels featured in this thesis are Dean Koontz’s Watchers (1987); Jack 
Ketchum’s Red (1995); Paul Auster’s Timbuktu (1999); Carolyn Parkhurst’s The Dogs of 
Babel (2003); Dan Rhodes’ Timoleon Vieta Come Home: A Sentimental Journey (2003); 
Gerard Donovan’s Julius Winsome (2006); Garth Stein’s The Art of Racing in the Rain 
(2008); Nancy Kress’ Dogs (2008) and David Wroblewski’s The Story of Edgar Sawtelle 
(2008). Each of the three chapters deals with four of the nine novels in various combinations, 
and each chapter centres on a key motif: ‘The Problem of Language’, ‘Dogs as Objects or 
Subjects-of-a-Life’ and ‘The Canine Companion as a Dual Device’. By adopting a canine-
centric perspective – to the extent that is humanly possible – my critique of these dog 
narratives provides insight into the paradoxical ways dogs are positioned and perceived in 
Western culture.  
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The relationship between the lives of dogs in Western societies and Western literary 
depictions of dogs is an important one. As Philip Armstrong points out, “Literary texts testify 
to the shared emotions, moods and thoughts of people in specific historical moments and 
places, as they are influenced by – and as they influence – the surrounding socio-cultural 
forces and systems” (What Animals Mean 4). Just as societal attitudes common to a certain 
time period arise in literature, literature can in turn influence the thoughts and moods of a 
particular population at a specific period in time. One might expect, therefore, the ways in 
which dogs are regarded in various Western societies at various points in history to be 
identifiable in examples of fiction from those contexts, and accordingly, the ways in which 
dogs are represented in fiction should in many ways reflect how they are perceived and 
treated in the societal milieu relevant to those fictions.   
Adopting an animal-centric perspective can be fraught for the novelist as well as the 
critic because the nonhuman mind cannot ever truly be known by a human. Yet, Margo 
DeMello states that “what is important about literary representations of animal minds isn’t 
whether or not they’re accurate; it’s what they reveal about how humans think about animals, 
and what the consequences of that thinking is” (10). In her statement, DeMello places 
emphasis on the ways in which literary depictions can reflect, perpetuate and challenge ideas 
about nonhuman animals and the consequences of the ideas generated. Accordingly, this 
thesis is concerned with what depictions of dogs in Western dog narratives can reveal about 
humanity’s perceptions of dogs and explains how this relates to the consequent treatment of 
humankind’s so-called ‘best friend’.  
Chapter One begins with a brief overview of how humans have come to view 
themselves as superior to other animals through a combination of Western theological, 
philosophical and scientific beliefs. I critique four novels to explore how the perceived ‘lack’ 
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of language is used to disenfranchise dogs. I argue that while some novels reinforce the belief 
that human language privileges the human species, some dog narratives undermine this claim 
by valorising canine forms of language and through depicting human language as overrated 
as a means of communication. The outcome of these polarised viewpoints can mean the 
difference between dogs’ being appreciated for their uniqueness or their being devalued when 
the perceived lack is used as justification.   
In Chapter Two I investigate four novels that reflect either socio-cultural anxieties 
relating to the link between animal cruelty and domestic violence, the relationship between 
animal cruelty and hunting practices, biological engineering and domestic dog attacks. As a 
result of these authors’ exploration of such anxieties, tension over whether domesticated dogs 
should be categorised as property or persons arises. Conflict stems from dogs’ legal 
classification as property or objects on one hand, and their positioning as cherished, valued 
members of human families on the other hand. Authors of dog narratives can utilise this 
conflict to raise questions about dogs’ place in Western culture and problematise the object 
status of dogs.  
In Chapter Three, I analyse depictions of the literary canine companion and his or her 
role as a dual device. Dogs often function as narrative tools to assist with the telling of a 
human story. Furthermore, dogs in dog narratives are often depicted as providing 
companionship to a socially isolated human being, making the canine character a surrogate. 
A canine-centric reading can identify instances where a dog serves as a device and determine 
when such depictions constitute mere instrumentalisation; however, many authors of dog 
narratives resist reductive instrumentalisation of canine characters by extending subjectivity 
to canine protagonists. While arguably most, if not all, dogs in novels are devices in some 
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capacity, employed to help convey stories more concerned with human experiences, authors 
can and do find ways to subvert reductive representations of the literary canine companion.  
In reference to her cultural exploration of the human-canine bond (published as Dog 
Love) Marjorie Garber states that she seeks to answer the question: “What does the [literary] 
emphasis on animals tell us about people” (“Reflection” 74 original emphasis). While this is 
an important and engaging question, my aim is the converse; that is, I wish to explore the 
following questions: What does the literary emphasis on animals tell us about animals and, in 
addition, what does the literary emphasis on animals tell us about people’s perceptions and 
treatment of animals, or more specifically, dogs.  
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Chapter One 
The Problem of Language  
The domesticated dog is an apt species to examine in literary representations because it is a 
species that humans simultaneously accept and reject; dogs are familiar, and yet unfamiliar to 
us. Dogs, writes Karla Armbruster, “are seen as existing on the boundary between nature and 
culture – and of all the domestic animals, they are most often seen as the closest to human 
beings and culture” (353). They adapt well to living with humans and are easily 
anthropomorphised because they display behaviours and express emotions associated with 
humanness, such as joy, sadness, affection and love. They are the animals “considered to be 
most humanlike” in Western culture (Taylor 66). Nevertheless, as nonhumans, they remain 
‘other’ and despite their privileged status, dogs remain subjugated along with all other 
nonhuman animal species. One of the main factors in this subjugation is language: in 
particular, the claim that since dogs cannot speak, they are therefore deficient in comparison 
with humans.  
In discussing dominant anthropocentric attitudes, cultural theorist John Berger states 
that despite the usefulness of the various domesticated animal species, it is the animal’s “lack 
of common language, its silence [that] guarantees its distance, its distinctness, its exclusion, 
from and of man” (4). Certainly, there are many justifications put forward for the 
disenfranchisement of nonhuman animals in Western culture but reasons related to language 
are one of the most common. Yet not everyone agrees. Stanley Coren, psychologist and 
author of How to Speak Dog: Mastering the Art of Dog-Human Communication (2000) is one 
of many scholars who reject the proposition that human language is essential for human-
canine interspecies communication; rather than devalue dogs for their inability to form words 
he places the onus on humans to learn the language of dogs (11). Coren believes that dogs 
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have a unique vocabulary in addition to being able to participate in some aspects of human 
language; he believes effective interspecies communication is possible if humans can meet 
dogs halfway. If Coren is correct, then only by doing so will we realise, as Orhan Pamuk 
writes, that “[d]ogs do speak, but only to those who know how to listen” (11).  
In this chapter, I focus on Dean Koontz’s Watchers (1987); Garth Stein’s The Art of 
Racing in the Rain (2008); Carolyn Parkhurst’s The Dogs of Babel (2003) and David 
Wroblewski’s The Story of Edgar Sawtelle (2008) to illustrate how these dog narratives 
approach the topic of language and its effect on interspecies communication. I argue that 
Koontz reinforces notions of human exceptionalism by privileging human language and 
undervaluing dogs’ unique mode of speech and communication, and by implying that 
‘ordinary’ dogs are dumb. Stein, on the other hand, effectively imagines his way into the 
canine mind and his canine protagonist’s point of view often disrupts and challenges 
complacency about human superiority; however, his narrative also ultimately reinforces 
anthropocentric assumptions. Critique of the novels by Parkhurst and Wroblewski shows how 
authors of dog narratives can effectively challenge the assumption that dogs are deficient 
communicators simply because they lack the capacity for human speech.   
The term ‘language’ typically refers to the spoken and written forms of 
communication used by human beings to communicate amongst ourselves. Humans also use 
non-verbal forms of communication such as gestures to communicate but our physiology and 
brain capacity means that we tend to claim the status as the only animal to use language. In 
the nineteenth century, American author and abolitionist Harriet Beecher Stowe argued (in an 
article she entitled “The Rights of Dumb Animals” published in an 1869 edition of the 
magazine Our Dumb Animals) that because nonhuman animals could not speak or write and 
had no hope of being taught these skills, they were not part of the linguistic community 
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(Pearson 93-4).1 However, her position drew criticism from an anonymous reader who 
rejected Stowe’s claim that nonhuman animals were dumb. The reader asks, “Is there no 
language but that made up of vowels and consonants, and uttered by vocal organs?” (Pearson 
92). The fact that the standard definition of language is so narrow and excludes nonverbal and 
non-written forms of communication – and in the process excludes all animals except for 
humans from the pool of language users – is as problematic for me as it was for Stowe’s 
anonymous reader over a century ago. Nonhuman animals, or more specifically dogs, do 
participate in communication involving human language, evident in their ability to respond to 
verbal commands. In addition, they use barks, whines and growls along with tail, ear and eye 
signals that constitute a species-specific “system of communication” of their own (Fudge 52-
3). Accordingly, unless prefaced with the word ‘human’, the term ‘language’ in this chapter 
refers to non-species-specific forms of communication: spoken, written and nonverbal alike.   
Dean Koontz’s novel Watchers reproduces many prejudices that modern Western 
culture harbours towards ‘ordinary’ nonhuman animals because they cannot produce human 
language. The story follows Travis Cornell, a 36 year old ex-Delta Force member who 
encounters ‘33-9’– a dog so named because of an identification tattooed in his ear. The dog is 
considered to be more intelligent than the ‘average’ dog because, while he does not speak 
words, he has been genetically engineered to produce human language. When Travis finds 
the retriever in the forest he is unaware that the dog has escaped from Banodyne Laboratories 
where he is the focus of the Francis Project, named after Saint Francis of Assisi who 
according to some traditions was able to speak to, and be understood by, nonhuman animals. 
                                                                 
1
 By contrast, toward the end of the nineteenth century, H. G Wells, author of The Island of Doctor Moreau 
(1896), certainly believed that, as reflected in simian language acquisition research, humans were not the only 
animal species to communicate using language (McLean 43).  
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The Project is explained in the novel as aiming to make “human-animal communication 
possible” (Koontz 278). Koontz writes:  
The idea was to apply the very latest knowledge in genetic engineering to the creation 
of animals with a much higher order of intelligence, animals capable of nearly 
human-level of thought, animals with whom we might be able to communicate. (278) 
Key assumptions about nonhuman animals, language and communication are revealed 
through the project’s aim. There is no indication that these attitudes are being presented at all 
ironically; instead, Koontz unproblematically stereotypes ‘ordinary’ dogs as being ‘dumb’ by 
comparing them to Einstein and by implying that humans do not already communicate with 
‘ordinary’ dogs. Through privileging the genetically engineered dog, Koontz diminishes the 
capacities of ‘average’ dogs to participate successfully in communication with human beings 
and casts them as being something more like Descartes’ sixteenth century ‘automata’.  
Sometimes regarded as the “father of modern philosophy” (Bracken 1), philosopher 
and mathematician René Descartes was, and in many ways remains, a powerful figure in 
Western culture. Descartes’ work relating to rationalism, which valorises the human mind as 
the source of all knowledge, his views on the soul, and his concept of the mind-body dualism, 
have been widely influential. While the traditional concept of the mind/body split predates 
Descartes, he reinforced it by describing it in terms of rationalism (Taylor 142). In regards to 
the impact that Cartesian doctrines have had on nonhuman animals, it is arguably Descartes’ 
automata theory, which casts nonhuman animals as ‘simple machines’ incapable of rational 
thought that has had long-lasting and detrimental impact. This, coupled with his affirmation 
of the Christian belief that souls are specific to humans and thus denied to nonhuman 
animals, made Descartes an authority on the ways Western society perceives, values and 
treats nonhuman animals.    
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Before and after Descartes’ era, the opinion that nonhuman animals are ‘dumb’ 
because they cannot speak or write words, and links between speechlessness and stupidity, 
were common. One way in which this prejudice manifests relates to the hearing impaired. In 
“Speaking Bodies, Speaking Minds: Animals, Language and History”, Susan Pearson states: 
“[T]he deaf were the original ‘dumb’ creatures” (100) – that is, at least until the early 
nineteenth-century when debates between deaf educators saw factions divided between those 
called oralists, who privileged verbal language, and those called manualists, who promoted 
sign language as the superior method for teaching the deaf to communicate (101). In many 
ways, the debates between those who privilege the spoken word and those who privilege 
gesture as means to communicate are relevant to the conceptualisation of the human-
nonhuman animal divide. This is because the associations of spoken and gestural forms of 
language are also linked with ideas about nature and culture.  
Debates over whether spoken or gestural forms of communication are superior are 
well-established and ongoing. The belief that gestures as a form of expression are inferior or 
less sophisticated than spoken or written language has largely to do with the assumed 
connection between the former with nature, and the latter with culture. In discussing 
American attitudes in the nineteenth-century, Pearson explains: 
[T]he difference between expression and language was the difference between the 
natural and the conventional. Expression was natural and corporeal – it was the facial 
expressions, the gestures, the grunts, and the groans the body gives forth. Language, 
on the other hand, was conventional and came not from nature or the body, but from 
the mind and human culture. (93)  
Hence, the association of human language with culture also led to a belief that nonverbal 
forms of communications were more primitive or less sophisticated. This paradox between 
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nature and culture is another example of the ways authors reinforce the anthropocentrically 
driven concept of the mind/body split.  
Issues relating to gesture and spoken forms of communication can be observed at play 
in Koontz’s novel. In the beginning, when the human and canine protagonists first meet, 
Travis is unaware of the retriever’s ability to produce human language. The dog cannot 
generate spoken works using his voice box but he can read and spell human words. 
Additionally, whereas real dogs have an impressive but limited vocabulary of words that they 
can understand, 33-9 understands almost every word that is spoken to him and fully 
comprehends their meaning in the context. However, until the dog can access props that 
enable him to spell out words, his presentation is that of a common domesticated dog. When 
33-9 appears in the clearing, he is, unbeknown to Travis, being hunted by another escaped 
trans-genetic animal Koontz calls ‘The Outsider’. Travis logically assumes that the scruffy 
anxious dog he finds in the forest is therefore an ‘average’, ‘ordinary’ dog.  
Since no props are available for the dog to use to communicate using words, Travis, 
like the readers, are initially unaware of the dog’s extraordinary linguistic abilities. Therefore, 
along with Travis, they must attempt to interpret the dog’s gestures, vocalisations and general 
behaviour to determine his character and intention. The conversation begins with Travis 
asking the dog a series of rhetorical questions. “‘Surely you’re not a wild dog – are you, 
boy?’ The retriever chuffed...‘Not lost, are you?’ It nuzzled his hand” ... ‘Looks like you’ve 
had a difficult journey, boy.’ The dog whined softly, as if agreeing with what Travis has said” 
(Koontz 8). Even though the dog’s vocalisations and gestures occur immediately after each 
question or comment, Travis overlooks the chuff, hand nudge and whine, presuming them to 
be meaningless.  
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As Travis continues to misinterpret the dog’s attempts to communicate using gestures 
and vocalisations the dog grows increasingly anxious. However, before leaving the clearing, 
the dog decides to warn Travis that he is in imminent danger. Koontz writes:  
‘On your way now.’   
[Travis]...gave the retriever a light slap on its side, rose, and stretched. The dog 
remained in front of him. He stepped past it,2 heading for the narrow path that 
descended into darkness. The dog bolted around him and blocked the deer trail.  
‘Move along, boy.’ 
The retriever bared its teeth and growled low in its throat. (8)  
The retriever continues to block Travis’ attempts to exit the clearing down the same path in 
which the threat approaches, by biting, growling, snapping and lunging. Travis is confused by 
the dog’s behaviour, which alternates between seemingly friendly and aggressive. When the 
dog reverts from acting aggressively “to a friendly mood”, and licks Travis’ hand, he calls the 
dog “schizophrenic” (11). This is clearly a reference to the reductive stereotype of those 
diagnosed as schizophrenics who are perceived to oscillate between ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ 
behaviours making them seem irrational and erratic, passive some of the time and 
unpredictable and dangerous at other times. When Travis pauses to analyse the dog’s 
behaviour, he finally recognises there is intention. Koontz writes: 
The dog returned to the other end of the clearing. It stood with its back to him, staring 
down the deer trail...The muscles in its back and haunches were visibly tensed as if it 
were preparing to move fast.  
‘What are you looking at?’  
                                                                 
2
 It is important to note Koontz’s use of the word ‘it’ in place of ‘the dog’ or ‘him’. Not using the pronoun to 
describe nonhuman animals is objectifying and also serves to reinforce the human -animal divide.  
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Travis was suddenly aware that the dog was not fascinated by the trail itself but, 
perhaps, by something on the trail. (11) 
Once Travis heeds 33-9’s gestures and vocalisations he is able to extract the meaning of the 
dog’s behaviour. Fortunately, despite the earlier dismissal of the dog’s behaviour as bizarre, 
erratic and meaningless, 33-9 is able to utilise vocalisations and gestures to provide Travis 
with enough forewarning to save his life.  
Travis’ suspicion that the dog is different is expressed through a comparison between 
33-9 and ‘ordinary’ dogs and the comparison entails the assumption that dogs are typically 
dumb. The first example of this occurs in the car, after the pair escapes from The Outsider 
and Travis decides to take the retriever home with him. During the car ride, Travis speculates 
about the dog’s origin. He senses something unusual about the animal. There is a certain look 
in the dog’s eyes: “they seemed somehow more expressive than a dog’s eyes usually were, 
more intelligent and aware” (Koontz 26). When Travis mentions the location of a peanut bar 
in the car, the dog promptly opens the glove compartment to remove it with his teeth. Travis 
takes this as evidence of extraordinary canine intelligence but in reality, of course, this is well 
within the capability of actual dogs. Their powerful sense of smell sees them used in 
numerous human service roles such as detecting cadavers, illegal drugs, unexploded 
landmines and biological hazards for customs and quarantine. Indeed, dogs’ incredible 
olfactory capacities enable them to detect cancer in the human body (Willis et al). In 
communication between dogs, the canine capacity for scent is crucial (Coren 184-5). Hence, 
any animal belonging to a species that can detect cadavers, illegal drugs, unexploded 
landmines, biological hazards and even cancer by scent would not have to be told there is a 
candy bar in the glove box right in front of his nose.  
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Travis’ suspicion that the retriever is ‘special’ continues once he reaches home and 
his assumption that dogs are ordinarily dumb persists. After announcing his intention to bath 
the dog, Travis observes: “The retriever turned towards him and cocked its head and 
appeared to listen when he spoke. But it did not look like one of those smart dogs in the 
movies. It did not look as if it understood him. It just looked dumb” (Koontz 52).  Then, 
when Travis briefly exits the room and returns to discover the dog has turned the water faucet 
on, he is, in this case justifiably, astonished (52). The sequence of events that leads Travis to 
consider 33-9 more intelligent than other dogs culminates when he announces his intention to 
give the dog a name. The retriever sits up attentively, as if in anticipation of his naming. 
Travis correctly interprets this response but then reconsiders: 
God in heaven...I’m attributing human intentions to him. He’s a mutt, special maybe 
but still only a mutt. He may look as if he’s waiting to hear what he’ll be called, but 
he sure as hell doesn’t understand English. (56)  
In all likelihood, although we cannot know for sure, it is beyond the capacity of dogs to 
interpret such a statement, although they are capable of various modes of complex thought. 
Nevertheless, this passage does reveal something about the way humans view dogs. Travis 
believes he is anthropomorphising 33-9, which means attributing to 33-9 human-specific 
behaviours, in this case, the ability to interpret and comprehend the meaning and context of 
information presented in words. To attribute the capacity for reason to the dog would, of 
course, conflict with Descartes’ rationalism, which erroneously posits the ability to reason as 
a human-specific trait. Notably, research shows that many nonhuman animals have the 
capacity for reason and are self-aware, including primates (Byrne), parrots (Pepperberg), 
chimpanzees, dolphins, elephants and magpies (Broom). Nevertheless, Travis’ reluctance to 
attribute the capacity for reason to the dog reflects the influence of social discourses that 
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construct dogs, as well as most other nonhuman animals, as inferior, simple, stupid and 
irrational.  
Still unaware of the dog’s ability to produce human language, but impressed by what 
he has seen thus far, Travis chooses to name the retriever ‘Einstein’, in reference to the man 
often considered to be the greatest intellectual figure in Western history. Einstein goes on to 
perform many tasks during his first night at Travis’ house that in reality are called ‘tricks’, 
actions that could reasonably be expected of any dog with appropriate motivation or training. 
For example, he retrieves beer from the fridge. What transpires to differentiate Einstein from 
other dogs, in Travis’ view, is that he seems to be self-aware, or possess consciousness: 
another trait long considered as being human-specific. Travis suspects that Einstein is using 
deception by pretending to be less intelligent that he actually is. Koontz writes:   
Dogs – all animals, in fact – simply did not possess the high degree of self-awareness 
required to analyze themselves in comparison to others of their kind. Comparative 
analysis was strictly a human quality... To assume this dog was, in fact, aware of such 
things was to credit it not only with remarkable intelligence but with a capacity for 
reason and logic, and with a facility for rational judgement superior to the instinct that 
ruled the decisions of all other animals. (66)  
In this passage, Descartes’ famous rationalist proposition is implicitly invoked: “I think 
therefore I am” (Descartes 18-19). This dictum, advanced in the same treatise that goes on to 
deny ‘mind’ to nonhuman animals, is reflected in Travis’ explanation of nonhuman animal 
consciousness because he is envisaging self-reflection and asserting that ‘ordinary’ dogs lack 
self-awareness. Thus, it is not so much the ‘tricks’ that Einstein performs that impresses 
Travis, but the idea that a nonhuman animal, in this case a domesticated dog, might share 
what is thought to be the human-specific capacity for reason and self-reflection. 
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Travis devotes considerable time to pondering how much an ‘average’ dog does or 
does not know, can or cannot comprehend in matters of language and communication. During 
the first evening at Travis’ home, he observes that Einstein shows an interest in his bookshelf 
and appears to intentionally withdraw selected books from the shelves. Travis, again, 
attempts to rationalise Einstein’s behaviour by drawing on what he thinks he knows about 
dogs:  
Surely, [the dog] could not understand the synopses [Travis] provided. Yet it seemed 
to listen raptly as he spoke. He knew he must be misinterpreting essentially 
meaningless animal behaviour, attributing complex intentions to the dog when it had 
none. (Koontz 68)  
This sequence in Koontz’s novel has the effect of denying real dogs – in contrast to the 
literate Einstein – the capacity for complex intentions. Of course, by all reasonable accounts, 
understanding the synopses of books is actually beyond the capability (and probably the 
interest) of actual dogs. At the same time, what is insinuated in this passage is that nonhuman 
animal behaviour must be meaningless if humans cannot understand it. Koontz also reminds 
the reader here that books are products of human culture: sophisticated and specialised 
medium crafted from human language; thus, if animals cannot produce human spoken 
language, then human written language is surely even further beyond their comprehension – 
an even more inaccessible territory of the human ‘mind’.  
Before discovering Einstein’s scientific role as the “most important experimental 
animal in history” (Koontz 354), Travis assumes he has found a regular dog, and therefore a 
‘dumb’ dog.  Notably, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, the term ‘dumb’ is 
defined as “Applied to the lower animals (and, by extension, to inanimate nature) as naturally 
incapable of articulate speech” (“dumb”). This explains why it is so often automatically 
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associated with nonhuman animals as it combines the two meanings of ‘unintelligent’ and 
‘incapable of speech’. Indeed the term ‘dumb’ features repeatedly in Koontz’s novel in 
reference to ‘average’ dogs. In one passage, Einstein is upset by an image of a demon in a 
magazine. Unaware that the image resembles The Outsider, and therefore terrifies Einstein, 
Travis cannot fathom why the dog takes the magazine and places it in the bin. Travis’ 
confusion is apparent when Koontz writes: “Sometimes Einstein exhibited uncanny 
intelligence, but sometimes he behaved like an ordinary dog, and these oscillations between 
canine genius and dopey mutt were enervating for anyone for anyone trying to understand 
how he could be so bright” (265). Suggesting any dog is a just a ‘dopey mutt’ is clearly 
reductive, although in this context, the distinction is primarily being made to elevate 
Einstein’s supposedly superior intellectual status.  
Koontz casts dogs as typically dumb when in order not to be exposed as extraordinary 
Einstein must pretend to be like normal dogs, which in Koontz’s novel means unintelligent. 
In one final example, Koontz explicitly links dogs with dumbness. Travis suspects that 
Einstein fears being recaptured and returned to Banodyne Laboratories where he lived 
unhappily in captivity. This leads Travis to form a hypothesis about Einstein’s inconsistent 
behaviour. He suggests the dog’s fear of being captured “is why he usually plays at being a 
dumb dog in public and reveals his intelligence only in private” (Koontz 304). ‘Playing 
dumb’ here involves Einstein concealing his linguistic abilities. In fact, the ability to deceive 
is another capacity often presented as evidence of a higher intelligence that distinguishes 
humans from other animal species (Searcy and Nowiki). And in reality, dogs routinely 
practise deception, particularly during the complex social activity of play (Irvine 152). As a 
result of Koontz’s approach, Watchers incorporates and introduces many of the basic 
assumptions about animality, humanity and language that novels such as The Art of Racing in 
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the Rain, The Dogs of Babel and The Story of Edgar Sawtelle explore in much more complex 
ways. 
Eventually, Einstein is able to articulate his thoughts in Koontz’s novel with the 
assistance of a spelling device that Travis creates using Scrabble tiles placed in Lucite tubes. 
Articulating a dog’s thoughts in fiction can be achieved through various means, one of which 
is using the conventions of first-person interior monologue to enable the reader to access the 
dog’s thoughts, which are then ordered and expressed in human language. This is the 
approach taken by Garth Stein in The Art of Racing in the Rain. The canine protagonist, 
Enzo, an elderly mixed-breed, tells his life story on the eve of his euthanasia. Unlike Einstein, 
Enzo is a typical dog who does not speak or write in ways that constitute producing human 
language, but in the world of the story, his perspective allows for his thoughts and 
observations to be known to the reader. What a dog thinks or might say if granted the ability 
to use human language cannot ever be known; thus, Stein imagines what he thinks Enzo 
might say and assumes how he might feel. Of course, this form of nonhuman animal 
representation involving a kind of ‘ventriloquism’ constitutes radical anthropomorphism 
(Harel 49), and to this extent it is not an authentic representation of canine reality. However, 
as mentioned in my introduction (in accordance with Margo DeMello’s point about reading 
narratives from an animal standpoint), it is not accuracy or authenticity that necessarily 
matters in regards to analysing animal representations but rather what a novel like Stein’s can 
tell us about how humans perceive dogs, and the consequences of these perceptions.  
Stein’s story is primarily about a human-canine bond: the interspecies relationship 
between a human named Denny Swift and his canine companion. The narrative follows 
Enzo’s life with Denny and then Denny’s partner Eve, and their daughter, Zoe. The novel 
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opens with Enzo, old and incontinent, lying in a pool of urine while lamenting the limitations 
he perceives to impede his ability to communicate with humans. He says:  
Gestures are all that I have; sometimes they must be grand in nature. And while I 
occasionally step over the line...it is what I must do in order to communicate clearly 
and effectively. In order to make my point understood without question. I have no 
words I can rely on because, much to my dismay, my tongue was designed long and 
flat and loose. (Stein 1) 
Enzo believes his struggle to communicate with humans is owing to his vocabulary being 
limited to gestures. He claims that it takes great effort for him to communicate when limited 
to gestures because there is a high risk of misunderstandings. In talking of his long, flat loose 
tongue, Enzo finds his own condition lacking when it is the case that dogs’ tongues are 
perfectly suited for canine needs. Indeed, dogs presumably find their tongues to be extremely 
valuable as the unique design enables them to lap water efficiently from bowls and release 
heat from their bodies via panting (Coren 70). Dogs also use their tongues to communicate in 
complex ways; the withdrawal or exposure of the tongue, and its shape and position in the 
mouth, are integral aspects of dogs’ “gesture-based communication systems” providing visual 
cues to others regarding mood, such as “information about anger, dominance, aggression, 
fear, attention, interest or relaxation” (Coren 84-8). Yet in this passage, Enzo assumes all the 
responsibility for interspecies communication breakdown and blames misunderstandings on 
his own physical ‘limitations’ and his inability to form words.  
Enzo’s sadness and frustration as a result of his inability to speak words lead him to 
desire reincarnation as a man. His knowledge of matters relating to interspecies reincarnation 
derives from a television documentary he once watched. The documentary film that Enzo 
refers to in the novel relates to the 1998 documentary “State of Dogs”, based on a Mongolian 
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legend, which Stein credits as his inspiration for The Art of Racing in the Rain (Stein “Garth 
Stein”). In the film, the spirit of canine protagonist Baasar – who is shot dead by a dog hunter 
at the outset – reflects on his life while transitioning from dog to human form via 
reincarnation. Baasar’s interactions with humans cause him to view them as untrustworthy 
and cruel, therefore undesirable to be; thus, he resists taking the human form. This marks a 
crucial point of difference between the desires of Baasar and Enzo. Enzo eagerly anticipates 
taking on the human form and proudly declares: “When I return to this world, I will be a man. 
I will walk among you. I will lick my lips with my small dextrous tongue. I will shake hands 
with other men, grasping firmly with my opposable thumbs. And I will teach people all that I 
know” (Stein 312). So while Baasar views reincarnation as a human unpleasant, Enzo views 
it as a kind of promotion. He states this explicitly when he lists all the ‘superior’ body parts 
he will acquire through his transformation. 
Reincarnation, or transmigration as it is sometimes called, is a concept of many 
Eastern religions but there is no concept of reincarnation in the ubiquitous Western Judeo-
Christian religion. Within some of the Eastern religious traditions, humans can be 
reincarnated on Earth as another species of animal and it is not thought impossible for a 
nonhuman animal to return to Earth as a human being. The ascension to a ‘higher’ life form 
echoes the teachings of influential Greek philosopher Aristotle. Born in 384 BC, Aristotle 
had a substantial impact on Western cultural attitudes regarding the social and moral status of 
nonhuman animals. He devised the Scala Naturae, or The Great Chain of Being, which is a 
scale that ranks animals and plants according to their apparent intellectual aptitude. On the 
scale, human beings are situated at the pinnacle above other mammals, below which in 
descending order come birds, reptiles, fish, insects, and so forth, concluding with inanimate 
matter at the base. Thus, in contrast to Baasar in “State of Dogs”, Enzo’s desire to end his life 
as a dog and reincarnate as a human aligns more with dominant Western anthropocentric 
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standpoints through the suggestion that there is a system of promotion and demotion at play 
in matters of interspecies reincarnation.  
 Enzo venerates the soul and values his sense of inner-humanness over his canine 
exterior. He states, “I’m stuffed into a dog’s body, but that’s just the shell. It’s what’s inside 
that’s important. The soul. And my soul is very human” (Stein 3). The soul is a pivotal 
feature of Judeo-Christian doctrine – and remained an important feature of Descartes’ 
philosophy – and is usually understood to be a gift from God that only humans possess. Once 
the soul exits the body, it transits to either Heaven or Hell for all eternity.3 The soul’s 
destination is determined by how an individual lives his or her life: Heaven is a reward and 
Hell is a punishment. In Christianity the human soul does not transmigrate because 
reincarnation is not a concept adopted by this religion. Reincarnation would not apply to 
nonhuman animals anyhow since according to orthodox Christianity, and Descartes, they do 
not possess souls.4 Christian and Cartesian doctrines support the assumption that nonhuman 
animals are physically and spiritually less significant than human beings, which reflects 
Enzo’s beliefs about himself in Stein’s novel. Like Descartes, Enzo believes that the soul and 
the ability to produce speech is what makes the human animal exceptional (along with the 
opposable thumb). Thus the Christian belief in the ‘exclusive’ human soul posited alongside 
Cartesian doctrine and echoes of Aristotelian hierarchy all contribute to the idea that it is 
better to be a human than a dog: in Stein’s novel, ironically, this anthropocentric assumption 
is made even more difficult to dispute because it is a dog himself who declares it.  
On the one hand, Enzo’s expressions of inadequacy might lend verisimilitude to his 
claim of inferiority; however, his self-deprecation can also be read as structural irony. This is 
because Enzo can be considered a naïve and unreliable as a narrator. Consider the opening 
                                                                 
3
 However, the Roman Catholic tradition allows for an interim period in Purgatory to do penance for sins.  
4
 Although nowadays, an increasing number of non-mainstream theologians and Christians do believe that 
nonhuman animals do in fact have souls (Camosy 76).  
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passage in which Denny arrives home to find Enzo lying in urine and apologises to him for 
being delayed and arriving home late. Enzo responds to this by thinking:  
I realize that he thinks my accident was because he was late. Oh, no. That’s not how it 
was meant. It’s so hard to communicate because there are so many moving parts. 
There’s presentation and there’s interpretation and they’re so dependent on each other 
it makes things very difficult. I didn’t want him to feel bad about this. (Stein 5)   
Enzo’s concern that his inability to speak words will leave Denny feeling guilty about the 
indoor urination lacks logic because Denny, and presumably the reader, recognises that 
incontinence is involuntary and therefore uncontrollable. The reader knows that there is no 
theory under which an aged and incontinent dog locked alone inside a house could reasonably 
be expected to make it outdoors to urinate, which is an insight that Enzo lacks but that Denny 
and the reader share. The reader, therefore, is encouraged to respond emotionally and 
empathetically to Enzo’s desire to do the ‘right’ thing despite being physically incapable.  
Another incident that exposes Enzo’s naïveté occurs when Denny’s partner, Eve, 
leans down near the dog’s muzzle to place a food bowl on the floor. Enzo explains: “I had 
detected a bad odour, like rotting wood, mushrooms, decay. Wet, soggy, decay. It came from 
her ears and sinuses. There was something in Eve’s head that didn’t belong” (Stein 36). 
Despite having identified Eve’s undiagnosed brain tumour with his remarkable sense of 
smell, Enzo feels that his early detection is pointless if he cannot tell of his discovery. In 
Enzo’s view, the fact that he cannot tell Eve her life is in danger means, as ‘the family’s 
protector’, he has failed. Once again, he laments his perceived physical limitations, saying, 
“Given a facile tongue, I could have warned them. I could have alerted them to her condition 
long before they discovered it with their machines, their computers and super-vision scopes 
that can see inside the human head” (36). Irony once again transpires as a result of Enzo’s 
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sense of inadequacy because he overlooks the incredible skills he possesses that enables him 
to detect the cancer long before humanity’s sophisticated and expensive machines. Readers 
are reminded of dogs’ powerful and acute sense of smell, which in reality can and does detect 
cancer in the human body.  
Stein’s characterisation of Enzo as a naïve narrator continues when the dog is 
accidently abandoned. The progression of Eve’s tumour causes her symptoms including 
nausea, pain and debilitating headaches and, with Denny away in France, she leaves the 
house with her daughter, Zoe, to stay with her parents. Since she forgets to take Enzo, he is 
left locked in the house alone for three days during which time he survives by drinking from 
the toilet bowl. However, when his hunger becomes unbearable on the second night, he 
claims to suffer hallucinations involving a stuffed zebra toy belonging to Zoe. Enzo describes 
watching the zebra come to life, abuse and humiliate the other stuffed toys in Zoe’s bedroom, 
then, he says, “I could take no more and I moved in, teeth bared for attack...” (Stein 53). But 
before he can attack the toy, he claims the zebra rips open its own stitching and pulls the 
stuffing out. When Denny returns home the following day, he is initially furious at Eve for 
leaving Enzo alone. However, his anger shifts to Enzo with the discovery of the destroyed 
toys in Zoe’s bedroom. Enzo explains that Denny, consumed with rage, “reared up and 
roared, and with his great hand, he struck me on the side of the head. I toppled over with a 
yelp, hunkering as close to the ground as possible. ‘Bad dog!’ he bellowed and he raised his 
hand to hit me again” (57). Denny never gets to hear about Enzo’s experience with the 
‘depraved zebra’; meanwhile, readers recognise that the zebra story is fabricated to 
counteract the shame Enzo feels about his ‘bad’ behaviour. Readers also recognise that Enzo 
is a victim here, in the first instance, as a result of being left alone without food, water or 
company for three days and secondly because he is then corporally punished for venting his 
frustrations in a way many dogs would, and do, in a similar situation. Stein’s use of structural 
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irony, via the naïve narrator, enables him to deliver insights to the reader by way of using 
complex point of view, narrative structure and by complicating ideas about human/animal 
distinctions based on assumptions about human uniqueness and language. 
Clearly, we are meant to see that it is humans, not dogs, who are limited in their 
understanding in Stein’s novel. Stein reflects the social reality whereby dogs who do not 
behave in a manner consistent with humans’ expectations are widely pathologised as being 
‘bad’, ‘dysfunctional’ or ‘destructive’. Two useful literary examples of this are memoirs 
about dogs: John Grogan’s Marley & Me: Life and Love with the World's Worst Dog (2005) 
and Milk Teeth: A Memoir of a Woman and Her Dog by Robbie Pfeufer Kahn (2008). Like 
Stein’s fictional Enzo, whom Denny explicitly calls a bad dog, the central canines in these 
non-fiction dog narratives are corporeally punished when normal canine behaviours are 
pathologised as being ‘bad’. Unlike Grogan’s ‘perfect’ childhood dog, Shaun, whom he 
recalls never stole food, was easily trained, obeyed all commands, returned when called, 
never broke or destroyed objects and sat quietly in the car, Marley, a golden Labrador, pulls 
on his lead, chews on foreign objects, barges into people, defecates in the ocean, chews door 
frames and resists training. He is castrated in order to diminish his energetic disposition, but 
to no avail. After John and his wife Jenny begin a family and their second child is born, Jenny 
grows intolerant of Marley’s behaviour. With a toddler and a new born to care for Jenny’s 
postpartum stress worsens and Marley’s ‘bad’ behaviour becomes a target of her frustration. 
John recounts arriving home on one occasion to find Jenny “beating Marley with her 
fists…crying uncontrollably and flailing wildly at him, more like she was pounding a 
kettledrum than imposing a beating, landing glancing blows on his back and shoulders and 
neck” (Grogan 162). Jenny demands that Marley be re-homed but reconsiders after a period 
of time.  
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Another rambunctious Labrador features in a journal-style memoir penned by 
sociologist Robbie Pfeufer Khan. It is immediately clear that Khan has an idealised 
expectation of how her dog Laska should behave and how their relationship together should 
be; but Laska seems determined to undermine that expectation at every turn. Laska can do 
little right as she eats cat faeces, defecates indoors, misses the newspaper when defecating 
indoors, issues bites instead of gentle licks, licks Khan after eating faeces, nips at Khan’s 
heels, chews on shoes, jumps up and tears stockings, dislikes sitting still to be petted and 
bites and snarls when roughly handled or struck on the head. When Khan seeks ‘professional’ 
help from Laska’s breeder, she is told that she should stop Laska jumping up using “an 
approach based on the old-fashioned style of correction” which, Khan explains, involves 
waiting for Laska to jump and then “punch[ing] her on top of the head or kick[ing] her in the 
chest with my knee” (126). Khan’s frustration at Laska’s ‘bad’ behaviour and ‘disrespect for 
authority’ leads her to conclude that her puppy has a genetic predisposition for disobedience. 
Khan’s initial issues with Laska clearly stem from her ignorance of dog behaviour and lack of 
understanding that dogs are not human and do not instinctively know what humans expect of 
them. In most of Khan’s examples, Laska appears to be using bites and jumping to seek 
attention, while chewing interesting objects and eating faeces are typical behaviours for most 
dogs. Like the factual experiences of Marley and Laska, recounted by their frustrated, and at 
times intolerant and abusive guardians, in Stein’s novel, Enzo is punished by his human 
guardian who displays frustration and intolerance at the dog’s behaviour. In Marley and Me, 
Milk Teeth and The Art of Racing in the Rain, normal dog behaviour is labelled ‘bad’ and 
incites physical violence. From the canine-centric perspective enabled by Stein’s 
‘ventriloquism’ of Enzo’s naïve point of view, however, it becomes clear that in each of these 
cases, the dogs are not bad but rather these miscommunications stem from humans’ 
insufficient expertise in interpreting ‘doglish’ – a term used here to refer to the language of 
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dogs, and lack of insight into the nature and experience of ‘dogdom’, meaning the experience 
and condition of being a dog.  
While Denny and Enzo’s relationship is at times marred by misunderstandings, for the 
most part the two have a strong and untroubled relationship. An example of this can be seen 
in the passage when after being struck, Enzo cautiously approaches Denny who apologises 
for hitting Enzo. In response, the dog places his head on Denny’s lap and gazes upwards. 
Denny says, “Sometimes I think you actually understand me” (Stein 61). This is another 
example of structural irony, only on this occasion the naïveté is Denny’s. Enzo and the 
readers know that this particular dog indeed understands Denny since Enzo confirms this at 
the outset when he says, “I might not be able to form words, but I understand them” (7). 
Denny may think that Enzo cannot comprehend him but he still talks to him. When Denny 
speaks out loud, Stein has Enzo reply in gestures (or for the reader’s benefit, in thoughts). 
The proficiency of this kind of non-verbal interspecies communication is demonstrated in the 
passage when Denny helps Enzo up and gently guides the dog until he can stand unassisted. 
To this, Enzo says, “To show him [that I can stand], I rub my muzzle against his thigh” (7).  
This representation of non-verbal interspecies interaction will resonate with many, if not most 
dog ‘owners’, who will have observed similarly subtle gestures being used by dogs as a 
means to communicate with the humans in their lives.  
Human-canine communication occurs most successfully without words at another 
point in Stein’s novel involving an interaction between Enzo and Zoe, who is pre-lingual. 
Having destroyed Zoe’s toys, and being smacked for it, Enzo explains the intricacies of his 
relationship with the toddler, saying, “she trusted me but was afraid when I made faces at her 
that were too expressive and defied what she’d learned from the adult-driven World Order 
that denies animals the process of thought” (Stein 58). While he may not know the specifics 
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of the teachings of the ‘adult-driven World Order’, Enzo is referring to the way in which 
Western religion, philosophy and science have combined over many thousands of years to 
influence the way in which humans view themselves as intelligent and exceptional, and other 
animals as stupid and subsidiary. Enzo knows that humans deny him the capacity to 
understand their world and seems aware that children raised in anthropocentric culture are 
indoctrinated into believing nonhuman animals are ‘dumb’. This assumption is challenged in 
the novel, however, when by way of offering an apology for tearing up her toys, Enzo crawls 
forward on his elbows and positions his muzzle aside Zoe’s leg. He explains, “She waited a 
long time to give me her answer, but she finally gave it. She placed her hand on my head and 
let it rest there...she did touch me, which meant she forgave me for what happened” (58). In 
this instance Enzo’s request for forgiveness and Zoe’s answer are unspoken. Human language 
is redundant as gestures powerfully and proficiently communicate the characters’ emotions. 
This more immediate and mutual communication is, perhaps, only made possible because as 
a child, Zoe is not yet fully integrated into the adult-driven World Order of human language. 
The complex intimate exchange that takes place between Zoe and Enzo demonstrates 
that a dog’s life is not simple or insignificant because of his lack of capacity to produce 
spoken words. While Enzo wants to escape from his dog body and inhabit the human form, 
he is still depicted as a sensitive social being whose experience of being a dog is in various 
ways rich and rewarding. It is significant that after a lifetime of dreaming about reincarnation 
as a man, as he lies dying in Denny’s arms it is not the human world that Enzo’s mind 
wanders to but the “rolling hills covered with the golden grasses” of his birth town (Stein 
315). He suddenly realises that this could be his last chance to embrace the experience of 
being a dog, and he asks rhetorically, “Have I squandered my dogness? Have I forsaken my 
nature for my desires? Have I made a mistake by anticipating my future and shunning my 
present?” (315). However, Enzo’s recognition that being a dog is just as valuable as being a 
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human being, while pleasing, is short-lived and, as a result, Stein’s novel concludes in a 
manner more consistent with dominant anthropocentric Western ideologies. Enzo achieves 
his life-long dream of being reincarnated as a human being and of speaking directly with 
Denny and in the process his regrets over squandering his dogness are promptly forgotten. 
The novel closes many years after Enzo’s death when Denny is introduced to a young speed 
car racing fan. When the boy reveals his name is Enzo, Denny is stuck by a sense of 
familiarity. The long-running ‘problematic’ language barrier as expressed by Enzo the 
narrator throughout the novel is finally overcome as the reader suspects that the human Enzo 
is the canine Enzo reincarnated. To this end, the reader is left believing Enzo and Denny are 
reunited and, even better, they are able to communicate effortlessly as both are now human. 
This idea is further reinforced by the fact that the boy is speaking Italian, which Denny just 
happens to understand. This ending ultimately devalues the experience of dogdom and 
despite the many ways that Stein challenges anthropocentric assumptions of human 
superiority based on language, The Art of Racing in the Rain reinforces in the end the idea 
that being a dog is an inferior experience to being a human.  
Until he is reincarnated as a human and acquires a human voice, Enzo feels stymied 
by his inability to produce human language and thinks that given the appropriate ‘equipment’, 
he could break down the perceived communication barrier between himself and the humans 
in his life. Reincarnation as a human being is a convenient device for novelists to give a dog 
the capacity to breach the species barrier, produce and comprehend human language (Lord 
Dunsany’s 1936 novel My Talks with Dean Spanley is one example) but the mechanism for 
creating talking dogs in Carolyn Parkhurst’s novel The Dogs of Babel is the spiritual’s arch-
enemy, science. Like the scientists of Banodyne Laboratory in Koontz’s Watchers, 
Parkhurst’s protagonist, linguistics professor Paul Iverson, desires to have a dog produce 
human language. Paul sets about teaching his Rhodesian ridgeback, Lorelei, to speak using 
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words after his wife Lexy commits suicide and Lorelei is the only witness. Paul hopes that 
Lorelei will provide him her eyewitness testimony. Unlike Koontz, but more consistently 
than Stein, Parkhurst challenges notions of human exceptionalism and does not privilege 
human language; rather, she portrays human language as being profoundly flawed. In doing 
so, she exposes the unreasonable expectations that humans pose on dogs kept as companion 
animals in regards to the ways in which they are expected to communicate.  
In a manner reminiscent of Enzo’s lament in The Art of Racing in the Rain, in 
Parkhurst’s novel, once again the tongue is considered a failure if it cannot produce words. 
But here, it is a human tongue at fault. Paul’s problems with language began the moment he 
was born: “I became a linguist in part because words have failed me all my life. I was born 
tongue-tied in the most literal sense...I was born with a tongue not meant for speaking” 
(Parkhurst 38). Fortunately for Paul, his tongue-tie is easily remedied with minor surgery; 
however, it is the psychological barriers to communication that go on to cause Paul the most 
grief. The first glimpse into his struggles with language comes when he explains his marriage 
breakdown with ex-wife, Maura. He recounts, “[Maura] spoke so much while saying so little 
that I sometimes felt as if I were drowning in the heavy paste of her words” (21). While 
Maura apparently speaks many words of little consequence, he says of himself, “I had to 
choose my words carefully, because I knew that any one of them, innocuous though they 
seemed to me, might mire me in a nightlong conversation about my motives in uttering them” 
(21-2). Their relationship ends when Paul ceases to engage in conversations with Maura and, 
as a result, he becomes the recipient of her increasingly hostile notes. It is with an impersonal 
note reading, “Fuck you. I’m sick of your fucking notes” that Paul ends the marriage (22). 
Written words substitute for spoken words but neither are sufficient to save this union.   
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Just as Paul’s marriage to Maura is negatively affected by poor communication, so too 
is his marriage to Lexy one year later. The primary source of conflict between them involves 
having children, as Lexy feels that she is not suited to motherhood. When pressed on the 
subject, Lexy responds, “I don’t want to talk about it anymore, okay?” (Parkhurst 104). 
Lexy’s unwillingness or inability to articulate her aversion to having children leads Paul to 
experience confusion, which fuels tension and resentment between them. After Lexy’s death, 
Paul is watching television and recognises Lexy’s voice on a pre-recorded call to a Psychic 
Helpline hosted by Lady Arabelle. He calls the Helpline hoping Lady Arabelle will recall 
speaking with Lexy and might be able to answer some questions and shed some light on her 
unexpected death. Even after Paul is told that the woman he is speaking to is not the same 
woman that Lexy spoke to (rather she is one of hundreds of psychics who work on the 
Helpline) he calls her regularly to talk about Lexy’s death anyway. This demonstrates that for 
Paul, any words spoken about Lexy are better than silence, and he indulges in the words 
knowing that they are purely conjecture.  
While the false words of the psychic bring Paul some solace, it is the eyewitness 
testimony of Lorelei that he believes will truly help him solve the mystery of Lexy’s death. 
Teaching a dog to speak human words might seem futile to a reader who knows this has 
never been done in reality; thus, to lend credibility to the endeavour, Parkhurst has Paul draw 
on three instances where dogs have supposedly been taught to talk. The first case is drawn 
from the sixteenth-century and involves a story about a dog who was surrogated by a woman 
and learnt to speak from her. As the tale goes, the dog was with the woman as she lay dying 
and the dog’s final words to her were, “Without your ear, I have no tongue” (Parkhurst 10). 
This story lends little credibility to Paul’s research because it seems more like a fable or 
myth. It does, however, reinforce the anthropocentric idea that language only matters if it is 
heard and understood by humans.    
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The second example Paul offers to lend credibility to his research involves a 
nineteenth-century Hungarian named Vasil, whose experiments on a litter of Hungarian 
vizsla puppies involved massaging their throats to produce the capacity for human speech. As 
the story goes, Vasil’s experiment resulted in one puppy gaining the ability to speak one word 
and another to gain fluency in a dialect that sounded like French. However, the final and most 
disturbing precedent to Paul’s research involves a vivisectionist named Wendell Hollis, 
whose experiment is outlined in the novel as follows: “Over a period of years, Hollis 
performed surgery on more than a hundred dogs, changing the shape of their palates to make 
them more conducive to the forming of words” (Parkhurst 12). Hollis’ experiments go further 
than merely surgically reconstructing palates. Paul explains that when Hollis’ home 
laboratory was uncovered many of the dogs kept there had incurred horrific facial 
mutilations. A dog named Dog J was Hollis’ only ‘success’ and subsequently, having being 
enabled the capacity to produce words, testified at Hollis’ animal cruelty trial. The dog’s 
testimony resulted in Hollis being convicted and sentenced to prison. Hollis’ experiments to 
make dogs productive participants in human language were not only deemed cruel, but 
backfired on him as in the process of creating a linguistic dog, he provided a witness to attest 
to his crime.  
Paul believes that Hollis’ experiment to make a dog speak human words is a success. 
Indeed, he feels “a sort of kinship” with Hollis, and says, “Whatever the differences in our 
methodologies, we are both driven by the same desire. We both want, more than anything, to 
coax words from the canine throat” (Parkhurst 83). Since Paul has no intention of subjecting 
Lorelei to vivisection, he devises a more humane methodology:   
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It is my proposal to work with Lorelei on a series of experiments designed to help her 
acquire language in whatever ways are possible, given her physical and mental 
capacities. It is my proposal to teach Lorelei to speak. (13)  
Paul’s experiments involve training exercises to teach Lorelei tricks and to play certain 
games. While his project fails to achieve its aim, the process does inadvertently lead Paul to 
discover Lorelei’s capacity as a receptive participant of human language and, more 
importantly, to recognise that she is already a highly skilled, communicative individual.  
In order to determine Lorelei’s potential for human language acquisition Paul begins 
with recording what he knows. Lorelei already engages with human language as a receptive 
participant and readily understands the meaning of many words spoken to her. Until he 
compiles a list, however, Paul does not realise that Lorelei knows around fifty words, 
including her name, certain commands and specific objects, which Paul points out matches 
the vocabulary understood by a thirteen-month-old child. The problem he faces is replicating 
in dogs the point whereby infants progress from being receptive participants to productive 
participants. Again, like the scientists from Banodyne Laboratory in Koontz’s Watchers, Paul 
is interested in the progression from understanding words to comprehension, then the “leap 
from comprehension to speech” (Parkhurst 18). But where Koontz’s novel, by emphasising 
Einstein’s exceptionalism, reinforces assumptions about the ‘dumbness’ of ordinary dogs, 
something different happens in Parkhurst’s text. Although he never does succeed in 
progressing Lorelei to the point of human speech, through the process of researching, Paul 
discovers the unique and complex language that is her own. 
In addition to understanding many words, Paul discovers that Lorelei has a second 
vocabulary. Just as she was once unaware of the existence of human words, it seems Paul has 
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been ignorant of the existence of canine language: or doglish. He makes a remarkable 
discovery:   
I’ve isolated and catalogued six distinct kinds of bark, four different yelps, three 
whines, and two growls. There is, for example, a certain sharp, staccato burst of noise 
she makes only when she has been trying to get my attention when it’s past her 
feeding time, say, or time to go for a walk, and she utters it only when a sustained 
period of sitting at my feet and staring pointedly up at me has failed to elicit a 
response. There is a soft, low growl, almost leisurely in its cadences, that rises from 
deep in her throat when she hears that slam of a car door outside the house, which is 
entirely different from the angry warning growl that precedes a bout of barking in the 
event that the owner of said car has the nerve to walk up the front steps and knock on 
the door. (Parkhurst 82)  
Observing Lorelei reveals the complex ways she communicates and Paul realises that her 
vocabulary is extensive and purposeful. After much practice, he says, “I have reached the 
point where, when Lorelei makes a sound, I know exactly what she means” (82). To this end, 
Paul gets much closer than Travis Cornell or Denny Swift in realising the innate 
communicative capacity of animals. His recognition of Lorelei’s unique capacity for 
language and communication, however, does not prevent him from pursuing his research into 
canine language acquisition.   
Paul’s discovery that Lorelei is a proficient receptor of human language and that she 
has her own unique, complex language does not help him obtain the dog’s testimony. 
Moreover, having come to appreciate Lorelei in a new way, Paul learns that Hollis was not as 
successful in achieving human language acquisition for dogs as he thought. Paul’s research 
leads him to attend a clandestine suburban meeting of Hollis’ disciples, called the Cerberus 
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Society. He is told that Dog J, Hollis’ famous speaking canine, will address the members at 
the event. When Dog J is led out before the crowd, Paul is shocked by the degree of facial 
mutilation the dog has endured. He explains, “His head has been completely reconstructed. 
His snout has been shortened so much that his face looks almost caved in. His jaw has been 
squared and broadened to resemble the shape of a human jaw” (Parkhurst 179). Then when 
Dog J begins to speak, Paul’s hopes of teaching Lorelei to speak words fade. He observes,   
The sound that comes out is unearthly. A cross between a howl and a yelp, the noise 
shapes itself into a string of random vowels and consonants. I’ve never heard a living 
creature make a noise like this before. It’s the saddest thing I’ve ever heard. But it 
isn’t speech. (179-80)  
Paul does not consider the sounds that Dog J produces to be speech but others in the room 
disagree. They listen enraptured as to Dog J makes vocalisations such as “Ayayay”, 
“Kafofwayo”, “Woganowoo” and “Jukaluk” (180). Now confused, Paul narrates, “Everyone 
in that room heard the same garbled noise I heard, and everyone but me interpreted that noise 
as speech. What did they think he was saying, that poor mutilated dog?” (199). His shocked 
reaction to Dog J’s facial mutilation highlights the horrific consequences that befall 
nonhuman animals as a result of our failure to recognise that there are more kinds of 
communication, and different kinds of intelligence other than those privileged by the human 
species.  
Human and canine vocabularies differ in Parkhurst’s novel just as they do in reality, 
but there are also times when humans and dogs share one language. The first instance of this 
occurs in a passage where Lorelei sleeps in her designated place on the floor beside Paul’s 
bed. Feeling sad and anxious about spending the night alone after Lexy’s death, Paul invites 
Lorelei to join him on the bed. Paul describes this moment: 
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‘Come one up, girl. Up. Up.’ I pat the bed. 
This is an unusual request on my part, and I have to repeat it a second time before she 
obeys. She yawns, then stands and stretches, and finally jumps on the bed and settles 
herself next to me. I stroke her fur...She sighs deeply – one of her most human sounds 
– and closes her eyes. (Parkhurst 88)  
Notably, Lorelei does not obey Paul’s first command to break from protocol and climb onto 
the bed because this has not been allowed in the past. Indeed, this passage is a depiction of 
two individuals whose lives had been forever changed as a result of Lexy’s suicide and who 
are both expressing anxiety. Sighing – Lorelei’s most human sound – is often an expression 
of contentment in dogs as well as humans (Coren 71) and Lorelei sighs only once she is close 
to Paul and feeling content. Hence, Parkhurst writes a passage where the greatest degree of 
information about these characters’ states of mind, and the way they are communicating their 
feelings to each other, is achieved in gestures and sounds, not words. Thus, Paul moves 
beyond the anthropocentric assumption that what matters most in interspecies encounters is 
one or both parties’ ability to produce human language.  
There are further examples of overlap between human and canine language in 
Parkhurst’s novel; however, it is not always the dog who is seen to replicate human-
associated gestures and sounds. During the crucial passage in which Paul sits watching the 
telephone psychic infomercial on television, as he realises that the voice on the end of Lady 
Arabelle’s call is his late wife, he says “I lose my legs beneath me...and I make a sound like 
an animal struck” (Parkhurst 112). In this instance, Paul’s shock defies expression in words 
and instead his anguish is represented by a sound. In another example, Paul recalls an 
incident before Lexy’s death when after a serious argument Lexy shuts herself in the 
bathroom. Paul enters to find her sitting naked on the floor. At first she resists his embrace 
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but then submits. Paul narrates, “Her skin was hot to the touch. She let out a guttural sound, 
an animal noise of frustration and resistance. And still I held her fast” (147). In these 
examples, words prove insufficient to express the profound emotions being felt by the human 
characters. In place of words, ‘animalistic’ or non-species-specific vocalisations emerge.   
The same dominant Western cultural attitudes that cast dogs as inferior because they 
cannot produce human language are shown to produce the kind of species prejudice that 
results in the victimisation of Lorelei in Parkhurst’s novel. Paul explains that Lexy found 
Lorelei on her doorstep as a five-month-old puppy. At this time, Lorelei had a neck wound 
that Paul would later come to discover was inflicted by The Cerberus Society before Lorelei 
escaped from their suburban vivisection laboratory. Lorelei, having avoided being the victim 
of vivisection once already as a puppy, attracts the Society’s attention as an adult through 
Paul’s involvement with them. Key members of the group steal her from Paul’s backyard in 
order to enact revenge on him for exposing their illegal activities to the authorities. Paul 
recovers Lorelei but while in the hands of the Cerberus Society, her larynx is surgically 
removed. Paul is devastated because his hopes of teaching Lorelei to speak words are ended 
but also because he has only just discovered her own unique voice. His hopes of obtaining 
her testimony are lost but so too is her ability to vocally communicate with him.  
Jill Morstad keenly observes that The Dogs of Babel “is the story of a silent man and a 
talking dog, and the space they must travel together in an effort to reach understanding” 
(195). While the loss of a unique voice is a tragedy in Parkhurst’s novel, ‘voicelessness’ 
provides the opportunity for David Wroblewski to challenge assumptions regarding who does 
and does not possess a ‘voice’ in his novel, The Story of Edgar Sawtelle. Edgar Sawtelle is a 
boy born mute who lives on farm in Wisconsin where the family business is breeding dogs. 
Wroblewski’s novel suggests that interspecies communication is not necessarily hindered by 
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the lack of linguistic ability and the author does this by employing a human protagonist who 
lacks the capacity for speech. Yet, it is this character with whom the dogs most effectively 
communicate.  
The primary human-canine relationship depicted in the novel is that of Edgar and 
Almondine. Edgar is an only child who bonds instantly with Almondine, a Sawtelle dog who 
lives in the family home. Their bond is established in the passage describing Edgar’s first 
memory of Almondine. Edgar is in his crib when a “muzzle comes hunting” and “tunnels 
beneath his blanket” and Edgar playfully squeezes “the crinkled black nose” (Wroblewski 
46). Wroblewski describes how Almondine’s tail switches side to side as Edgar “tugs the 
blackest whisker on her chin”; she licks his hand gently and he blows air in her face softly 
(46). She then “bows and woofs” before “she smears her tongue across his nose and 
forehead”; Edgar “claps a hand to his face but it’s too late – she’s away, spinning, biting her 
tail” (46). No words are exchanged throughout this interaction and yet Wroblewski describes 
a complex and intricate interspecies encounter that establishes the nature of Edgar and 
Almondine’s speech-free relationship. 
Almondine is one of the few in Edgar’s life to accept him as he is, and local psychic 
Ida Paine is another. Edgar’s parents, Trudy and Gar, are so desperate to find the cause of 
their son’s muteness – a process that sees them consult multiple physicians and subject Edgar 
to many diagnostic tests – that Trudy takes Edgar to Ida’s store and places her baby on the 
counter. Ida answers Trudy’s unspoken question (which one assumes is related to whether 
Edgar will ever speak) with the word, “No” (Wroblewski 38). “Not ever?” Trudy asks, to 
which Ida replies, “He can use his hands” (38). Like Almondine, Ida does not assume that 
Edgar’s communicative capacity is in any way diminished by his inability to speak words.  
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It is because Almondine has no expectations of Edgar that she is able to immediately 
and efficiently communicate with him. After describing Edgar’s first memory of Almondine 
from the human perspective, Wroblewski balances this by having Almondine describe the 
moment she met Edgar. Their introduction occurs when Edgar is brought home from the 
hospital after his birth. Wroblewski writes:  
Faint huffing sounds emanated from the fabric and a delicate pink hand jerked out. 
Five fingers splayed and relaxed and so managed to express a yawn. That would have 
be the first time Almondine saw Edgar’s hands. In a way, that would have been the 
first time Almondine saw him make a sign. (38) 
In this passage, Almondine is attentive to the motion of Edgar’s hands and translates the 
human hand gesture as a yawn rather than await sounds that might, under other 
circumstances, emit from his mouth. For Almondine, Edgar’s vocal silence does not diminish 
his capacity to communicate with her. It merely changes the basis upon which 
communication between them takes place.  
Wroblewski presents Edgar’s bond with Almondine as being more than an 
interspecies relationship: it is a kinship. The basis of this kinship becomes known when 
Edgar is six months old and a stranger named Louisa Wilkes arrives unexpectedly at the 
Sawtelle’s house, having been directed to the property by Ida Paine. It transpires that Louisa 
is the child of deaf parents and a teacher of sign language, and so she initiates a discussion 
with Trudy about Edgar’s muteness. During the conversation she notices Almondine, whose 
expressions Louise says, reminds her of her nephew’s dog, Benny, who, it turns out, is also 
Sawtelle bred. Regarding Benny, Louisa says, “I’ve never seen a dog quite so aware of 
conversation. I could swear he turns towards me when he thinks it is my turn to speak” 
(Wroblewski 46). When Louisa signs to Edgar – who she recognises is mute but not deaf or 
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unintelligent – the nature of Edgar and Almondine’s kinship materialises. Literary reviewer 
Mike Peed identifies it when he writes Edgar is “a boy who, like the family’s dogs, can hear 
but cannot speak” (“The Dog Whisperer” 2008). Until he is taught to sign, Edgar partakes in 
human language as a receptive participant, in precisely the same way as dogs, and thus 
Almondine.    
Just as dogs use species-specific gestures, Edgar creates a distinctive vocabulary of 
his own, although his vocabulary, which is distinct from conventional sign language, makes 
him prone to being misunderstood and, as a consequence, feel alienated. Unlike dogs, he does 
develop to be a productive participant in conversations involving human language; 
nonetheless, his version of sign language is unique. Edgar’s manner of signing is not 
inefficient but it does need to be learned in order to be understood. This is clear in the 
passages involving Edgar and his uncle Claude, who makes little effort to learn Edgar’s signs. 
Edgar does not know Claude prior to his arrival at the farm for a short stay; hence, Claude 
does not know Edgar, or anything about sign language. Edgar teaches his uncle a “couple of 
signs”, which the reader is told, “Claude promptly forgot” (Wroblewski 61). This reveals 
Claude’s disinterest in learning Edgar’s language, which is demonstrated again during a 
discussion in which Claude tells Edgar that one of the stairs in the barn squeaks. When Edgar 
responds by signing that he already knows about the squeaky stair, Claude is not looking at 
him so does not see his sign. These examples show that – like Enzo and pre-lingual Zoe in 
Stein’s novel – Edgar’s difference, that is being mute, positions him outside of the so-called 
‘adult-driven World Order’ as are the Sawtelle (and all other) dogs. In other words, he too is 
the possessor and user of a nonverbal, gesture based communication system that adults, with 
the exception of his mother and father, do not understand. It does not matter that Edgar and 
Claude are members of the same species, or what vocabulary they use, because their attempt 
to communicate fails. Almondine, on the other hand, who is not a human and does not have 
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the capacity to produce human language, understands Edgar better than Claude. She actively 
seeks ways to communicate with Edgar, observes and respects him.   
While Edgar is perceived to be deficient in human spoken language the Sawtelle dogs, 
on the other hand, are perceived to be more proficient than typical dogs in engaging with 
human modes of communication. Sawtelle dogs have supposedly been selectively bred with a 
greater ability to interact with humans on an intellectual level. When talking with Edgar 
about the business of breeding Sawtelle dogs, Trudy asks her son whether he thinks they are 
selling dogs or something more. Edgar does not know the answer until later in the novel, after 
he has run away from home and is observing an interaction between Henry, a Samaritan who 
takes him in, and one of the Sawtelle dogs named Tinder. Edgar attempts to teach Henry how 
to command Tinder to perform guided fetches. At first, Henry’s flawed attempts to use 
command using hand gestures confuses Tinder. When Henry finally masters the skill of 
commanding the dog, Edgar, who is observing, realises the answer to Trudy’s question. The 
Sawtelles are not selling ordinary dogs, but are rather selling dogs with enhanced abilities to 
communicate with humans.  
One example of successful non-verbal communication between human and dog 
occurs in the passage where Edgar patiently instructs Almondine how to descend the stairs in 
the barn without making a sound. Wroblewski writes: 
[Edgar] stepped quickly down to the sixth and fifth and turned back and picked up 
Almondine’s foot and stroked it.  
He tapped the owl-eye.5 Here. 
She stepped down.  
                                                                 
5
 ‘Owl eye’ refers to the knot in the wood.  
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Yes. Good girl. (55) 
Teaching Almondine where to step by utilising her power of observation and memory is no 
extraordinary feat and is within the capability of most dogs. Many dog trainers would likely 
agree that patience, repetition and praise are all that is required to teach a dog most things, 
including the sequence of steps that allow one to silently descend stairs. Human language is 
made redundant here and the assumption that effective and complex communication relies on 
human language is challenged. In this passage, the boy and his dog are able to communicate 
using only gestures at an advanced level without the need for either to produce or 
comprehend human language.     
Since Edgar’s mode of communication is unconventional and, as outlined previously, 
signing is not always recognised to be as sophisticated as spoken word, he represents dogs 
who like him, are marginalised because they have ‘trivialised’ vocabularies. Ron Charles, 
writing for the The Washington Post, chooses the phrase “Terrible Silence” to head his 
review of Wroblewski’s novel, but silence is far from terrible in this novel. As Marion 
Copeland observes, “Edgar’s muteness...allows him to attend to voices other than his own” 
(357-8). Indeed, Wroblewski’s novel, like Parkhurst’s, demonstrates that there is more than 
one kind of voice and the voice is not human specific.   
Authors of dog narratives often incorporate into their novels issues relating to 
language and its effect on interspecies communication. Watchers is a narrative that reflects 
many of the Western cultural prejudices that see nonhuman animals cast as inferior to 
humans. Koontz brands dogs as ‘dopey’ and ‘dumb’ by comparing them to Einstein, who is 
able to produce human language. This diminishes the value of dogs’ unique and exceptional 
species-specific skills and qualities. Stein’s decision to have a dog narrate The Art of Racing 
in the Rain lends verisimilitude to the canine protagonist’s feelings of inferiority, which 
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stems from his inability to speak using words. Read as structural irony, it can be argued that 
Stein effectively undermines notions of human exceptionalism based on the privileging of 
human language. In the end, nevertheless, Western anthropocentric ideologies proposing that 
humans are superior to other animals are ultimately reinforced when Enzo is reincarnated as a 
human and finally achieves his life-long dream of shaking hands with and speaking to Denny.  
In different ways and to various degrees Koontz and Stein reinforce notions of human 
exceptionalism stemming from humans’ ability to communicate using human language. 
Parkhurst and Wroblewski, on the other hand, explicitly challenge human exceptionalism and 
the assumption that dogs are unintelligent in their narratives by highlighting the canine 
species’ ability to communicate successfully with humans using non-linguistic methods. In 
The Dogs of Babel, Parkhurst suggests that human language is flawed, and the efficacy of 
human language is destabilised though the juxtaposition of the plot and subplot. While Paul 
strives to teach Lorelei to speak words, in order to obtain the truth about Lexy’s suicide, 
flashbacks to Paul and Lexy’s marriage show words to be deceptive and unreliable. In a 
horrible irony, Paul’s quest to obtain words from Lorelei results in her larynx being surgically 
removed, which strips her of her own unique voice and the ability to vocalise at all. 
Wroblewski also challenges the veneration of human language in The Story of Edgar 
Sawtelle by employing a protagonist who, like dogs, is perceived to be ‘voiceless’. 
Wroblewski further disrupts assumptions about the importance of spoken words by having 
Edgar – despite his ‘disability’ – emerge as the one who communicates the most successfully 
with dogs in the novel.  
Performing a canine-centric critique of dog narratives can expose some of the key 
dominant discourses that underlie reductive attitudes towards dogs in contemporary Western 
culture. Species prejudice stemming from Western religious and philosophical perspectives 
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often rests upon assumptions that animals other than humans lack an immortal soul, the 
capacity for reason, the capability to produce human language, and a voice with which to 
speak.  Dogs’ limitations as participants in human language results in their marginalisation 
and often fuels misunderstandings that can lead to their victimisation and exposes them to 
violence. Each of these novels raises important questions about the narrow definition of 
‘language’ and they offer us the opportunity to question the prevailing prejudices that humans 
impose on dogs and other nonhuman animal species who do not communicate using spoken 
or written words. Importantly, novels incorporating dogs as characters can help us recognise 
that there are voices other than those of humanity. 
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Chapter Two 
Dogs as Objects or Subjects-of-a-Life  
As outlined in Chapter One, a perceived division exists between humans and other animals 
that has been created and fortified by influential ideas stemming from Classical Western 
philosophy and reinforced by subsequent discourses such as Christianity and Cartesianism. 
Dogs – along with all other nonhuman animal species – have been denied souls, sensibility 
and intelligence, attributes that are uniquely associated with humans and notions of 
personhood.6 Nonhuman animals are not typically considered to be persons and are 
positioned instead under antonymic categories like ‘things’, ‘property’ and ‘objects’.7 Or to 
borrow a phrase from author J. M Coetzee’s pro-animal protagonist Elizabeth Costello: “man 
is godlike, animals thinglike” (23). Contrary to common belief, the word ‘person’ does not 
mean human, and actually derives from persona and means “a mask” or character (Midgley 
53). Mary Midgley summarises German philosopher Immanuel Kant’s definition of what 
constitutes a ‘person’: “It is the idea of a rational being, capable of choice and therefore 
endowed with dignity, worthy of respect, having rights; one that must be regarded always as 
an end in itself, not only as a means to the ends of others” (54).8 While Kant does not exclude 
nonhuman animals from this definition, the fact they are still deemed to lack valued forms of 
intelligence such as rationality implicitly excludes them from being granted personhood.  
Midgley, however, argues that certain species of nonhuman animals should not be 
denied personhood simply because of any particular feature they lack; rather they should be 
                                                                 
6
 For further discussion of nonhuman animals as nonpersons, see Mary Midgley’s essay “Persons and Non-
Persons” in Singer, Peter, ed. In Defense of Animals. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1985. 52-62. 
7
 Midgley also explains that historically, women and slaves were denied personhood (52), which was crucial in 
the oppression, and social and legal disenfranchisement of these individuals who like nonhuman animals, are 
classed as ‘others’.   
8
 Ethologist Marc Bekoff points out that while many nonhuman animals meet the definition of ‘person’ but are 
nevertheless denied personhood, many humans (such as those who suffer “major losses of locomotor,  cognitive 
and physiological functions”) remain classified as persons even after they no longer fit the definition (14).  
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viewed as persons because “they are highly sensitive social beings” (62).9 To counter the 
view that nonhuman animals are objects, American animal rights philosopher Tom Regan 
argues that nonhuman animals of many species fulfil the definition of what he terms ‘the 
subject-of-a-life’. In his 1983 book, The Case for Animal Rights, Regan explains that the 
subject-of-a-life category applies to any animal who has  
beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future,10 including their 
own future; an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference 
and welfare interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; 
a psychophysical identity over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their 
experiential life fares well or ill for them, logically independently of their utility for 
others and logically independently of their being the object of anyone else’s interests. 
(243) 
Animals who fulfil these criteria have, he states, “a distinctive kind of value – inherent value 
– and are not to be viewed or treated as mere receptacles” (Regan 243). It is because of their 
inherent value that such animals are worthy of moral consideration and consequently humans 
have a moral duty not to act cruelly towards them (Regan 195). When referring throughout 
this chapter to the way novelists represent dogs as ‘persons’, I am therefore using the term in 
accordance both with Midgley’s assertion that nonhuman animals are highly sensitive social 
beings, and with Regan’s definition of the subject-of-a-life.  
Many would agree that dogs are social, sensitive beings with rich emotional lives, 
desires, goals and interests independent of their usefulness to others (Bekoff; Dawkins; 
Horowitz; Coren; Garber). Yet despite occupying a privileged position in human hearts and 
                                                                 
9
 I would argue that even sensitive solitary animals can fulfil the criteria of personhood. 
10
 Or had these capacities at one time in the case of long-term or permanent memory loss resulting from disease 
or injury, one might presume.  
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homes, dogs remain, to varying degrees, outcasts of human society. While they are 
sometimes thought to possess traits typically associated with humans, such as feelings, 
intelligence and agency, dogs are often adopted then abandoned, welcomed then rejected, 
cherished and mistreated en masse (Palmer 570). Susan McHugh explains, “The dangers for 
contemporary dogs are real: destroyed by the millions every year as unwanted pets, strays 
and research subjects, domesticated dogs bear the double-bind of sharing many of the 
maladies as well as the joys of living the so-called good life...” (9). McHugh suggests that it 
is through these “lived contradictions” that Western humanity’s “conflicting attitudes towards 
dogs” becomes visible (9). The double-bind that produces this paradoxical treatment of dogs 
in Western society is both reflected and interrogated in many works of popular fiction, 
especially the genre I have been calling ‘dog narratives’. Such novels often represent the 
most negative aspect of the double bind by incorporating depictions of animal abuse.  
Various forms of animal abuse ranging from violence through to neglect are central 
motifs in four of the narratives examined in this thesis: Jack Ketchum’s Red (1995), Gerard 
Donovan’s Julius Winsome (2006), Nancy Kress’ Dogs (2008) and Dan Rhodes’ Timoleon 
Vieta Come Home: A Sentimental Journey (2003). Via their inclusion of depictions of animal 
abuse, these novels raise questions regarding the paradoxical way dogs are categorised in 
Western culture. In raising these questions, these narratives challenge the view that dogs are 
‘things’ or ‘objects’ by finding literary ways of presenting accounts of dogdom, and thereby 
allowing the reader to visit the grim social realities of many dogs living in contemporary 
Western culture. These texts offer representations of the negative aspects of being a dog bred 
for the purposes of providing humans with companionship and, as a result, they expose the 
consequences of the conflict between dualistic views of dogs; that is, when dogs are 
considered objects or property by some and sensitive social beings by others.  
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The canine companion at the centre of Ketchum’s novel, an elderly crossbreed named 
Red, is fatally shot in an apparently random act of violence. Red’s human companion is 67-
year-old Avery Allan Ludlow, a retired war veteran and widower, who is approached by three 
youths while river-fishing. After a failed attempt to rob Avery, one of the boys shoots Red 
with a shotgun. Ketchum presents Red’s murder and events surrounding it in ways that reveal 
tensions stemming from conflicting attitudes towards dogs as they exist in Western culture, 
such as the ways dogs are considered to be unique, valuable and significant individuals by 
some, and replaceable possessions by others.    
Ketchum exposes the causes and consequences of paradoxical attitudes towards dogs 
in his novel by focussing explicitly on the social reality linking domestic abuse and animal 
cruelty, and he takes this approach to critique the abuse of power. He begins by revealing 
Red’s killer to be 18-year-old Daniel McCormack, whose temperament and upbringing are 
shown to be contributing factors to his cruel and violent behaviour, not only towards 
nonhuman animals, but also fellow humans. On the day of the shooting, Avery is fishing as 
Red lies in the sun on the riverbank nearby. While Avery is hunting fish, it is clarified that he 
no longer partakes in “blood sports” (Ketchum 16); that is, he is no longer a recreational 
hunter but a subsistence hunter who takes only what is legally allowed and is sufficient to 
feed him and his dog.11 The approach of the amateur hunters is signalled when Avery hears 
them disturbing the peace and detects the smell of gun oil, indicating a poorly swabbed 
firearm. When the boys appear, Avery notices that one, later revealed to be Daniel, is wearing 
a t-shirt brandishing a sexist image and the slogan “STOLEN FROM MABEL’S 
                                                                 
11
 Of course fishing cannot in reality be isolated from other forms of hunting as this recreational pastime is just 
as brutal as hunting with guns (Gadenne 67-8). Furthermore, fish feel pain and can suffer (Braithwaite). 
Ketchum deliberately distinguishes Avery’s hunting practice from Daniel’s when he cla rifies that Avery is 
subsistence hunting whereas hunting for fun or entertainment is particularly cruel. He equates recognition of this 
distinction with maturity and wisdom and most importantly, with respect for nonhuman animal life.  
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WHOREHOUSE”, and has a shotgun recklessly “slung over his shoulder like it was a stick or 
a bat, not a firearm” (17-18). This passage clearly hints that Daniel has no respect for either 
women or weapons.   
Ketchum develops Daniel’s characterisation as a social deviant and it becomes clear 
that Daniel also lacks respect for his elders and nonhuman animals. After a brief, seemingly 
polite conversation about Avery’s daily catch, Daniel asks about Red. Avery tells the boys 
that Red is about thirteen or fourteen years old and friendly. One of the boys, named Pete, 
then rudely remarks, “Raggedy old fella” (Ketchum 19). Ketchum writes: Avery “had 
nothing to say to that. He didn’t much like the boy’s tone, though. He gathered that the boy 
didn’t have much use for animals” (19). Although friendly, Red growls when Daniel orders 
Avery to hand over his wallet and flicks off the gun’s safety catch. Since Avery’s wallet is in 
his car, the boys take his keys, but before they leave, Daniel asks for the dog’s name. Avery 
says “Red” and Ketchum writes:  
The boy took a deep breath and blew it out and seemed calmer and the old man 
thought it was possible that the storm in the boy was passing though he didn’t 
understand why that should be with just the knowing of a name and then the boy 
whirled and the dog was getting up out of his crouch, so much slower that he would 
have just a year ago when he was only that much younger, sensing something beyond 
the old man’s staying hand or his power over events and the boy took one step 
towards him and the shotgun tore deep through the peace of the river...there wasn’t 
even a yelp or a cry because the top of the dog’s head wasn’t there anymore nor the 
quick brown eyes nor the cat-scarred nose, all of them blasted into the bush behind 
the dog like a sudden rain of familiar flesh, the very look of the dog a sudden 
memory. (23)  
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Having shot Red for no apparent reason, the boys cruelly laugh and shout, “Red!”, “He’s red 
now!” (23). Ketchum writes: “The old man stood there stunned. Why? He thought. Dear god 
[sic], why?” (23).  
As the novel progresses the circumstances leading up to this incident are unravelled 
and the paradoxical reactions of the town citizens to the crime are exposed. Ketchum reveals 
that Daniel McCormack’s ability to perpetrate such a violent act of animal cruelty is a 
symptom of the socio-cultural conditions in which he was raised and now lives. His lack of 
compassion towards others is presented as a consequence of his home life and the attitudes of 
the culture within which he belongs. Avery discovers that Daniel is the teenage son of 
Michael D. McCormack, a local wealthy property developer and that Daniel’s domestic 
situation is one defined by power relations. This is first implied when after the shooting, 
Avery visits the McCormack family home and is met at the door by a maid described as “a 
small young black woman with a withered left hand that was discoloured white from her 
wrist to the knuckles” – a detail that will become significant a little later in the novel 
(Ketchum 38). Daniel’s father summons his sons to face Avery, who recognises the second 
younger sibling, Harold, as having been present at Red’s shooting. In their father’s presence, 
the boys deny their involvement in the crime but through observing Harold’s body language, 
Avery detects the boy’s fear. Hoping to gain a confession, Avery later follows Harold to talk 
with him alone. During their conversation, Harold is anxious that Daniel might observe them 
talking and says Daniel would be “pretty damn mad if he knew I was talking to you” (110). 
Avery then asks, “He get mad a lot, your brother?” When Harold does not reply, Avery asks, 
“Who are you afraid of, Harold? Your brother? Your father?” to which Harold replies, “Mr 
Ludlow, believe me, you haven’t got a clue” (111). Crucially, before walking away, Harold 
says, “I want you to consider why my father would hire a maid with a crippled hand...Out of 
all the help available around here, my father chooses her” (112). Harold’s comment leads 
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Avery to ponder the values of the people he is dealing with. Ketchum makes it clear that 
Michael McCormack did not hire the woman out of compassion for her disability; rather, 
“[Avery]wondered how often McCormack found some way to remind the woman of her 
withered hand or even how he might choose to go about it. If with regard to McCormack he 
was dealing with the ordinary smug superiority of the rich or whether it was cruelty” (112). 
Avery links the McCormacks’ wealth to their sense of superiority, visible in their abuse of 
others whom they perceive as weak or inferior. Daniel and his father equate wealth with 
dominance and dominance involves the exertion of power. They abuse their power to 
victimise those they consider less valuable and significant than themselves, such as Carla the 
maid, Avery, and Avery’s gentle, elderly canine companion, Red.  
The social link between domestic violence and animal cruelty is reflected in 
Ketchum’s novel through his attention to the ways in which abuse of power is learned and 
modelled.12 Ketchum’s novel is structured around a victim hierarchy whereby Michael 
McCormack exploits Carla and then Daniel mirrors this behaviour through the intimidation 
and bullying of his brother, Harold, his disregard and disrespect for Avery and the murder of 
Avery’s dog. Perhaps inadvertently on Ketchum’s part, the way that abuse is produced and 
replicated in the McCormack family reflects the generational inheritability of reductive 
attitudes about nonhuman animals in Western culture stemming from religious, philosophical 
and scientific discourses that largely centre on distancing nonhuman animals from humans 
and categorising them as property or objects rather than as subjects or persons.  
Companion animals are not considered to be persons in Western legal discourse 
because they are viewed as objects; bred to be sold, purchased traded and ‘owned’. Joan 
Dunayer explains: “Under the law, ‘persons’ are rights-holders whereas ‘animals’ are not” 
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 For comprehensive studies on the link between domestic violence and animal cruelty see Gullone (2012).   
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(171). Of course, Homo sapiens are taxonomically classified as animals but legal discourse, 
as well as the numerous cultural discourses discussed in Chapter One, reinforces the 
assumption that humans are superior to, and distinct from, nonhuman animal species. So 
instead of being granted individual rights, dogs are legally declared human property; thus, 
despite being adopted into human families and treated as family members, dogs are not 
afforded legal rights as ‘persons’. This means they are often insufficiently protected when 
they are abused (Dunayer 170). It is a crime to shoot and kill a dog for pleasure in Ketchum’s 
fictional world just as it is in many societies with animal welfare legislation; nevertheless, 
Avery feels legally unsupported. He does receive moral support from some members of the 
community, including his employee, Bill Prine, Clarence, an elderly clerk employed by the 
store who sold Daniel ammunition, Sheriff Tom Bridgewater, his friend Emma Siddons and 
journalist Carrie Donnel; nevertheless, the law does not support him. In the novel, Avery’s 
lawyer Sam Berry explains the status quo to his client:  
“First let’s assume your boy is eighteen or over. If not, it’s a matter of juvenile court 
and all they’re going to give him is a slap on the fanny...But let’s assume he is [over 
eighteen years old]. A crime like this would go before a judge in district court under 
title 17, section 1031, cruelty to animals. That carries a mandatory fine of a hundred 
dollars, though, theoretically, a prosecutor could go for more. I say theoretically 
because most prosecutors would be happy with the hundred and some jail time. Under 
the law the most you could ask for in jail and on animal cruelty is three hundred and 
sixty-four days. And practically speaking, no prosecutor in his right mind would 
shoot for more than thirty. Fact is, he’d be hoping like hell to get ten.” (49-50) 
Sam’s explanation shows how the legal devaluation of animal lives is structurally related to, 
and complicit with, the kind of callousness that Daniel shows when he shoots Red. He goes 
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on to say why this is the case: “I’m talking property here, Av. Under the law, an animal’s just 
property. Not only here in Maine but in damn near every state in the Union” (50). Sam 
Berry’s summary of the way that the law fails to take animal cruelty seriously and 
successfully prosecute perpetrators is not limited to the fictional world as Ketchum’s 
summary of the animal cruelty laws in Maine, United States is drawn from the actual 
legislation.13 The legal system’s failure to enact justice for Red’s death is a source of 
frustration for Avery. He puts his faith in the law but is disappointed to learn that the 
Assistant District Attorney has declined to prosecute.  
Avery is left unsupported by the law and he also encounters insensitive attitudes 
among acquaintances. Emma Siddons, for example, suggests Avery should go straight out 
and buy himself a puppy to deal with his loss. Suggesting a person replace a human loved one 
immediately following such a tragic loss would surely be construed as insensitive and yet, it 
is “almost commonplace” to suggest pets are replaced soon after their deaths to accelerate 
emotional healing (Podrazik et al 376), which is clearly a point Ketchum wants to emphasise. 
Emma’s comment reinforces the idea that however much they may be loved, dogs are liable 
to be seen as replaceable objects rather than irreplaceable subjects. Another example is Sam 
Berry who discourages Avery from pursuing a law suit, saying,  “All this time, all this work 
and all this expense for an old mongrel dog you already buried” (Ketchum 51). However, 
Avery clearly does not consider Red to be a worthless mongrel dog.  
Although Red is killed in the novel’s opening pages he has a presence throughout the 
narrative via Avery’s memories of him. Red is remembered as a dog who once slept on a 
floor rug but then decided to sleep on the bed beside Avery after his wife Mary and son Tim’s 
deaths. Avery remembers how Red would pass wind in his sleep and how he seemed to be 
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  See http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/statutes/17/title17sec1031.html 
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dreaming, perhaps “running, chasing, cats or rabbits” or “running next to Mary or Tim” 
(Ketchum 147). Red clearly displays autonomy and shows preference in his choice to sleep in 
one particular location over another. The focus on Red’s dreams suggests that he has an inner 
life, which expresses his subjectivity. Red even maintains a literal presence after his death 
when Avery exhumes the dog’s body to show to the McCormacks. Avery’s determination not 
to allow Red to be disregarded after his death is apparent when, despite having been shot in 
the ear, run off the road into a ditch, bludgeoned and left for dead in the forest by the 
McCormacks, Avery regains consciousness only to stagger back to the McCormacks’ cabin – 
where he had visited earlier to confront the family – to retrieve Red’s body, which he left on 
their porch. Red’s presence in this novel through Avery’s refusal to let his dog’s death pass as 
insignificant contrasts with the many dismissive and reductive attitudes of those people he 
encounters and is testament to depth of his attachment to his canine companion. He rejects 
Red’s categorisation as a disposable, replaceable commodity. 
Avery’s father is one of the few in the novel to believe that Red’s life matters and that 
a dog has intrinsic worth outside of his or her value to humans. Feeling frustrated with the 
dismissive attitudes of those around him and the lack of legal support, Avery visits his father 
in an aged-care facility for advice. When Avery tells his father that his anger and frustration 
has driven him to contemplate taking drastic, unlawful action to avenge Red’s death, his 
father understands. He says, “Hell, blood’s blood. You ever taste an animal’s? It tastes 
exactly like your own does. You tell me why a man’s blood is any better or more precious 
than a dog’s blood” (Ketchum 107). Even though Avery’s father was not Red’s human 
companion, he is able to recognise that Red was not just an object, but a feeling living being 
whose life had meaning and value. More than just being a unique individual who Avery cared 
for, Red is, in Avery’s and his father’s opinions, as worthy of justice as any victim of a 
violent crime. 
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In Ketchum’s novel, therefore, dogdom is depicted as being a state of limbo; that is, 
dogs are situated somewhere between person and property in the eyes of society and this 
leads to conflict between people. In this way, Ketchum’s narrative is comparable with the 
storyline of Gerard Donovan’s novel, Julius Winsome. In Donovan’s narrative, a friendly pit-
bull terrier named Hobbes is shot dead at point blank range by an unidentified hunter. Just as 
Ketchum explores ideas relating to power and abuse in Red, so too does Donovan in Julius 
Winsome; however, whereas Ketchum approaches the topic through the link between the 
abuse of power and animal cruelty, Donovan addresses violence perpetrated against 
nonhuman animals through the lens of hunting culture. Of course, hunting is also the situation 
that brings Avery and Daniel McCormack together in Red – since Daniel is out hunting with 
a shotgun when he comes across Avery fishing. However, issues relating to hunting do not 
dominate the narrative in Red to the degree that they do in Julius Winsome. Hobbes’ human 
guardian, Julius Winsome, lives in a secluded cabin in the woods, in an area in Maine popular 
for hunting bears and deer. Almost forty minutes after hearing a gunshot unusually close by, 
he finds Hobbes “lying in the flowers, bleeding, breathing, but barely” with a fatal shotgun 
wound (Donovan 12). Julius rushes Hobbes to the veterinarian who informs him that the 
gunshot was administered at close range, just inches away. When the veterinarian says, “You 
have to be mighty cruel and then some to pull the trigger on a dog like that” (13), Julius 
realises that Hobbes’ fatal injury was intentionally and maliciously inflicted.  
Like Avery Ludlow in Red, Julius Winsome cannot comprehend why anyone would 
murder a friendly domesticated dog, and like Avery, Julius draws conclusions about the 
character and values of the type of person who would commit such an act. Owing to the 
remote location of his cabin, and the frequency with which hunters use the surrounding 
woods, Julius concludes that the person who murdered Hobbes is a hunter. He determines the 
person to be what reviewer Diane Evans craftily summarises as a “roaming hunter - probably 
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a man, a rifle-carrier, enthuser of Remington slide action and Rifle Association badges, killer 
of bears, deer, birds – and dogs” (52). Therefore, Hobbes’ killer is a person for whom 
violence is commonplace, for whom killing is a hobby and a way of life; a person who has 
the capacity to view nonhuman animals as objects rather than subjects and who enjoys 
dominating nonhuman animals and seeks to kill them for pleasure.14  
The motive for Hobbes’ murder is never revealed but there is the hint of a possible 
motive in the novel: Hobbes is a pit-bull terrier. As discussed earlier in this chapter, 
domesticated dogs under the law are property, and not persons, and the novels of Ketchum 
and Donovan reflect societal attitudes that diminish the value of dogs as subjects-of-a-life. 
The pit bull is one breed, however, whose object status is compounded not only as a result of 
being a dog, but because this particular breed is often despised and demonised. A common 
reaction amongst Western middle-class people to this maligned breed is described by Judy 
Cohen and John Richardson as “Pit Pull Panic”. In their article by the same name, they 
reiterate how pit-bulls are “the archetype of canine evil, predators of the defenseless. 
Unpredictable companions that kill and maim without discretion. Walking horror shows bred 
with an appetite for violence” (citing Verzemnieks 285).15 In order to maintain this negative 
perception of pit bulls, dogs of this breed are often denied personal identities and succumb to 
the demonisation of the entire breed. They become seen as dangerous weapons; as objects, 
rather than as sensitive individuals.  
                                                                 
14
 It is necessary to note that in contrast, some hunters believe that their hunting practices are a way of showing 
respect for nature and state that they view their prey as subjects rather than objects. Eco -feminist Marti Kheel 
discusses this category of hunter, calling one who engages in this form of hunting a “Holistic Hunter” (35-6).  
15
 According to Twining et al, negative perception of pit bulls is quite a recent phenomenon, for between 1890 
to 1948 “pit bulls were very popular dogs to own because they were seen as ‘a good-natured watchdog and 
family pet’” (26).  
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Read in this way, Donovan’s novel is a response to the widespread stigmatisation and 
demonisation of this particular breed. This author subverts the stereotypic notion of the 
menacing pit bull who makes victims of others by positioning Hobbes as the victim of social 
stigma. Donovan’s intentions are revealed in an interview with Dermott Bolger, where he 
explains:  
I lived with a pit bull terrier for five years. A much-maligned breed that does not 
deserve its reputation because the conditions where you hear about them attacking 
people are based on them being chained up or kept in small spaces and made to fight 
with each other. I lived with this dog for five years and it took me five years to learn 
the language of dogs, how dogs relate to you, how they speak to you, and all of that 
went into the novel. (14) 
Firstly, it is significant that Donovan places emphasis on learning the dog’s language in order 
to ensure harmony and efficient interspecies communication. As discussed in Chapter One, a 
lack of understanding of another species’ mechanisms of communication is often the cause of 
problematic interspecies relations, which can lead to violence. Donovan not only advocates 
that humans have a responsibility to learn doglish and relate to dogs in a way that recognises 
and respects the experience of dogdom, but he specifically utilises the socio-cultural anxiety 
arising from a fear of certain dog breeds to challenge assumptions that lead to the 
depersonalisation and persecution of pit bulls in his novel.  
Donovan begins his critique of breed stigmatisation by revealing reductive attitudes 
towards dogs generally before focussing specifically on breed prejudice. Julius uncovers the 
dismissive attitudes aimed at domesticated dogs that permeate his community when he posts 
a public notice to gather information about the shooting. Clearly, not everybody considers the 
wanton killing of a dog worthy of seeking justice because shortly after pinning the notice up, 
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it is defaced with insensitive comments such as “Bye-bye dog” and “So what, one less dog. 
Get over it” (Donovan 22). Such dismissive responses reflect the same indifferent and 
insensitive attitudes that Avery Ludlow experiences in response to the shooting death of his 
dog Red in Ketchum’s novel. Thus, both authors depict a gentle-natured, much-loved and 
well socialised dog who is shot in a random act of violence and, based on those attitudes 
expressed in the novel by members of the respective societies, there is surprisingly little 
sympathy for the dogs or the dogs’ human companions.   
Donovan’s critique of breed prejudice appears to begin in the passage where he 
reveals how Hobbes was acquired as a puppy from the Fort Kent animal shelter for the 
purpose of providing Julius with companionship. It is not surprising that Julius immediately 
identifies with this particular puppy considering that the two – man and dog – share the 
experience of being social outcasts. When Julius sees Hobbes as a puppy in a cage, his female 
companion at the time, Claire, points out “That’s a dangerous breed” (Donovan 89). Julius 
adopts the puppy anyway and Claire, who first suggested Julius acquire a canine companion, 
says, “I’m sorry I suggested anything...Now when I come [to visit] I will be facing a pit bull” 
(89). Julius is also made privy to the stigma associated with this particular dog breed during 
an encounter with a shelter worker. Donovan writes:  
The boy who worked there nodded sadly as if he knew this fellow’s time was up; the 
breed and his size would win no one’s heart or a home to him. He would be put to 
sleep. The boy said he was brought in by a couple who had baby twins and couldn’t 
have him around the house, they were afraid. (52) 
While certain dog breeds, such as the golden retriever, are idealised as the ‘perfect pet’, pit 
bulls exist at the other end of the spectrum. Hillary Twining, Arnold Arluke and Gary 
Patronek, who performed an ethnographic study on this theme, explain that 
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pit bulls have come to be seen as an abomination or disturbance in the natural order – 
an unacceptable threat to the perceived security and stability of the entire community 
and a violation of the almost sacred image of the dog as an amiable cultural hero. (26) 
Donovan builds this prejudice into the structure of his novel by implying that, although 
Hobbes displays no aggressive tendencies and does no harm, he is shot and killed simply 
because he is identifiable as a member of this socially reviled dog breed.  
Just as Ketchum does in Red, Donovan gives his canine character Hobbes personality 
and character even after his death via Julius’ memories of him. Hobbes is remembered as a 
“friendly but punchy little pit-bull terrier” who, Julius says, “always greeted me when I 
returned home” (Donovan 58, 69). He elaborates:  
[H]e ran from his spot in the hot wood-pile, from his walks in the woods, where he 
went for solitude or whatever drives them there, ran to see me after my landscaping 
work, ran to greet me when I was happy, ran to greet me when I was unhappy, ran to 
greet me when I was distracted, vague, thoughtful. (69)  
Furthermore, Julius describes the small pleasures that existed in Hobbes’ life, such as “the 
sound of the truck’s keys...[which] brought him bounding from the woods or scratching to get 
out the door” (57). Julius recalls: “With his head out the window and a breeze in his face as 
we drove along the countryside, he was a dog run through with happiness...” (57). As Julius 
buries his companion’s body, he struggles to “throw that first shovel of clay over his face, to 
see a hole gouged around the body that had so often ran [sic] after toys I’d thrown or shivered 
in dreams on the floor as he ran and barked” (15). Notably, the reference to a dog’s capacity 
to dream is, similarly to Ketchum in Red, used by Donovan to imply the existence of an inner 
life and therefore subjectivity.  
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It is such poignant memories that go some way towards explaining Julius’ extreme 
reaction to Hobbes’ wrongful death. Julius Winsome, like Avery Ludlow in Red, does not 
condone recreational hunting or the wanton killing of socially ‘protected’ companion 
animals, but unlike Avery, who places his faith in the law, Julius bypasses the legal system 
and decides to personally enact revenge for Hobbes’ murder. However, because he does not 
know the identity of Hobbes’ killer, Julius chooses to undertake a sniper-styled assassination 
of random hunters in the woods proximate to his cabin. On the first morning of his revenge 
expedition he waits two hours before a truck brandishing deer antlers on the grille appears. 
He observes a man in his thirties, wearing camouflage, carrying a rifle while drinking a beer. 
Julius wounds the hunter with a shot to the neck before showing the dying man a drawing of 
Hobbes and saying, “Did you shoot this dog” (Donovan 33). Significantly, Donovan omits 
the question mark here indicating that this is not a question, but rather a statement. Despite 
the hunter’s denial, Julius watches him die. He then removes a magazine entitled Hunt from 
the man’s vehicle, returns to his cabin and calmly drinks tea. He stands in the spot where 
Hobbes used to sleep and simply states, “I missed my friend” (35).  
In Chapter One, I discussed the way language functions to divide humans from other 
animals, as this trope is common in fiction exploring human-dog relationships and I argued 
that humans often use the ‘language barrier’ to justify the objectification of nonhuman 
animals. Language is also used as a device to create distance between human and victim in 
Donovan’s novel. After Hobbes’ murder, Julius randomly stalks and kills hunters who stray 
into the vicinity of the cabin. On each occasion after shooting a hunter, he approaches the 
dying man and speaks to him using obscure words that his father tells him were invented by 
Shakespeare. “You are blood-bolted...You are besmoiled,” he tells his first victim (Donovan 
33). To another he says, “Amort, bow hunter” (48), and he tells another “your convoy is a 
cullion”; finally, he says, “Prithee...I took you, harvested you” (49). Julius explains: 
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As part of my education [my father] had me write out lists with Shakespeare’s words 
in them, a few new words every day, using his fountain pen, and soon those words 
and the smell of ink entered my mind, and when I began to speak them in daily use 
my father was quietly pleased... (20)  
The effect of using Shakespeare is two-fold in this novel. In the first instance, it relates to the 
connection between Shakespeare’s words and Julius’ memory of his father, who encouraged 
his son to read Shakespeare. More importantly, Julius’ use of Shakespearian vocabulary 
alienates his victims because they cannot understand this language. In the same way as 
humans disenfranchise nonhuman animals because they ‘cannot’ use human language, as 
discussed in Chapter One, Julius can rationalise that his victims are not akin to him for this 
same reason. Moreover, his use of a ‘foreign’ vocabulary makes it easier for him to distance 
himself from his victims and view them as ‘other’; as objects rather than as people.  
Donovan cites an actual instance of animal cruelty as the inspiration for his narrative 
and this revelation goes a long way towards answering some of the questions that arise from 
his novel, such as: How should the reader react to Julius Winsome’s unlawful vigilantism as 
he sets about seeking justice for his murdered dog? Donovan states:  
I knew the story because someone actually shot my neighbour’s dog in real life and 
the dog had gone 500 yards and collapsed in the flowers, although the dog in real life 
survived. I was talking to myself afterwards and wondering what would I do if 
someone shot my dog, and the answer was that I would have killed them. (Bolger 14) 
Donovan has Julius Winsome challenge the anthropocentric status quo when his character 
decides to avenge his dog’s death and in a manner inconsistent with anthropocentric social 
expectations. Julius does not identify with the individual who writes “People are more 
important than dogs!!!” on the public notice he posts up to gather information about the 
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shooting (Donovan 68). He explicitly rejects anthropocentrism in this way and is presenting a 
countercultural understanding and experience of human-animal relations. Indeed, Julius has a 
history of showing concern for the welfare of animals, evident through a childhood memory 
when he single-handedly fought a group of boys who were torturing a domesticated cat. 
Thus, it seems, he recognises nonhuman animals are valuable individuals, sensitive social 
beings who have an interest in living a pleasurable, pain free life. Julius states this explicitly 
when he says, “Hobbes [was] taken from me, taken from his own life, his joy” (203). “He 
was my friend” he says, “and I loved him” (213). In his view, this is justification for seeking 
justice and enacting revenge.  
Donovan shows how an intense human-canine bond centred on love and loyalty can 
inspire violence. The socially trivialised act of animal cruelty perpetrated against Hobbes 
incites a larger, more socially recognised form of violence against humans. The link between 
violence against animals and violence against humans is a crucial aspect of research into 
human-animal relationships because it shows that there is no such thing as trivial violence, or 
an unimportant victim of violence. Julius Winsome, which is clearly meant to be an 
uncomfortable novel to read, reflects the relationship between animal abuse and human 
violence which is now widely recognised (Gullone). Yet, Donovan achieves more than that 
and he highlights society’s paradoxical view of nonhuman animals by depicting the 
victimisation of a much maligned and socially stigmatised dog breed. In his interview with 
Bolger, Donovan states that the novelist’s task is “to admit things in public... [to] say what 
other people won’t say” (14). As he reflects on Julius’ reaction to Hobbes’ murder, and 
discusses how this character comes to rationalise taking human life as recompense for a dog’s 
life, Donovan explains, “It was an uncomfortable truth. Have I ever shot anyone? No. But in 
my mind I said if I could get away with it and I knew who had done it, I would probably kill 
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them” (Bolger 14). Of course, the most disconcerting aspect of Donovan’s novel is that Julius 
does not know who killed his dog and murders multiple hunters anyway.  
The issue of breed stigmatisation and conflict over the social status of domesticated 
dogs also features in Nancy Kress’ novel, Dogs. The story is set in the fictional town of 
Tyler, wherein dogs kept as companions begin to attack – and in 36 instances – kill the 
humans with whom they live. Pit-bull terriers are just one of many dog breeds in Kress’ novel 
who transform from being benevolent to aggressive when they become infected with a 
pathogen as a result of an act of bioterrorism. While the plot of Kress’ novel seems extreme 
and unlikely, the premise is rooted in contemporary social anxieties. Whereas Donovan 
concentrates on the social stigma associated with one particular dog breed, Kress utilises the 
fear of domestic dog attacks in order to critique Western humanity’s paradoxical attitudes 
towards dogs more broadly.  
The response of Tyler’s citizens to the dogs’ atypically aggressively behaviour 
provides insight into how dogs are valued by some and devalued by others in human society. 
Kress raises the stakes when instead of depicting these attacks as being committed by a 
particular or socially stigmatised breed, the first attack to appear in her novel is perpetrated 
by a sweet-natured eleven year-old golden retriever named Princess. More surprising than the 
attack being at odds with Princess’ characterisation as a gentle, elderly dog of a typically 
highly benevolent breed, is the revelation that the victim is a child called Jenny who is a 
member of Princess’ human family. The attack on Jenny is followed in quick succession by 
further reports of suburban domestic dog attacks in Tyler. It is clear that this is unprecedented 
when Animal Control Officer (ACO) Jess Langstrom states that he has never encountered 
“six bites within twelve hours in his own small jurisdiction” (Kress 8). What follows is a 
systematic division between the residents of Tyler; approximately half of whom think dogs 
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showing symptoms of infection should be killed and the other half who want the town’s dogs 
to be protected and saved.  
Princess’ attack on Jenny is the first instance in which attitudes towards domesticated 
dogs are shown to move rapidly between dogs being viewed as subject or object, person or 
property. Although once a cherished and trusted companion to the Kingwell family, Princess’ 
seemingly unprovoked attack on Jenny changes the family’s attitudes towards her. Evidence 
of her change in status moving from subject to object arises when she is no longer called by 
her name. When Jess and his fellow ACO Billy Davis attend the Kingwell property to seize 
Princess after the attack, Daniel, the dog’s human guardian, tells them, “You’re too late...I 
shot the bitch” (Kress 9). When she was a benevolent family pet, Princess was called by her 
name; however, once she acts in an uncivilised, savage or ‘animalistic’ manner, she is 
stripped of her personal identity and becomes a detested object, denoted by the impersonal 
and pejorative term ‘bitch’.  
Language continues to feature as a mechanism by which the human characters in the 
novel depersonalise ‘deviant’ dogs. Despite the fact that his job requires him to work closely 
with animals, ACO Billy considers dogs to be little more than ‘items’ he must catch, deal 
with or dispose of. Billy rarely addresses a dog using his or her given name. For example, 
when a report comes in that a pet pit-bull named Duke has attacked two children, and one 
child remains trapped in the house with the dog, Billy and Jess attend the property. When 
Billy looks through the kitchen window, he sees Duke and says, “That bastard got blood on 
his jaws already” (Kress 21). After Billy shoots Duke in the head, he tells Jess to go home, 
saying “I can deal with Fang here alone – ain’t like the son-of-a-bitch’s going to attack 
anybody else. Right between the eyes. Damn, I’m good” (22). Clearly, Billy dislikes dogs, 
which enables him to detach himself from the fact this dog was named Duke, not ‘bastard’ or 
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‘Fang’ or ‘son-of-a bitch’, and at one time, Duke was a beloved canine companion who lived 
with a human family, as one of them.  
The intersectionality of oppression arises in Kress’ novel through one character’s 
reductive comparison between certain dog breeds and human ethnicities. Cora Dormund and 
her husband Ed, guardians to three Siberian huskies, are neighbours to Del Lassiter who has a 
Chihuahua named Folly. When Del contacts the Dormunds to warn them about the dog 
plague, Cora, who is sceptical that such a thing exists, later says, “Some people will believe 
anything. Probably afraid that little Spic mutt of his will bite his finger” (Kress 49). The use 
of non-human animal associations as racial epithets and the association of certain kinds of 
nonhuman animals with people of certain ethnicity is a historically ubiquitous occurrence 
(Dunayer 161). In this passage, however, Cora projects her racist attitudes onto Folly by 
pejoratively calling the dog a ‘Spic mutt’, because, of course, the Chihuahua breed derives 
from Mexico. So Cora reduces Folly to a tool to insult Latin Americans which demonstrates 
how contempt for certain breeds of dog is often linked to racism towards humans. The aim of 
these epithets is to depersonalise a particular person or culture through the association to the 
already depersonalised nonhuman animal. Thus, as a result of Cora’s comment, Folly is 
viewed though a racist and speciesist lens to be doubly depersonalised.   
Daniel Kingwell, Billy Davis and Cora Dormund are all characters in Kress’ novel 
who view domesticated dogs as objects rather than persons. There are, however, characters in 
the novel who oppose this view of dogs. Ex-FBI domestic counter-terrorism agent, Tessa 
Sanderson, guardian to toy poodle Minette, is one example. Another is young Allen Levy, 
whose family canine companion is a cocker spaniel named Susie. In contrast to the other dogs 
in the narrative who are treated like objects, Minette and Susie are portrayed as being unique, 
cherished individuals. Unlike the many depersonalised dogs, Minette and Susie are given 
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embellished descriptions; for example, Minette is described as an “elegant little bundle of 
silvery fur and huge black eyes” (Kress 23) and Susie is said to have “long silky ears” and a 
wagging tail (68). While depersonalised dogs feature in the narrative only when attacking 
someone, Minette is described as going about her daily activities, sleeping on Tessa’s bed, 
toileting, play fighting with Tessa and walking on a leash. Minette is considered worth saving 
when she is seized by the authorities and placed in a quarantine facility where vivisection to 
research the ‘dog plague’ occurs. ACO Jess, who is Tessa’s friend, swaps the labelling on 
Minette’s cage, preventing her from being earmarked as a “sacrifice for dissection” (127). 
Allen Levy maintains that his dog Susie is “not an ‘it’!” (221). When Allen learns that dogs 
are being seized by the authorities, he sedates Susie with Phenobarbital and hides her in the 
bottom draw of a filing cabinet in his home, which prevents her being seized by the 
authorities. Minette and Susie survive Tyler’s uncompromising response to the dog plague as 
a result of Tessa and Allen’s actions and attitudes: they love them and view them as persons, 
not property. Furthermore, as a result of their more personalised characterisation, readers are 
encouraged to identify with them as individuals and thus are more likely to care about their 
survival.  
Ellie Caine, guardian to four rescued ex-racetrack Greyhounds named Song, Chimes, 
Music and Butterfly also views her dogs as persons. Ellie is already sympathetic to the 
objectification of dogs before the plague strikes because prior to adopting the dogs, they 
endured a severe form of exploitation as tools of the commercial Greyhound racing industry. 
Kress writes: “Dogs were trained to run by starving them and then forcing them to chase a 
piece of meat on a mechanical arm that moved faster and faster” (40). Dogs who do not 
perform are simply killed. Despite not supporting Greyhound racing herself, Ellie feels guilty 
for the way that humans have commercially objectified greyhounds for financial gain. Thus, 
upon hearing news of the dog plague, and realising that her dogs will be seized, destroyed or 
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vivisected, Ellie chooses to set them free. When Song and Butterfly later return to the house 
infected with the viral agent, they attempt to maul Ellie. Even then, she cannot suppress her 
perception of the dogs as precious individuals, “her pets, her babies” (161). When Butterfly 
is shot and killed, rather than feel relief or resentment towards her once beloved companion, 
she sobs hysterically, soon stops eating and sleeping, and suffers from depression.  
Daniel, Billy and Cora view dogs as objects and Tessa, Allen and Ellie consider their 
companion animals to be subjects-of-a-life. These polarised attitudes towards dogs are 
represented more broadly in the novel because approximately half of the town demands that 
their dogs be preserved and protected while the remainder agree that they should be seized or 
captured and killed. The divide between those who want to protect dogs as if they are persons 
and those who consider dogs to be replaceable property is represented by two groups that 
form in response to the plague. After the authorities order that all dogs, whether infected or 
not, are to be caught and quarantined, a vigilante group led by Ed Dormund forms to oppose 
the seizure of asymptomatic dogs. They bomb a Stop’n’Shop store owned by the mayor’s 
son; an act which is met with accusations that they are irrational pet owners (Kress 177). 
Meanwhile, an antithetical vigilante group forms who threaten to kill all the town’s dogs 
themselves if the government does not do so. Thus, while the pro-dog faction says, “Return 
all uninfected dogs to their owners within the next twenty-four hours, or this [bombing] will 
happen again”, the anti-dog faction says, “If you and the whole damn federal government 
can’t kill these vicious dogs, we’ll do it for you” (223). These opposing factions aptly and 
succinctly reflect polarised attitudes relating to dogs who are viewed as subjects by some in 
Western culture and as objects by others.  
Another dog who moves from being seen as a unique and valued individual to a 
disposable object features in Dan Rhodes’ novel, Timoleon Vieta Come Home: A Sentimental 
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Journey. Timoleon Vieta is the name given to a crossbreed dog who one rainy night, aged 
approximately two years, wanders into Carthusians Cockcroft’s kitchen in Umbria, Italy. A 
retired man in his 60’s, Cockcroft has a poor history of caring for canine companions across 
fifteen years. His first dog, a red setter, died of a drug reaction and he accidently killed the 
second when, during an argument with an Austrian lover, he threw an ashtray which hit the 
Dalmatian’s head fracturing the skull. The third dog, a Samoyed, unexplainably vanished 
four years prior to Timoleon Vieta’s arrival. So when Timoleon Vieta wanders in he becomes 
“the centre of Cockcroft’s world” (Rhodes 5) because Cockcroft is depicted as a lonely man 
who lives in social isolation and the presence of a canine companion makes his loneliness 
more bearable.  
As a stray, Timoleon Vieta is a victim of societal abuse in the form of neglect before 
Cockcroft begins to care for him. In addition to those who are rescued, an untold number of 
domesticated dogs are born, live and die as strays in the Western world, without the sanctuary 
of human homes or shelters. Timoleon Vieta’s origins are unknown. It is possible that he was 
either born a stray dog, or more likely, considering his affable and sociable disposition, he 
was abandoned by someone else prior to finding a home with Cockcroft. Either way, he is 
without a guardian. Timoleon Vieta’s fate echoes the fates of many strays, who are 
abandoned and neglected in vast numbers for numerous reasons such as they become 
troublesome, too expensive, inconvenient or simply come to be viewed as tiresome.  
For five years Timoleon Vieta resides with Cockcroft in the villa and is shown 
affection, given food and comfortable, safe lodgings. He is “unshakably loyal” to Cockcroft 
(Rhodes 5) and remains so even after Simon, a stranger in his mid-twenties pretending to be a 
Bosnian refugee, arrives unannounced at Cockcroft’s home. Despite Timoleon Vieta’s instant 
dislike of Simon, evident by a rumbling growl, Cockcroft welcomes Simon in. As Simon 
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moves to sit down, Rhodes writes that Timoleon Vieta “exploded with rage, his hackles 
raised and his barks piercing the still night air” (11). Timoleon Vieta’s intense aversion to 
Simon foreshadows a series of severe physical assaults perpetrated by ‘the Bosnian’ against 
this already once victimised animal.   
Prior to Simon’s arrival, Timoleon Vieta is treated well by Cockcroft who cares for 
him and considers him a cherished companion. After Simon’s arrival, however, and over a 
number of weeks, the dog is increasingly treated like a thing. Cockcroft ignores Timoleon 
Vieta’s aversion to the stranger because Cockcroft finds Simon sexually attractive. The 
polarised feelings that the dog and his guardian have for Simon becomes clear in the passage 
where Rhodes explains how Timoleon Vieta sits with his “half-closed eyes” fixed on “the 
newcomer’s face” while Cockcroft inspects Simon’s  “young, firm body” and fantasises 
about giving him “a lot of very close attention” (12). Simon is aware of Timoleon Vieta’s 
hostility towards him; nevertheless, he accepts Cockcroft’s offer of lodging. Rhodes writes: 
“The only things he didn’t like about the new home were the growling dog and the way of 
paying his rent”, which involves providing Cockcroft with sexual favours despite not being 
homosexual. It is Cockcroft’s obsession with keeping Simon at his home and in his life that 
leads to Timoleon Vieta’s subjection to severe physical abuse, rejection, abandonment and 
ultimately murder.  
Simon exploits Cockcroft’s loneliness, his need to be needed and his desire to be 
desired, when he plots Timoleon Vieta’s disposal. Although he has lived with the dog as a 
companion, Cockcroft craves emotional and physical connection with another human being 
and Simon presents him with this opportunity. This situation exemplifies Yi-Fu Tuan’s 
argument that “pets exist for human pleasure and convenience. Fond as owners are of their 
animals, they do not hesitate to get rid of them when they prove inconvenient” (88). 
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Timoleon Vieta becomes inconvenient for Cockcroft because Simon does not want the dog 
around. Although Simon’s physical abuse of the dog is upsetting for Cockcroft, the promise 
of a human relationship involving sexual intimacy changes the way he views and values his 
dog. As Cockcroft’s desire for Simon’s companionship increases, so does Simon’s power 
over Cockcroft which extends to him having greater power over Timoleon Vieta. The men’s 
sexual relationship is crucial in the narrative because sexual intimacy is something Cockcroft 
craves and which Simon can provide, so in this case, the ability to fulfil this role defines the 
difference between the value of the companionship offered by man and by dog. 
Simon’s vendetta against Timoleon Vieta takes shape as he slowly begins to drive a 
wedge between man and dog. The first time Simon abuses his power over Cockcroft and his 
dog arises during a dispute over who should take the front seat in Cockcroft’s car. When 
Cockcroft offers to take Simon into town to acquire some new clothes, Cockcroft assumes 
Timoleon Vieta will accompany them because “he loves his trips into town” (Rhodes 26). 
Cockcroft says, “We go everywhere together, don’t we Timoleon Vieta?” as his canine 
companion scratches at the car’s passenger door. Since the vehicle is a pick-up, and there are 
only two seats in the front cab, Simon suggests that the dog travel on the tray back. When 
Cockcroft explains that back of the vehicle is not a comfortable place for Timoleon Vieta to 
ride, and suggests Simon ride in the back instead, Simon remarks, “He is dog, right? He is 
animal?” (26). Simon uses species as a way to disenfranchise and depreciate the dog. He is 
explicitly suggesting that the front seat is the superior position in the vehicle and as a human 
being he should be assigned the seat. Despite Timoleon Vieta’s usually claiming the front 
seat, which he has sat in for many years, Simon argues that the rightful place for a dog is in 
the back of the pick-up and not the front seat because a dog is not a person. Timoleon Vieta 
retains the front seat on this occasion but his victory is temporary because Cockcroft 
promises Simon the dog will travel in the back in the future.  
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The consequences of being caught between subject and object worsens for Timoleon 
Vieta when the three next take a car trip and Simon claims the passenger seat. Timoleon 
Vieta is displeased with being supplanted and tied in the back. Rhodes writes, “Timoleon 
Vieta peered into the cab through the dirty back window, his whines escalating into snarls” 
(Rhodes 54). After a stroll around town, they all return to the car and Timoleon Vieta, likely 
out of habit, heads to the passenger door. As Cockcroft drags the dog to the back of the car, 
Simon, annoyed with the dog’s ‘complaining’, kicks him in the abdomen. Cockcroft is 
shocked and upset when his dog is harmed, but Simon explains, “I’m sick of his fucking crap. 
You treat him like a fucking baby. You should teach him to shut the fuck up” (57).  
Simon’s power over Cockcroft escalates and the rift between Cockcroft and his dog 
deepens when the two men start taking car rides together leaving Timoleon Vieta home 
alone. The second major incident occurs one day when Cockcroft walks out of the house to 
inspect some maintenance work Simon has done. Timoleon Vieta follows his human 
companion and when Simon decides to pat the dog on the head, Timoleon Vieta bites him. 
Simon, once again, uses physical violence to demean and dominate Timoleon Vieta and kicks 
the dog in the head with his booted foot. This incident distresses Cockcroft who starts to 
contemplate life without Timoleon Vieta around. Meanwhile, Simon fantasises about killing 
the dog but reconsiders because “if he killed it and dumped it in the woods”, Cockcroft would 
be bereft (Rhodes 77 emphasis added). To illustrate the degree to which Simon 
depersonalises the dog, Timoleon Vieta is stripped of the personal pronoun ‘him’ – a 
common way in which human language delegitimizes nonhuman animals (Dunayer 149-56). 
Faced with the prospect of being left bereft of human company, Cockcroft agrees to consider 
Simon’s suggestion that they return Timoleon Vieta to live in the ‘wild’ (in this case an urban 
wilderness) and begin a “fresh start in life” (Rhodes 83), which is simply a euphemism for 
abandoning him. The two men drive Timoleon Vieta to Rome and dump him outside the 
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Coliseum. Through his cruel abandonment, Rhodes has Timoleon Vieta exemplify the 
‘disposability’ of dogs kept as companions in Western culture. Indeed, he is a prototypical 
victim of what Clare Palmer terms an “attitude of instrumentalisation” (575); an attitude that 
makes it possible for people who feel inconvenienced by their pets’ presence to simply 
abandon and dispose of them.  
After Timoleon Vieta is abandoned, Rhodes’ novel employs a series of vignettes in 
which the dog enters and exits the lives of numerous people. This technique draws on a 
common trope seen in dog narratives, which Laura Brown terms “itinerancy” (133). The 
itinerancy trope can be traced back to Eric Knight’s novel Lassie Come-Home in which Sam 
Carraclough sells his prized Collie dog Lassie to a wealthy Duke but the dog repeatedly 
escapes to return to the Carraclough home. The Duke relocates Lassie from England to 
Scotland but Lassie escapes from the Scottish property and embarks on an arduous journey 
through moors, flatlands, farming districts, industrial centres and across rivers in order to 
return to her human companion, young Joe Carraclough. She is witnessed at different stages 
of her journey; first by two men sitting outside a cottage, by a weasel from who Lassie 
snatches a rabbit carcass, a landscape artist, two men hunting feral dogs, brutal animal control 
officers, a kind and compassionate elderly couple and finally a travelling potter. Similarly to 
Lassie, and despite his rejection and abandonment, Timoleon Vieta chooses to return home. 
Along this journey he encounters an Italian police-officer named Cosimo who pities 
Timoleon Vieta having witnessed him being dumped; an English girl visiting Italy who 
shares a chocolate bar with Timoleon Vieta; a father dealing with his daughter’s progressive 
decline towards death, as well as others. Just as Lassie is renamed ‘Herself’ and ‘Your 
Majesty’ as she encounters different people, Timoleon Vieta is given various names 
including ‘Abbondio’; ‘Teg’; ‘Dusty’; ‘Giuseppe’ and ‘Leonardo Da Vinci’. The itinerancy 
trope extends to these dogs individuality and agency and shows how humans often treat dogs 
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like ‘blank canvases’ upon which we can write, erase, and rewrite upon. It also shows that 
through all their adversity, these canine characters maintain their history of experiences and a 
simple name change does not change who they are or erase what they have been through. 
Furthermore, they do not have to be witnessed or valued by humanity to be significant or to 
rightfully exist.  
Hence, after many months and an arduous journey, Timoleon Vieta’s journey 
concludes on the track leading to Cockcroft’s house. Having followed Timoleon Vieta’s 
travels from the time he was dumped outside the Coliseum, and observed his interaction with 
the various people he met along the way, readers are invested in the dog’s success, which for 
Timoleon Vieta involves reunion with Cockroft. Following the dog through this part of the 
story encourages readers to care about Timoleon Vieta and builds anticipation as the weary, 
loyal dog finally arrives at the laneway leading to his one-time loving home. Rhodes, 
however, shocks the reader with an unexpected ending to this promised ‘sentimental journey’ 
when Simon, who is leaving Cockcroft’s home at the time, meets Timoleon Vieta on his way 
out, lifts the dog up by the scruff and then slits his throat. Rhodes writes: 
The dog made a choking sound, twitched, and fell still. The Bosnian dropped 
Timoleon Vieta on the ground. ‘I am from Bosnia,’ he said, kicking and stamping on 
the dog’s head and neck. ‘I kill the dogs.’...The dog lay dead on its side, one of its 
eyes facing upwards as though it could see the sky. Noticing this, the Bosnian jabbed 
his knife into the eyeball over and over again, until it was a mess and no longer 
looked as though it could see the sky. (212) 
Erica Fudge states Rhodes’ narrative “mocks our desire for Lassien endings” (37). However, 
while credited as being the most sentimental of all dog narratives, Lassie is, in reality, also a 
story about an animal regarded as disposable property. The catalyst for her journey home is 
77 
 
the fact she is sold by the Carracloughs so that the money she fetches can pay some bills. 
While the ‘loyal dog makes a return journey’ feature of Lassie and Timoleon Vieta’s stories 
resonates, their endings are converse. Lassie’s is a happy ending as she is allowed to stay 
where she most desires whereas Timoleon Vieta goes from being Cockcroft’s cherished 
companion and genuine friend to being repeatedly assaulted, abandoned, mutilated and 
brutally killed.  
A significant aspect of Timoleon Vieta’s murder is the mutilation of the dog’s eye. 
The eyes are often thought to be the windows to the soul, which is a common cultural cliché 
deriving from the Latin proverb oculus animi index, meaning “the eye is the soul’s 
window/mirror” (Rauthmann et al 147 foot note). By mutilating the dog’s eye, Simon enacts 
the ultimate and complete annihilation of Timoleon Vieta as a person and as a subject. 
Another way to read the stabbing of Timoleon Vieta’s ‘witnessing eye’ – an eye that even 
post mortem has the ability to enrage Simon – relates to the power of the animal gaze. In his 
2011 essay, “The Gaze of Animals”, Philip Armstrong provides a historical account of the 
ways in which the animal gaze appears in narratives stemming from the early days of myth, 
to post- enlightenment, through to postmodernity. He writes: “The human experience of 
discomfiture before the gaze of other animals has a long genealogy. For many centuries the 
eyes of animals were thought to emit a physical force, an irradiation with the power to 
transfix or infect those who encountered it” (Armstrong “The Gaze” 178). This fear of the 
animal’s gaze is linked to mysticism and superstition as well as to humans’ anxieties 
regarding their control over other animals. However, it is “the attack against the animal gaze” 
that resonates here because, like Rhodes, authors have historically incorporated depictions of 
mutilations of the animal eye in their fictions (Armstrong “The Gaze” 184). Rhodes detailing 
of Simon’s mutilation of the dead dog’s eye suggests that Timoleon Vieta’s gaze reminds his 
killer that the dog never respected or trusted him. In defiance of the perceived power emitted 
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by the animal gaze and in ways that reinforce humans’ mastery over nature using weapons 
and violence, Timoleon Vieta’s eye and its accusation are silenced.  
Ketchum, Donovan, Kress and Rhodes each incorporate depictions of animal cruelty 
in the forms of violence and neglect in their novels in order to raise questions about the 
perception and positioning of dogs in Western society. Ketchum creates tension in his novel 
that arises as a consequence of conflicting attitudes regarding the status and value of 
nonhuman animals. By centring his novel on the wanton killing of a gentle elderly dog, and 
having the perpetrator of this crime a victim of his father’s abuse as well as a victimiser of 
others, Ketchum connects animal cruelty to a wider cultural issue involving the abuse of 
power. In drawing attention to Western legal discourse, which classifies nonhuman animals 
as objects and property, Ketchum is able to challenge the status quo by having select 
characters in the novel reject this classification and argue that the system is flawed because, 
as Avery’s father claims, blood is blood.   
Donovan’s novel is also shaped by social issues relating to power and violence, 
particularly the link between violence against animals and violence against humans. By 
having a hunter murder Hobbes, a person stereotypically thought to view nonhuman animals 
as objects – as ‘prey’, ‘quarry’ or ‘game’ – Donovan raises questions about violence towards 
animals. He complicates the assumption that a dog’s life is worthless by depicting Hobbes in 
a way that affords him subjectivity. He presents Hobbes as a friendly, benevolent individual 
which, in addition to extending him subjectivity, questions the problem of breed 
stigmatisation. In choosing to depict Hobbes as a pit bull, a breed widely demonised in 
Western culture, Donovan subverts the assumption that pit bulls are evil dogs. Donovan has 
Julius dispassionately shoot random hunters in the same manner that Hobbes’ killer 
dispassionately shoots nonhuman animals and he uses language as a way to alienate and 
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‘other’ the human victims, which reflects the way humans use language to disenfranchise 
nonhuman animals.  
In Dogs, Kress employs a dog plague that dramatically alters domesticated dogs’ 
typically acquiescent temperaments so that family pets metamorphose into savage, 
unpredictable enemies of humankind. The transition from subject to object is established 
when beloved dogs once called by their given names are, when infected, referred to using 
pejoratives such as bitch and bastard. Kress further establishes the dogs’ shift in status from 
subject to object by revealing oppositional opinions about dogs that existed even prior to the 
plague striking. For example, she has an Animal Control Officer describe dogs as ‘things’ to 
be captured and dealt with, which contrasts with her portrayal of Minette and Susie who, by 
being represented as having desires and as enjoying daily pleasures, are given subjectivity. 
The polarisation of the town into opposing vigilante groups, one pro-dog and the other anti-
dog, enables Kress to succinctly and effectively capture, as well as raise questions about, the 
polarised status of dogs as either objects/property or subjects/persons as it exists in Western 
culture.   
Rhodes makes the transition from subject to object more personal and poignant in his 
novel by centring his narrative on the trials and tribulations of just one repeatedly victimised 
dog. Unlike most of the dogs in the other novels featured in this chapter, Timoleon Vieta is 
already a victim of Western cultural attitudes that undervalue the lives of dogs because before 
finding Cockcroft he is an urban stray. By providing this back story, Rhodes encourages the 
reader to immediately rejoice in the dog’s happy newfound life with Cockcroft. But then  
disrupts this seemingly wonderful relationship between a man and his loyal dog by 
introducing Simon, a man who exploits Cockcroft and happens to dislike dogs. Timoleon 
Vieta, thus, becomes situated between Cockcroft, who loves him like a person, and Simon, 
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who views and treats him like an object. Rhodes is able to use the dog’s positioning between 
these two men as a way to highlight the disposability of dogs in Western culture after Simon 
convinces Cockcroft to abandon his dog. Rhodes’ mockery of the Lassien ending resonates as 
a powerful testament to the fragility and fickleness of the human-canine bond.    
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Chapter Three 
The Canine Companion as a Dual Device  
As my discussion so far has shown, dog narratives are fertile ground for examining how 
domesticated dogs are categorised as inferior to human beings based on qualities they are 
perceived to lack, such as capacity for language and personhood. Yet it is also clear that some 
dog narratives can, by various means, challenge and transcend these reductive ideologies. In 
performing a canine-centric critique of certain novels, a further ambivalence emerges 
concerning the way novelists engage with the ways that dogs are ubiquitously classified 
according to the roles they fulfil in Western culture.  
Hal Herzog summarises some of the roles that dogs perform in Western culture as 
follows: “[They] locate kids and rotting cadavers, warn deaf owners when the smoke alarm 
goes off, and lead the blind through the city streets”, they partake in “hunting and herding” 
and “sniff out bombs, dope and bladder cancer” (111). Furthermore, in the course of fulfilling 
these, and numerous other social service roles, dogs attract various labels such as ‘sheepdog’, 
‘rescue dog’, ‘sled dog’, ‘guard dog’, ‘guide dog’, ‘sniffer dog’, ‘hunting dog’, ‘laboratory 
dog’, ‘war dog’, ‘therapy dog’, ‘police dog’ and, of course, ‘pet’ or ‘companion’.   
Dogs also perform many specific functions in literature, a tradition that has captured 
the attention of many literary animal studies scholars. For example, Kate Soper argues that 
nonhuman animals “never appear in literature simply as themselves”; rather, she claims they 
are always functioning as descriptive narrative devices, symbols or allegory (303). 
Discussing Claude Levi-Strauss’ statement “animals are good to think with”, Soper captures 
the appeal of using animals as devices when she writes, “In animals we discover our own 
most loathsome and most laudable qualities, projecting on to them both that with which we 
most closely identify, and that which we are most keen to be distanced from” (307). Dogs 
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work particularly well in this capacity because their species-specific traits are easily adapted 
to function as symbols, metaphors, allegories, totems or metonyms. This is because dogs are 
similar to humans in many ways: they enjoy human company and seem to exhibit 
recognisable and familiar emotions, and so they are easily anthropomorphised. To this end, 
canine characters often appear in fiction not as themselves but as literary instruments, and 
such depictions tend to teach us very little about actual dogs.  
Lynda Birke notes: “Within Western cultural traditions, there is a long history of 
domination and of perceiving other animals as there solely for our use” (Taylor and Signal 
xviii). Indeed, the designation of any role to a dog is problematic from a Critical Animal 
Studies perspective because the obligations and expectations placed upon the animal forges 
him or her into a tool for human purposes, however else he or she may also be perceived. The 
conflation of utilisation and domination means that there is no way to assign socio-cultural 
roles to animals such as dogs – either in fiction or in reality – without necessarily imposing 
upon the individual some degree of human control in the process. Whether the role is social 
or literary, labelling and categorising imposes certain traits and characteristics onto the 
nonhuman animal and too often prevents us from recognising the animal beneath. As a 
literary device, the dog becomes a means to an anthropocentric end, which constitutes a 
“reductive and disrespectful” misappropriation (Shapiro and Copeland 344), just as in 
carrying out a social service, whereby the dog is subjugated and becomes a mechanism when 
manipulated to perform a human-designated occupation.  
Since the dogs depicted in the four novels selected for this chapter are categorised as 
‘companions’ it is this double-layered role – simultaneously as social support and as literary 
mechanism – that will provide the foundation of my analysis. In what follows, I show how 
canine characters act as devices to support and advance the human protagonist’s journey in 
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Dean Koontz’s Watchers (1987), Jack Ketchum’s Red (1995), Paul Auster’s Timbuktu (1999) 
and David Wroblewski’s The Story of Edgar Sawtelle (2008). Yet while both literary 
representations and social utilisations of dogs can be observed as reductive and limiting, my 
aim is to demonstrate how some authors of dog narratives challenge and transcend both kinds 
of instrumentalism, instead encouraging us to recognise dogs as multifaceted beings who 
defy cultural categorisation. Specifically, I argue that where Koontz fails, Ketchum, Auster 
and Wroblewski find effective ways to move their canine protagonists beyond both their 
literal and literary classifications and present them as being individuals in possession of 
subjectivity and a distinct canine identity.  
As the previous chapters have made clear, authors of dog narratives consider the 
canine companion to be a great asset to facilitate the telling of human stories. However, while 
dogs feature prolifically in fictional narratives as a means to an anthropocentric end, when 
read from a canine-centric perspective, these narratives can tell us a great deal about our 
tendency to construct, control and classify the ‘canine companion’. Hal Herzog states, “The 
language that we use to talk about animals...affects how we think about animals” and this is 
connected to “the categories we put them in” (46). The term ‘companion animal’ is a 
category that seemingly privileges certain animal species such as dogs, yet it is also highly 
problematic. Adopting a Critical Animal Studies perspective, Joan Dunayer explains that the 
label “turns ‘companion’ into a trait, something inseparable from a nonhuman’s being, [it] 
obliges certain nonhuman animals to be (and remain) some human’s companion...it restricts 
animal to nonhumans” (204 original emphasis). Viewed in this way, the title ‘companion’ 
when applied to a nonhuman animal or animal species is just another way in which humans 
use language to subjugate, shape and manipulate.  
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In addition to attracting the label ‘companion’, the dogs depicted in the four novels 
featured in this chapter specifically provide companionship to lonely socially isolated human 
beings who, for one reason or another, are estranged from humankind. For this reason, I 
begin by outlining one rather divisive motivation often cited as a reason for why some 
humans might invite dogs into their lives. The suggestion is that a dog’s companionship 
substitutes for what would otherwise be more ‘normal’ or ‘natural’ relationships with fellow 
human beings. The claim that the role of companion is simply another way that humans make 
use of, or instrumentalise, dogs has been made by many. Plutarch, two thousand years ago, 
was one of the first to suggest that companion animals were recipients of affection that 
should rather be directed towards other humans (Serpell 24). This position has been repeated 
often, right through to recent times, perhaps most notably by Yi-Fu Tuan in his 1984 text 
Dominance and Affection. Another example is John Berger, who in his 1980 essay “Why 
Look at Animals?” states that the pet’s dependence and susceptibility to conditioning satisfies 
the human need to feel complete; they confirm and validate us (12-13). He proposes that 
“...animals offer man a companionship which is different from any offered by human 
exchange. Different because it is a companionship offered to the loneliness of man as a 
species” (4). Berger frames companion species as social and psychological devices and as 
tools useful to remedy the loneliness humankind feels as a result of being disconnected from 
the rest of the animal kingdom; or in other words, the relationships humans forge with 
domesticated (and other captive) animals appeases our insecurities as well as our intense 
feelings of disconnection from nature (24).  
Others, such as Jonathan Burt, who responds to Berger’s essay by arguing that 
human-animal relationships are not “monuments to disappearance” but rather are “a different 
sort of relationship entirely”, challenge the reduction of the human-companion animal bond 
to a social or psychological dysfunction (211). Similarly, Leslie Irvine criticises what she 
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calls ‘The Deficiency Argument’ and rejects the suggestion that animals are surrogates for 
humans. She labels this claim sensationalist and flawed (19), and says that to imply humans’ 
relationships with companion animals serve primarily to substitute for otherwise ‘normal’ 
human relationships “assumes that people who enjoy the company of animals lack the 
qualities or skills that would allow them to enjoy human company” (18). Based on the 
depictions of the human-canine relationships in the novels in this chapter, dogs certainly do 
appear to be surrogates or human substitutes in the fictional words that they inhabit; however, 
in three of the four novels to be discussed here, there is also evidence to suggest that this 
appointment is not necessarily limited or limiting. 
At the same time as analysing a few of the ways in which some authors challenge the 
reductive cultural categorisation of dogs, it is necessary also to outline the extent to which, 
and the ways in which, portrayals of co-dependent human-canine relationships incorporate 
the canine character as a literary, social or psychological device. The manner and degree of 
instrumentalisation of dogs varies in the selected novels. In Watchers, for example, the dog, 
Einstein, fulfils Travis Cornell’s desire to be needed and Red, the dog in Ketchum’s novel, 
provides Avery Ludlow with emotional support after the loss of his wife and son. Both dogs 
are catalysts that facilitate the human-centric plot involving Travis’ romantic relationship 
with Nora Devon in Watchers, and Avery’s reconnection with his daughter and society in 
Red. Point-of-view focalising characters like Mr. Bones in Timbuktu and Almondine in The 
Story of Edgar Sawtelle enable the reader to discover things about the human characters via 
the dogs’ perception of them. Mr. Bones offers intimacy and social support to his socially 
stigmatised human guardian and Sawtelle dog Almondine is an unconventional sibling to 
Wroblewski’s mute eponymous character, Edgar Sawtelle.  
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In Watchers, Travis Cornell is characterised as a deeply depressed and lonely man 
who is ‘celebrating’ his 36th birthday the day that he encounters the genetically engineered 
golden retriever in the forest. In contrast to typical birthday celebrations, involving parties, 
gifts, cakes, friends and family, on this day he rises at 5am, dresses in hiking gear and drives 
from Santiago to a rural canyon on the outskirts of Los Angeles to sit alone in the woods. His 
depressed state of mind is evident as Koontz writes, “During the two-and-a-half hour trip, he 
never switched on the radio. He never hummed, whistled or sang to himself as men alone 
often do...[he] did not once glance appreciatively at the sun-sequined water” (3). The extent 
of Travis’ trauma and loneliness is clear as he is described as a man who had experienced 
“his share of suffering” and whose smile “had once charmed women, though not recently”; 
thus, he is a man who “had not smiled in a long time” (Koontz 4). His sadness is coupled 
with anxiety as Koontz writes, “Lately, alternately depressed and angered by the loneliness 
and sheer pointlessness of his life, he had been wound as tight as a crossbow string” (6). As 
Travis reflects on his long term struggles to maintain friendships it is revealed that he avoids 
human intimacy because he thinks he is cursed as a result of his mother’s death during 
childbirth, his older brother’s childhood drowning and because he survived a car accident that 
killed his father (85-6). As a result of these familial tragedies, he has lost “the ability to form 
and nurture intimate relationships” and has become “emotionally isolated” (87). So it is at a 
time when Travis is craving connection with another living being that the dog enters the 
clearing and Travis’ life.  
In the passage in which Travis and Einstein meet, Koontz draws on the fabled Collie 
dog Lassie from Lassie Come-Home to signify an act of salvation is taking place. Susan 
McHugh calls Lassie a ‘super dog’: “Physically strong and beautiful, emotionally available 
and tactful, Lassie also tutors people she encounters; in addition to saving their lives...” (109). 
Travis does not initially know that he is being saved because he struggles to interpret 
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Einstein’s behaviour, which is motivated by the approach of The Outsider, a deadly trans-
genetic animal. To communicate the warning (as discussed in Chapter One), Einstein growls, 
snarls, wags his tail and paces back and forth, which prompts Travis to call him a “freelance 
Lassie” (Koontz 12). In the Lassie film and television franchise, Lassie is always a 
conscientious helper who paces, whimpers and barks, amongst other things, to communicate 
urgent, often life-saving information to human beings. Lassie’s ability to sense danger and 
communicate with people enables her to help save lives; similarly, in Watchers, Einstein is a 
‘super dog’ whose genetic engineering for heightened understanding of human language 
allows him to warn Travis of the danger and ultimately save his life.  
Einstein literally saves Travis from being killed by The Outsider but there is a far 
greater, less obvious rescue taking place; the dog saves Travis from social and emotional 
exile. He does this by becoming Travis’ friend, by offering companionship, and he also fulfils 
Travis’ yearning to be needed. This is evident in the passage where Travis takes the dog 
home, bathes him and decides to put a collar on him. When the collar is presented, Einstein 
growls and cowers in the corner. When he eventually yields to wearing a collar, Koontz 
writes: 
Travis felt a lump in his throat and was aware of hot tears scalding the corner of his 
eyes...he knew why the dog’s considered submiss ion affected him so strongly. For the 
first time in three years, Travis Cornell felt needed, felt a deep connection with 
another living creature. (56)  
Prior to meeting Einstein, Travis’ wife Paula has succumbed to cancer, leaving him a 
widower. The reader is aware that, since Paula would have needed Travis’ support during her 
illness, for Travis, being needed is likely to constitute a powerful emotional connection.  
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Einstein’s suitability to appeasing Travis’ desire to be needed is transient as Koontz 
soon has the canine character act as a social catalyst when he facilitates a meeting between 
Travis and his future wife Nora Devon. Nora is a withdrawn, socially awkward 30-year-old 
woman who lives alone. Since becoming the focus of a sexual predator named Art Streck, her 
need for protection is equal to if not greater than Einstein’s need to be protected from those 
who are hunting him – that is, The Outsider and also the staff from Banodyne Laboratory 
where he was a captive laboratory animal. Streck accosts Nora in a public park when Travis 
happens to be walking Einstein nearby. Sensing Streck’s intentions, Einstein defies Travis’ 
recall command and confronts Streck by growling and barking. Once Streck leaves the scene, 
Travis looks over to see that Einstein “had settled down on his belly with his head on the 
woman’s lap” (Koontz 122). Hence, in this instance, Einstein acts as a “social lubricant”, a 
term used by Herzog (68) to denote the way pets facilitate social interaction between people, 
in this case antisocial Travis and shy, isolated Nora. People who care for nonhuman animals 
are often perceived in social circumstances as “nicer” and “less threatening” (Veevers 16); 
hence, it can be inferred that Nora trusts Travis at a time when men seem especially 
threatening to her because Einstein is with him.  
Einstein is crucial to the connection of two socially and emotionally isolated human 
individuals and Travis and Nora’s shared connection with Einstein enables them to overcome 
their problems with forming human relationships and find companionship with each other. 
For Koontz as a writer, the canine character fulfils a literary or plot function: he facilitates the 
meeting between Travis and Nora whose relationship is the novel’s principal focus. The 
dog’s appearance and his ongoing presence in the narrative enable Travis to transform from 
social outcast to husband, father and devoted family man, and Nora from a shy, withdrawn 
single woman to confident wife and mother. Einstein’s involvement with Travis and Nora 
works out well for him because although his task as Travis’ saviour and as social catalyst is 
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temporary, when Travis and Nora learn that they are expecting a child, Einstein is invited to 
remain with them as a member of their human family. Not all the dogs chosen for this study 
fare so well. 
Einstein is a flat or two-dimensional character, which means that he “is built around 
‘a single idea or quality’ and is presented without much individualizing detail” (Abrams and 
Harpham 43). As a result of being able to produce human speech, Einstein is heavily 
anthropomorphised; thus, his desires become decidedly anthropocentric, which undermines 
any attempt to present him with any qualities relating to canine subjectivity that might be 
useful in our understanding of the dreams and desires of actual dogs. Apart from a few 
expected likes and dislikes, such as an aversion to being vaccinated (353) and delight in 
playing with other dogs (362), Einstein asks to drink beer (420) and snack on hamburgers and 
weenies (438); furthermore, he gains pleasure from reading novels (366) and playing 
Scrabble (495). He does tell Travis that he dreams (456), which would indicate a complex 
mind, but there is no exposition as to what these dreams typically involve. As a result, such 
characterising details seem more concerned with humanising him (as a way to exceptionalise 
him), and as a result, he is not extended any significant degree of canine subjectivity or 
bestowed a unique canine identity. 
Furthermore, unlike the dogs in the novels to follow, Einstein seems valued less for 
his personal qualities than for what he represents in terms of scientific importance. His 
possible death from the disease canine distemper is viewed more as a tragedy for modern 
science than as a personal tragedy. As Einstein fights the disease, Travis considers what it 
might mean should the dog die. Koontz writes, “And what other loss could be more 
devastating than the loss of Einstein, this first hopeful evidence that humankind carried with 
it the seeds not merely of greatness but of godhood?” (518). When the vet explains that the 
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encephalitis Einstein suffers may leave him brain damaged, but emphasises that this does not 
necessarily mean he cannot be a good pet, Travis shouts, “To hell with whether he’d make a 
good pet or not. I'm not concerned about physical effects on the brain damage. What about 
his mind?” (507 original emphasis). Then when warned of long-term consequences of the 
brain damage, such as incontinence, Travis adds, “I don't give a damn if he pisses all over the 
house as long as he can still think!” (508). Travis’ concerns for Einstein centre on the dog’s 
retention of the trait that Travis, as a human being, values most: cognition, which in this 
novel means the dog’s ability to produce human language. Rather than view Einstein’s death 
as a tragedy in and of itself, Travis focuses on what Einstein’s death might mean for modern 
science and, more generally, the triumph of humankind.   
Einstein expresses one significant desire towards the end of the novel that is swiftly 
superseded by his commoditisation. Despite the companionship offered by Travis and Nora, 
Einstein feels lonely and decides that he would like a female dog in his life. Upon learning 
this, Koontz immediately has Travis contemplate the potential benefits of breeding Einstein 
because there is a fair chance he will produce extraordinarily intelligent offspring, or as 
Koontz writes, “a colony of intelligent golden retrievers, thousands of them all over the 
world” (553). As a result of Travis’ response to Einstein’s request, what could have evolved 
to be an example of complex canine subjectivity is superseded by Travis’ instrumentalisation 
of Einstein as a tool useful to produce more dogs who would, presumably, be born 
intellectually gifted like their father.   
Einstein’s flat characterisation becomes more evident when he is compared to other 
dogs in dog narratives, such as Mr. Bones from Timbuktu. Like Einstein, Mr. Bones is the 
sole companion to a troubled man who needs him and in this capacity he facilitates the 
exposition of a human-centric story; yet, Mr. Bones is a rounded character, which means 
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“complex in temperament and motivation and...represented with subtle particularity” 
(Abrams and Harpham 43). Unlike Koontz, Auster presents the dog’s journey in his novel as 
equal in value to the human protagonist’s journey. Since the story unfolds from the dog’s 
point of view, as in Stein’s The Art of Racing in the Rain, the reader gains access to the dog’s 
personal experiences, memories, thoughts, desires and motivations. As a result, Mr. Bones’ 
characterisation undermines his utility as a narrative tool or a canine companion and portrays 
him as possessing a unique canine identity. 
Timbuktu is concerned with issues relating to human social exclusion and to that end 
Mr. Bones is useful for the exploration of this motif. From the outset, Auster’s story is 
narrated through Mr. Bones’ consciousness; although, at the start, the story is centred on the 
dog’s human companion, Willy G. Christmas. Willy is a lonely, unemployed, unwell, 
homeless poet, aged in his late forties, who suffers from schizophrenia. He is also a social 
outcast. After his father’s death, which occurs when Willy is aged twelve, he embarks on a 
path of substance abuse, which exacerbates his symptoms of schizophrenia. Hallucinations 
lead him to spend some time in a mental illness treatment facility and, ultimately, his 
problems force him out of his mother’s home and onto the street. Drug use, mental illness, 
low socio-economic status and homelessness are all factors that often result in social and 
cultural victimisation (Hart et al 1582) and Willy suffers not from one, but all of these 
conditions. After his mother dies, Willy, now middle-aged, is left without any immediate 
family to provide him with financial, emotional or psychological support. He is estranged 
from human society, unemployed and bereft of family and friends. Hence, he is left with only 
one source of support and companionship: his dog, Mr. Bones.  
Auster’s novel invites the reader to compare Willy and Mr. Bones as they wander the 
streets of Baltimore together. In obvious ways, Willy and Mr. Bones are similar because they 
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face the same challenges. In the first instance, as Wendy Woodward observes, the two 
characters are similarly “physically challenged by disease and poverty” (26). Owing to their 
circumstances, they are overlooked and dismissed by society, have insufficient food, shelter 
and health care and endure a difficult and degrading existence on the streets. Both attract 
negative labels. Terms such as ‘homeless’, ‘insane’, ‘unemployed’ and ‘outcast’ are 
descriptions that alienate people like Willy and Auster seems particularly interested in 
addressing the ways that sufferers of mental disorders are stigmatised resulting in what 
psychologists term social “devaluation and rejection” (Martinez et al 2). Willy’s situation 
reflects social reality whereby those with differences such as mental illness are often demoted 
to a “devalued social category” and may be “animalistically dehumanized...[or] rendered 
animal-like in terms of lacking such uniquely human qualities of constraint, complex 
emotional capacities, and refinement” (Martinez et al 3). The devaluation, rejection, 
animalisation and dehumanisation that Willy suffers as a result of the labels society imposes 
on him renders him more like Mr. Bones, who happens to be a member of a disenfranchised 
and less venerated species.   
Just as negative labels work to stigmatise Willy, they also alter the social perception 
of certain groups of dogs in Western culture. Terms used to describe cross-breed dogs like 
Mr. Bones, such as ‘mutt’ and the synonym ‘mongrel’, are contrasted with the more regal 
terms ‘pedigree’ and ‘pure breed’. Discussing Victorian attitudes to dogs, Nik Taylor 
explains, “Purebred dogs were something to be cherished, displaying as they did their 
owners’ status, while mongrels were associated with commonness and commonality and were 
therefore to be avoided at all costs” (47-8). Mr. Bones’ pre-existing identity issue as a result 
of being a cross-breed is exacerbated by the death of his human companion and caregiver 
because the consequences of his ancestry, once left without a human carer, are compounded. 
Willy, prior to his death, establishes the importance of pedigree for social acceptability when 
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he explains to Mr. Bones that pure or recognisable dog breeds are more appealing to humans. 
So Mr. Bones believes that as a “hodgepodge of genetic strains” he is fundamentally 
undesirable (Auster 5). Furthermore, Mr. Bones suspects he has an additional handicap 
because of his filthy, matted coat, dental decay and sad bloodshot eyes. He knows that 
because of his mixed ancestry and motley appearance, his chances of being adopted from an 
animal shelter after Willy dies are extremely poor.  
Like his canine companion, Willy also has issues involving his sense of identity, 
which leads him to attract even more labels. Through Mr. Bones’ memories of the rambling 
stories that Willy has told him, we learn that Willy’s outcast status began when he was a child 
in Brooklyn. An only son of poor long-suffering polish immigrants, Willy’s childhood is 
described as cheerless as a result of living in an apartment “tinged with sourness and 
desperation” (Auster 13). Identifying as an American while growing up, Willy feels estranged 
from his parents and considers them to be “alien”, “embarrassing” and “foreign” (14). 
Furthermore, it cannot be overlooked that the term mongrel, has long been used as a 
pejorative to describe a “person of mixed descent; a person whose parents are of different 
nationalities; a person whose parents are of differing social status...[or a] person of low or 
indeterminate status” (“mongrel”). Thus, like Mr. Bones, Willy feels as if he is genetically 
disadvantaged and, like Mr. Bones, his mixed heritage places him in a cultural category that 
is sometimes viewed by society as inferior.  
The result of being persecuted on the basis of identity arises more forcefully in the 
novel through Auster’s analogy between the fates of stray dogs and the fates of Jews who 
were victims of the Holocaust.16 On the run after Willy’s death, Mr. Bones knows that he 
must avoid being captured by animal control because his identity as a ‘stray’ means that if 
                                                                 
16
 Parallels between the treatment and fate of Jews during the Holocaust and the treatment and fate of nonhuman 
animals is well represented in the realm of Animal Studies just as it is in fiction. See Patterson’s Eternal 
Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust , 2002 and J. M. Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals, 1999. 
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caught, he will be locked up at a shelter and will most likely be exterminated there. Auster 
writes, “Mr. Bones knew the drill by heart: how to avoid the dog catchers and constables, the 
paddy wagons and unmarked cars...No matter how sweetly they talked to you, the word 
shelter meant trouble” (5 original emphasis). Free-roaming strays are the least desired dogs in 
society and as a result of having no one specific to care about them. They are sought out, 
captured, incarcerated and generally terminated. In this capacity, they are analogous to Jews 
who were deemed “undesirable” and “relegated to the status of ‘vermin’ throughout history 
in order to justify their extermination” (Serpell 229). While Jews were killed in carbon 
monoxide chambers using a method called ‘gassing’ (Arluke 123), dogs in shelters are 
typically killed using lethal injection today, however gassing is still used as a method for 
canicide.17 Nazi concentration camps where Jews were incarcerated and the dog shelters of 
urban landscapes are, therefore, similarly sites of capture and death. 
Auster reinforces the parallel between Mr. Bones’ predicament and that of the Jewish 
people during Hitler’s reign in the passage in which Willy posthumously addresses his dog in 
a dream. In the dream, Willy brings up his mother’s successful evasion of the Nazis when he 
says, “Remember Mom-san, Mr. Bones?...Well, they tried to kill her too. They hunted her 
down like a dog and she had to run for her life” (Auster 120). Like Willy’s mother, if 
captured, Mr. Bones knows he will be taken to a concrete shelter, a place reminiscent of 
concentration camps of the Holocaust. Willy tells Mr. Bones that “the word shelter meant 
trouble. It would begin with nets and tranquillizer guns, devolve into a nightmare of cages 
and fluorescent lights, and end with a lethal injection or a dose of poisonous gas” (5 original 
emphasis). This sequence, as Woodward observes, reflects the genocide of Jewish people, 
and this model of extermination, she argues, “recalls the Final Solution” (33). While the term 
‘Final Solution’ referred to the genocide of the Jewish people, in Western culture, where dogs 
                                                                 
17
 As well as widely used to kill animals raised in industrialised food production industries. 
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are concerned, the official term use to denote the extermination of ‘unwanted’ dogs is 
‘humane euthanasia’. By drawing a parallel between Mr. Bones’ predicament as a stray dog 
and the treatment of Jewish people during the Holocaust, Auster emphasises not only the 
gravity of the socially ‘undesirable’ dog’s plight but he compounds the extent of Mr. Bones’ 
victimisation at the hands of a culture who depersonalises dogs in order to justify destroying 
them. As a result, the reader further empathises with Mr. Bones and desires for him a much 
more positive outcome.   
Woodward highlights the many parallels drawn between Willy and Mr. Bones in 
Timbuktu, and suggests that these parallels reflect the novel’s concerns with “connections and 
vulnerabilities”, and ideas about the “‘shared vulnerability’ of humans and animals” (28); yet, 
Woodward, like Auster, does not privilege the exploration of human vulnerabilities over 
nonhuman ones. In one sense, Willy reflects the devaluation and dehumanisation suffered by 
those in the world who are like him while Mr. Bones embodies the plight of unwelcome free-
roaming dogs who face similar issues to the homeless human being. Yet, Auster’s novel can 
either be read as a narrative about human social exclusion told through the experience of a 
stray dog or it can be considered a novel about the social exclusion of stray dogs told through 
a story about a human. In the former instance, the dog is used as a means to an 
anthropocentric end and in the latter instance the man is a means to a canine-centric end, or 
perhaps more correctly, both are devices and it is the way in which the novel is read that 
changes the object of instrumentality. In this way, Mr. Bones’ function goes well beyond that 
of Einstein in Watchers.  
There is one further way in which Auster’s novel, whether intentionally or not, 
provides a fuller and more ambivalent representation of dogs’ role as ‘companions’. After 
walking through the city streets in the wake of Willy’s death, Mr. Bones encounters Henry 
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Chow, a lonely schoolboy. Henry, like Willy, is socially isolated but instead of suffering from 
schizophrenia and homelessness, he is identified as “an only child whose parents worked long 
hours” (Auster 100) and Auster describes him as “a solitary child, a boy who was used to 
being alone and living in his thoughts” (105). His sense of alienation is likely exacerbated 
because, like Willy and Mr. Bones, Henry’s ontological identity is destabilised, in this case 
because he is a Chinese boy residing in America. Just as Mr. Bones functions as a sounding 
board for Willy in life, “a man in love with his own voice” who talks to his dog constantly 
(6), he also serves as a sounding board for the “smallest, most ephemeral musings that flitted 
through...[Henry’s] eleven-year-old brain” (105). Henry and Willy take advantage of Mr. 
Bones as an obligatory listener because neither man nor boy has anyone they feel they can 
talk to. Just as Berger argues our interest in other animals is self-serving, in Auster’s novel, 
Mr. Bones completes, confirms and validates these people. He fills the void of loneliness and 
remedies Henry’s intense feelings of interpersonal disconnection. Furthermore, in a way that 
reflects precisely the point made by Dunayer discussed above, ‘companion’ becomes Mr. 
Bones’ defining trait and is something inseparable from his nonhuman being. He feels 
obliged to be and remain some human’s companion, which essentially restricts and 
depreciates him.  
Dunayer goes further than determining the term ‘companion animal’ to be reductive; 
she claims it is potentially dangerous because “such an animal has no place... if they aren’t 
some human’s companion or their companionship fails to please” and, as a result, “they can 
be abandoned or killed” (8). Indeed, this is reflected in Timbuktu through Auster’s depiction 
of the potential consequences of Mr. Bones’ cultural categorisation. As a domesticated dog 
bred to provide humans with companionship, Mr. Bones cannot fathom a life that is not based 
upon interspecies co-dependence. He is so dependent upon Willy that he suffers from what 
Edward Stourton, author of Diary of a Dog-Walker, calls “canine monomania” (115), 
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meaning that he is fixated on his human companion and feels defined by this relationship. 
Mr. Bones proclaims that it is “next to impossible for him to imagine a world that did not 
have his master in it”; indeed, “pure ontological terror” is evoked when he tries to conceive 
of his world without Willy and he believes that when Willy dies, “the odds were that the 
world itself would cease to exist” (Auster 4). Without a human to care for him, Mr. Bones 
believes he has only two options: either continue to live as a stray and risk being captured, 
confined and eventually exterminated or give up on living altogether. Of the former option, 
Auster writes, “Mr. Bones had run into homeless dogs in the past, but he had never felt 
anything but pity for them – pity and a touch of distain” (88). He fears the “loneliness of their 
lives was to brutal too contemplate” and avoids these “abject creatures” because of the “ticks 
and fleas hidden in their fur”, and for fear “the diseases and desperation they carried would 
rub off on him” (89), and his fear of the dog shelter is clear. Notably, even Mr. Bones 
perpetrates a kind of exclusion whereby some dogs, the ones he considers to be ‘true’ strays, 
are undesirable to him. Thus, his aversion to being an outcast leads him to select the latter 
option, and he chooses to die on his own terms by running across a busy motorway.    
Mr. Bones commits suicide because his designation as ‘companion’ makes it 
impossible for him to imagine that he could have an autonomous, valuable and independent 
life outside of the human-canine paradigm. His decision to die, of course, is made easier by 
the fact that he believes in a spiritual place called ‘Timbuktu’, where after death on Earth, 
man and dog can reunite. The appeal of reaching Timbuktu is manifold, but one benefit Mr. 
Bones cites is that in Timbuktu, dogs can speak the language of humans which, as discussed 
in Chapter One in regards to Stein’s Enzo, is often imagined to appeal to canine characters. 
Given the impossibility of this dream, and since it is the promise of reunion with his human 
counterpart that most appeals to Mr. Bones, the reader is left wondering whether there is ever 
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any possibility of a rich and pleasurable life for Mr. Bones outside of his role as this man’s 
best friend.  
Lending equal weight and importance to the human and canine experiences of social 
alienation makes Auster’s novel unique because the main narrative arc does not overtly 
privilege the human journey over the canine one. Only if Timbuktu is read from a human-
centric perspective is Mr. Bones’ usefulness as a resource for Auster’s engagement with this 
anthropocentric focus potentially reductive. There is no doubt as to the many ways Mr. Bones 
as a character acts as a resource useful in the telling of Willy’s story but, as already shown, 
this novel differs from typical dog narratives in the way it represents the canine experience as 
equally valid as the human’s journey. Indeed, Auster employs numerous effective techniques 
in order to ensure the reader recognises that dogs, with or without a human guardian to care 
for them, live rich emotional lives filled with valid experiences. While the life may be one 
filled with struggles and hardships, as is the case with Mr. Bones, it is a legitimate existence, 
nonetheless.  
Through the exposition of complex thoughts and the revelation of dreams and desires 
Mr. Bones transcends his restriction to a social role and emerges as a multi- faceted canine 
character. One way this is achieved, using a technique obviously different from that used in 
Koontz’s novel, is that Timbuktu is told from the canine protagonist’s perspective. Structuring 
the narrative in this way encourages the reader to adopt Mr. Bones’ point of view and thus 
identify with him as he endures life without Willy. Experiencing the world from the dog’s 
perspective evokes an intimacy in the narrative and leads to a deeper understanding of the 
gravity of Mr. Bones’ predicament. The reader shares the dog’s experiences as they witness 
the many perils he faces as a free roaming stray dog. Auster evokes a sense of pathos through 
the reader’s recognition that Mr. Bones is acutely aware of this dreadful fate that awaits him 
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should he be captured. Timbuktu is a creative imagining of how an actual dog might feel 
about, and deal with, the fears, desires and motivations that might arise if put in a similar 
circumstance. Of course, how a dog would actually feel can never be known, but Auster 
effectively speculates how a dog who has only even known a life amongst humans might be 
driven to avoid death and danger, and long to find another human to care for him.  
Telling the story from the canine protagonist’s perspective means that Auster is able 
to have Mr. Bones express his complex thoughts and sensations. The effectiveness of this 
technique can be seen in the passage when Auster has Mr. Bones explain how being bred 
dependent upon humans makes him feel once he is left alone. Auster writes: “He was a dog 
built for companionship, for the give-and-take life with others, and he needed to be touched 
and spoken to, to be part of a world that included more than just himself” (140). Mr. Bones’ 
awareness of his dependence upon humans, as a result of being bred a companion animal, 
shows not only that he is a self-reflective and emotionally complex individual, it emphasises 
the pitfalls of this designation. “He had grown into a soft, civilized creature, a thinking dog 
instead of an athletic dog,” he laments, “and as far back as he could remember his bodily 
needs had been taken care of by someone else” (Auster 88). When hunger sees him attempt to 
stalk and fell a ‘stupid’, plump, slow-moving pigeon but fail, he feels embarrassed and is left 
to scavenge garbage scraps (92). Mr. Bones’ experience of shame reveals him to be not 
merely a literary convenience, but an emotionally intelligent, sensitive and fragile natured 
canine character in his own right.   
It is the itinerancy trope – previously discussed in relation to Lassie and Timoleon 
Vieta in Chapter Two – that ultimately extends subjectivity to Mr. Bones and undermines his 
limiting cultural classification. After Willy’s death on a suburban sidewalk, the arrival of the 
police prompts Mr. Bones to flee to avoid capture. Thereafter, his journey is itinerant as he 
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first encounters a group of cruel boys at a park, then Henry Chow, whom he has to leave 
because of Henry’s violent father; finally he spends some time with the bourgeois Jones 
family. Like Lassie and Timoleon Vieta, Mr. Bones is given various names such as ‘Cal’ and 
then ‘Sparky’. Laura Brown explains that the aim of the itinerancy trope is ultimately 
anthropocentric as the dog’s transition from person to person serves to “assert the diversity of 
human experience” (133). While this is certainly true in many cases, novels like Auster’s 
suggest this anthropocentrism is not inevitable, because in such texts, the dogs’ itinerancy 
also functions as a reminder that animals bred for the purposes of providing companionship 
to humans are not defined by this human-relegated role. Beyond the label, there exists a dog, 
not bound to a human assigned designation, but rather who inhabits a unique canine identity.   
Within the world of the novel, no one observes or acknowledges Mr. Bones’ 
immediate and desperate search for food, water and shelter. Although he goes unnoticed as he 
wanders the streets in search of food and laps up “the warm, grayish water” from puddles 
(Auster 86), Auster provides a detailed account of these experiences. No one observes his joy 
at finding “an ice cream cone melting on the sidewalk” or watches as he scavenges “the 
remnants of a Kentucky Fried Chicken dinner someone had left on a park bench” (92, 93), yet 
Auster still describes these experiences in vivid detail. Auster even goes as far as to document 
the dog’s capitulatory request for death. He writes:  
[Mr. Bones] rolled onto his back and spread his legs wide open – exposing his throat, 
belly and genitals to the sky. He was utterly vulnerable to attack in that position. 
Splayed out in puppylike innocence, he waited for God to strike him dead, fully 
prepared to offer himself up as a sacrifice now that his master was gone. (94)  
It seems that not even God is watching as his request for death at this time is denied. Shortly 
after, in the moments before his suicide on the highway, he waits in vain by the side of the 
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road hoping that someone driving by might stop and pick him up. Instead, he attracts a new 
label and becomes just another “sick and crazy old dog” wandering on the motorway (180), 
but he is certainly not just a sick and crazy dog to the reader who having witnessed his 
harrowing journey feels empathy for him and invests in a happy ending for this individual at 
the conclusion of an arduous and harrowing journey. Most of Mr. Bones’ experiences take 
place unseen or unacknowledged by the humans around him; yet, it is by documenting these 
events in detail that Auster shows that animal experiences do not require the observation or 
validation of humans in order to matter or exist.  
In contrast to Mr. Bones’ suicide in Timbuktu, whereby the dog is likely neither 
missed nor mourned, there are multiple witnesses to the murder of the canine protagonist in 
Jack Ketchum’s novel Red and at least one man is left deeply aggrieved. Like in Koontz’s 
and Auster’s novels, Red’s murder at the hands of teenager Daniel McCormack  enables 
Ketchum to develop a human-centric narrative involving Avery Ludlow’s reconnection with 
his estranged family and explore issues relating to social justice. It soon becomes clear that 
Avery’s response to his dog’s killing is not just a reaction to the event itself but rather relates 
to all the psychological meanings rising up from Avery’s past that have become attached to it. 
In this regard, Ketchum clearly utilises Red as a character to facilitate Avery’s reconnection 
with his family and the wider community. 
The extent to which Red’s murder facilitates Ketchum’s human-focussed interests in 
the narrative becomes evident when the true motivation for Avery’s search for justice 
emerges. At first, it seems that Avery seeks justice for his dog’s murder because the act was 
cruel and wanton. However, on closer inspection, it seems that to a large degree, Avery’s 
need for justice stems more specifically from his outstanding issues with his son Billy. His 
reaction to Red’s death is rooted in unresolved grief and anger over Billy having murdered 
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Mary and Tim. The novel suggests this by implicitly linking Red’s murder and the deaths of 
Avery’s family members in various ways: for example, the similarities in age and the shared 
tendencies towards antisocial and criminal conduct that exist between Billy and Red’s killer, 
Daniel; and the fact that Avery’s family, like the McCormack family, has “a whole lot of bad 
troubles in it” because of young boys with profound “problems” (Ketchum 137).  
Furthermore, Avery’s quest for justice has much to do with his need to punish Daniel 
because Daniel reminds him of Billy. Billy is described as a troubled boy who would lie, 
steal, who dropped out of school and could not retain a job. The Navy officially discharges 
him for mental instability. On the fateful night, while Avery and Alice are out, Billy, aged 24 
years at the time, asks Mary for money and when she refuses he beats her and leaves. He 
returns to douse his sleeping brother, Tim, and his unconscious mother in petrol and sets the 
house on fire. Tim dies in the fire and Mary dies in hospital five days later. Ketchum invites 
the reader to connect Billy’s acts of familial homicide and Daniel’s act of animal cruelty 
when it transpires that justice for Avery constitutes no more than an admission of guilt and 
apology, which despite coming from Daniel, might substitute for the admission and apology 
Avery never got from Billy. The importance of gaining an apology is clear when Carrie 
Donnel asks Avery what became of Billy. Avery explains that Billy blamed the murders on 
another boy: “I said I’d stand by him even after what he did if he’d just admit it and stop his 
damn lying and tell my why he did it, why he had to go and kill them” (97 original emphasis). 
Read in this way, the literary function of the dog in this novel is revealed: Red’s death is the 
catalyst to prompt Avery’s revisiting of his family trauma, the resolution of his emotional and 
psychological pain and the reconnection with his fractured family. 
In the world of the novel, Red, like Mr. Bones in Timbuktu, functions as a literary 
device to support a human-focused narrative and he fulfills a social role as a companion. 
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Avery Ludlow’s wife Mary gives Red, a puppy at the time, to her husband on his 53rd 
birthday. After Mary’s and Tim’s murders, Avery – now aged 67 – is devastated and 
emotionally dependent on his dog who becomes a psychological prop. In other ways, 
however, Ketchum – just like Auster – gives Red a subjectivity that goes beyond his 
instrumental functions. The dog is characterised as possessing a canine identity and depicted 
as a valuable individual. After being shot and killed by Daniel McCormack, Red is also 
considered worthy of the justice his human guardian seeks for him.  
Like Einstein in Watchers and Mr. Bones in Timbuktu, in Ketchum’s novel, Red is the 
only friend to a socially isolated adult male. Even before Red’s death, Avery suffers some 
loneliness and depression as a result of his social isolation. While he has some friendships 
with the likes of lawyer Sam Berry, his employee Bill Prine and local woman, Emma 
Siddons, Avery is socially withdrawn as a result of his family tragedy. His daughter Alice, 
who was not home and so was not physically harmed on the evening of Billy’s killing spree, 
has since married and moved away. Avery avoids her for fear she will raise the issue of 
reconciliation with Billy. Avery’s father, almost ninety years of age, resides in a nursing 
home and although Avery confides in him, the two seem estranged. No definitive reason 
exists for this estrangement but when Avery visits his father, their conversation ends with his 
father saying “Go on about your business son...Come see me again sometime before my 
birthday. You can be a worrisome difficult son of a bitch but I don’t mind your company, not 
at all” (Ketchum 107). Thus, for various reasons, Avery has minima l contact with his 
surviving family and is distanced from friends, so without Red as a companion, he is 
effectively alone. 
Ketchum’s characterisation of Red as a feeling and knowing individual begins when 
Red acts autonomously to provide Avery after tragedy strikes his family. Avery struggles to 
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deal with his loss: “There were times after Mary and Tim’s deaths he’d drink himself to 
sleep” (Ketchum 105). However Red, who has “a clock in his belly unfixed to Ludlow’s 
sorrow” assists his human guardian’s recovery through his persistent attempts to rouse Avery 
in the mornings. He licks Avery’s face and makes it his habit to “burrow beneath the covers 
and with his cold wet nose seek out the back of Ludlow’s neck” (105). Even when Avery 
responds by striking Red, he persists. Ketchum writes, “The dog would not permit Ludlow 
his indulgences and self-pity...” (106). Despite struggling with severe depression, Avery finds 
pleasure in the activities he shares with Red, such as fishing and hiking. Thus, Red’s 
companionship compensates, at least in part, for Mary and Tim’s absence and the dog’s 
presence assists Avery to partially recover. 
Avery’s memories of Red and the fact he was a source of support for his grieving 
human guardian provides insight into this dog’s unique personality. Furthermore, as 
discussed in Chapter Two, Red is remembered as being a dog who dreamed of chasing cats 
and rabbits or perhaps running alongside Mary or Tim. He has a rich inner life and exercises 
preferences and expresses motivations and desires. Avery’s attachment to Red and perception 
of him as a worthy individual are strong. Avery’s desire for justice after his dog’s murder is, 
as previously shown, certainly linked to his desire for justice for his wife and son but, in 
addition to this, Avery seeks justice for Red because he genuinely believes the dog deserves 
it. Ketchum goes to great lengths to depict Red as a sensitive social being whose murder is 
worthy of attention. By assigning Red such intrinsic value, Ketchum validates animal cruelty 
as a serious social issue connected to human antisocial behaviour that places not only 
nonhuman animals but also society in danger. In addition to this, he also demonstrates that 
literature, and in particular fiction, are useful and valuable media for exploring issues about 
animals and human-animal relations. By various means, Ketchum encourages the reader to 
view Red as having inherent value and he emphasises that to Avery, the dog is a unique and 
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worthy being. In this way, like Auster in Timbuktu, Ketchum produces a paradox whereby he 
uses the companion animal, in this case not to explore human social exclusion, but to 
facilitate a resolution to Avery’s family drama and initiate a reunion with his daughter and 
her family. Yet he also aims to ensure the dog is not just a device but rather a worthy being in 
his own right. 
In all three novels discussed above, then, dogs perform in various ways that provide 
companionship to lonely individuals as well as functioning to support the anthropocentric 
narrative; in Timbuktu and Red, however, this does not occur at the expense of representing 
dogs as developed and detailed individuals. In Wroblewski’s bildungsroman, The Story of 
Edgar Sawtelle, something different again happens: here, the dogs are obviously narrative 
devices and the details of their instrumentalisation as companions are laid bare.  
Wroblewski’s novel is widely recognised as a contemporary revisiting of 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet. In her 2014 essay, ‘An Onomastic Approach to The Story of Edgar 
Sawtelle: David Wroblewski’s Transformation of Shakespeare’s Hamlet’, Marie Nelson 
examines the significance of character names in Wroblewski’s novel. She argues that names 
“guide the reader from the beginning to the end... [and] whether the source being drawn upon 
is Shakespeare’s Hamlet or Kipling’s Jungle Books, the Sawtelle dogs are presented as 
having as fully developed personalities as human beings” (29-30). Annette Krizanich argues, 
“Wroblewski’s novel utilizes parallels with Hamlet to depict a world in which animals can be 
morally superior to humans, in order to subvert the ideology of human exceptionalism” (90). 
Krizanich suggests that the Sawtelle dogs Almondine and Essay represent Shakespearian 
characters Ophelia and Horatio respectively, and the stray dog named Forte, who lives in the 
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woods, represents Fortinbras (92-3). When read in this way, the novel’s implementation of 
the canine characters as literary devices is clearly apparent.18  
Like Watchers and Red, Wroblewski’s novel is primarily about the life of a human 
being, in this case Edgar Sawtelle. Edgar is socially isolated owing to his muteness (as 
discussed in Chapter One), and because he is an only child living on a remote farm. He does 
attend school but there is no mention of any significant interpersonal relationships he has 
outside of his immediate family. So like Travis Cornell, Willy G. Christmas and Avery 
Ludlow in the previous novels, Edgar Sawtelle harbours a closer relationship with dogs than 
he does with the humans in his life and, furthermore, it can be argued that the dogs actually 
serve to replace human relationships. Edgar’s preference for spending time with dogs over 
people stems largely from his ability to communicate with dogs using gestures. While all the 
canine characters in the novel assist with the telling of this human’s story, it is Sawtelle dog 
Almondine who, like Einstein, Mr. Bones and Red, serves as a substitute for a human in her 
co-dependent interspecies relationship with Edgar. 
Edgar and Almondine’s relationship is described as if they are siblings, even twins. 
When Edgar is born and brought home, he is introduced to Almondine in much the same way 
one child is introduced to a newborn brother or sister. Holding Edgar swaddled in her arms, 
Trudy allows Almondine to approach and smell the baby, whispering “No licks” in her ear 
(Wroblewski 33). They interact throughout his infancy and childhood; they play games 
together in the hills and around the barn. They soon come to view each other as a missing 
part of themselves that when absent leaves them incomplete. Wroblewski writes:  
                                                                 
18 In Krizanich's reading of the novel, the dogs’ parallel to human characters from Hamlet is done as a means to 
an (uncharacteristically) animal-centric end. However, to what end they are used as literary devices does not 
detract from the fact that they are still functioning as devices.  
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Others dreamed of finding a person in the world whose soul was made in their mirror 
image, but [Almondine] and Edgar had been conceived nearly together, grown up 
together, and however strange it might be, she was his other. (457) 
Almondine misses Edgar after he runs away from the farm taking three of the Sawtelle dogs 
along with him. As she is not with him when he flees, she is left behind to wander around the 
farm looking for her “essence”, her “soul” (463). Working against the premise that dogs do 
not have souls (see Chapter One), Almondine is humanised in the novel through her 
characterisation as Edgar’s soul mate. She is his sibling because he has no human sibling, his 
spiritual counterpart because he needs one: and in this sense, like Einstein, Mr. Bones and 
Red, she appears to be a psychological prop.  
However, in a way similar to Ketchum’s and Auster’s characterisation respectively of 
Red and Mr. Bones, Wroblewski’s depiction of Almondine moves her beyond functioning as 
a mere pseudo sibling or psychological prop. To begin with, two of the chapters in the novel 
are written from her point of view. While speaking for dogs, as I have acknowledged 
previously, might not be an accurate representation of canine consciousness, as with Stein in 
The Art of Racing in the Rain and Auster in Timbuktu, Wroblewski nevertheless tries to find 
ways to imagine himself into Almondine’s mind. This is evident in the passage where she 
meets Edgar for the first time, as described and discussed in Chapter One. It is, however, 
Edgar’s musings about Almondine while on the run that provides the most vivid account of 
this dog’s unique and complex character. Upon planning his return to the farm after his 
sabbatical in the woods, Edgar looks forward to reuniting with Almondine. He reminisces 
about how “she liked peanut butter but not peanuts; how she preferred lima beans to corn but 
refused peas; how, best of all, she adored honey, any way she could get it, licked from his 
fingers, licked from his lips, dabbed on her nose. How she liked to snatch things from his 
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hands and let him take them back” (Wroblewski 471). In being given detailed and intricate 
preferences and desires, like those given to Red and Hobbes (see Chapter Two), Almondine 
becomes the subject-of-a-life. In this way, Wroblewski presents Almondine as being as apt a 
soul mate and sibling as a human brother or sister or friend would be. The surrogacy trope, 
then, in this case, actually offers a challenge to anthropocentrism and the deficiency 
hypothesis. This human-canine interspecies relationship is not trivialised or presented as an 
inappropriate or inadequate relationship and this particular dog is characterised as an 
intelligent and discerning individual.  
Significantly, Almondine differs from the rest of the Sawtelle dogs because she is not 
for sale and is treated as a direct member of the Sawtelle family member. The other dogs 
however are products fashioned into marketable commodities, or ‘companions’. It is though 
Wroblewski’s meticulous outlining of the process involved in breeding and training dogs to 
perform as ‘companions’ that the depth of instrumentalisation behind this ubiquitously 
designated social role is revealed.  
Sawtelle dogs are selectively bred are highly regimented through rigorous training 
practices in order to become “Canis posterus – the ‘next dogs’” as Gar Sawtelle calls them, 
which in the novel correlates to the ‘ideal’ canine companions (Wroblewski 176). The 
Sawtelle family has been breeding dogs for three generations, ever since Edgar’s grandfather, 
John, bought land upon which he established the Sawtelle farm and dog kennels. John’s 
interest in breeding dogs begins as a hobby, when he trades his own dog’s pups with pups 
bred locally. As John’s hobby develops, Wroblewski writes he “converted the giant barn into 
a kennel...[and] honed his gift for breeding dogs, dogs so unlike the shepherds and hounds 
and retrievers and sled dogs he used as foundation stock they simply became known as 
Sawtelle dogs” (19). The breed is created by John Sawtelle’s introduction of dogs with traits 
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that he admires into the bloodline, especially particular kinds of intelligence. For example, he 
trades a pup born to his own canine companion, Violet, for a pup sired by a local dog named 
Captain. While Captain’s physical appearance appeals to John, he is more interested in the 
fact there is “something about his eyes – the way the dog met his gaze” (11). Since what 
captures John’s attention is Captain’s sociability, the way he “trotted around greeting the 
patrons” in a local bar, and the fact that when ordered to greet John, Captain “lifted a paw to 
shake” (11), it seems John equates canine intelligence with attentiveness to humans and 
obedience. John Sawtelle’s search for apparently intelligent dogs is again evident in the 
passage where he requests that the pup Captain’s guardian, Billy, chooses to trade with him 
should be the “smartest pup” from the litter (14 original emphasis). So while aesthetics is 
important, it is something “less tangible” (11) that John seeks as the defining trait of his 
unique canine creation. As a result, the ‘Sawtelle dog’ is a highly regarded and much sought-
after breed. 
Wroblewski goes on to outline the degree unto which the Sawtelle dogs are 
genetically and behaviourally manipulated in order to become so-called ‘Canis posterus’. In 
addition to intelligence, the Sawtelle dogs are bred for loyalty and devotion. Margo DeMello, 
discussing the story of Odysseus and his faithful dog Argos, points out that the dog who waits 
for his or her master “represents two of the qualities that we most associate with dogs: loyalty 
and waiting” (8). Before Trudy and Gar inherit the farm, it is said that John Sawtelle sought 
out dogs showing high levels of loyalty and devotion to their human ‘master’.19 One such dog 
features in some letters that Edgar finds long after his grandfather’s death, sent to John from a 
man named Charles Adwin, who shares the story of Hachiko, a dog in Tokyo whose tale 
                                                                 
19
 The term ‘master’ in reference to a dog’s human guardian is a ubiquitous term. It should be noted that this 
term explicitly reveals the human-companion animal relationship to be one based on power inequality. The term 
is used uncritically in The Art of Racing in the Rain, Watchers, The Dogs of Babel, The Story of Edgar Sawtelle, 
Timoleon Vieta Come Home- A Sentimental Journey and Timbuktu. 
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resembles Homer’s story about Argos in Odyssey.20 Like Argos, a loyal dog who for a decade 
“awaits his master’s return from battle” (DeMello 8), Hachiko waits daily for his ‘master’ 
Professor Ueno at the Shibuya train station even though Ueno died three years prior. Charles 
writes that he suspects Hachiko knew Ueno was dead; yet, still he returns to the station until 
his own death. Hachiko’s devotion to his ‘master’ is so admirable that a monument is erected 
in Japan in his honour. John Sawtelle is also impressed by Hachiko’s devotion and in a 
written response he requests that Charles locate the dog’s breeder and obtain a pup for him.  
To serve as ‘ideal’ companions, Sawtelle dogs are selectively bred to be smart and 
loyal but it seems good genetics are not enough as extensive training is also required to 
complete the process. Sawtelle dogs are taught to be obedient by enduring a strict daily 
training regime virtually from birth until the dogs are placed in new homes aged eighteen 
months. As pups, they are taught to obey numerous commands including, but not limited to 
“hurdles”, “retrieves”, “stays”, “balance work”, “bite-and-hold exercises” (Wroblewski 22), 
“come-fors” (119), “long-distance downs”, “standing stay[s]”, (121) “guided fetches” (421), 
“crazywalking”, “releases” and “shared gaze drills” (180). The expectation placed on trained 
dogs is high. Wroblewski writes: “From the time they were pups, Sawtelle dogs learned that 
stay meant remaining not just still but quiet...” (87 original emphasis). Furthermore, the dogs 
are ‘proofed’, which means taught to tolerate and respond ‘appropriately’ to unexpected or 
stress-inducing stimuli (92-3). Hence, notwithstanding their supposedly superior genetics, the 
Sawtelle dogs’ training schedule is protracted, exhaustive and highly complex. 
                                                                 
20
 Hachiko’s story is told in the 2004 children’s book, Hachiko Waits, by Lesléa Newman. Yet another 
significant example of the ‘faithful dog’ story is the legend of Skye terrier, Greyfriars Bobby. He is deemed to 
be “Scotland’s most famous dog” and “the most faithful dog in the world” because he “kept vigil at his master’s 
grave for fourteen long years” until his own death in 1872 (Bondeson 7). 
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The Sawtelle dogs epitomise the extent unto which domesticated dogs are created and 
conditioned to fulfil the role of companion in the Western world. They resemble Paul 
Sheperd’s description of the contemporary domestic pet: highly genetically manipulated 
“monsters of the order invented by Frankenstein...engineered to conform to our wishes” 
(553). They are “biological slaves who cringe and fawn or perform whatever we 
wish...embodiments of trust, dependence, companionship, aesthetic beauty, vicarious power, 
innocence, or action by command... they are organic machines conforming to our needs” 
(Sheperd 553). Yet, like Auster and Ketchum, Wroblewski complicates this act of strict 
design and accompanying social designation by drawing his readers’ attention to ideas about 
captivity and freedom, control and choice. In raising questions about the capacity of dogs to 
make choices and demonstrating the possible outcomes when given the opportunity to choose 
how they live their own lives, Wroblewski invites the reader to consider the legitimacy of 
producing dogs to serve as contrived and controlled, commoditised providers of 
companionship. It is through the characterisation of two particular dogs in the novel, Forte 
and Essay, Wroblewski most obviously makes his inquiry into the ways that humans create 
and control domesticated dogs.  
Forte challenges ideas about dog’s willingness to submit to human dominion by 
rejecting the offer of domestication. He is not a Sawtelle dog but he is a pedigree German 
shepherd aged about one year who is suspicious of humans after living in the woods 
surrounding the Sawtelle farm for some time. His status as a stray is apparent owing to his 
emaciation and the fact he eats gravel to quell his hunger. It is his hunger that makes him 
vulnerable to humans as demonstrated when Gar and Edgar repeatedly attempt to lure him 
using food. For example, Gar is said to have “produced a plastic bag” from which he “shook 
out dinner scraps” (Wroblewski 71) and later Gar and Edgar leave out a bowl of kibble 
tethered to a tree (75). Edgar keeps the bowl regularly topped up and, eventually, having 
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earned Forte’s trust, Wroblewski writes that the dog “ate the kibble from Edgar’s hand” (90). 
Edgar is keen to capture and domesticate Forte so that he might be brought “into the line” 
(80), meaning bred into the bloodline to improve the quality of the Sawtelle pedigree. If 
captured and used in this way, Forte would relinquish his freedom, subjugate to human 
control and be used to manufacture ‘ideal’ canine companions alongside the other Sawtelle 
breeding dogs. 
Forte, whose name “comes from the Latin root ‘fortitude’ and is associated with 
resolute endurance” (Nelson 26), so just happens to mean strong, resists submission to 
domestication despite accepting food from Edgar’s hand and allowing Edgar to stroke and 
groom him. Armbruster states that in the dog narrative, “the classic formula requires dogs to 
suppress or abandon their wild or natural aspects and subjugate their own interests to those of 
human culture” (354). Yet unlike the Sawtelle dogs, who are born into captivity and are bred 
to be loyal and obedient companions, Forte does not suppress his own interests and 
continually chooses to return alone to live in the woods. Despite Forte’s resistance, Edgar is 
eager to possess him; however, Gar extends subjectivity and autonomy to the dog when he 
says the decision to join them must be left to the dog. By emphasising Forte’s rejection of 
domestication – which also signifies his resistance to becoming a means to improve the 
Sawtelle pedigree – Wroblewski questions what freedom for a dog really means and invites 
the reader to reflect on how much freedom domesticated dogs actually do or should have. The 
kind of freedom, one presumes, that would include the option to reject a human-designated 
social role, and freedom to mate with whom he chooses, rather than having breeding partners 
chosen for him through the process of selective breeding.  
Despite all efforts, Forte resists joining the Satwelles and the highly commoditised 
dogs on the farm. Sawtelle dog, Essay, also called “the wild one, and the leader” in the novel 
113 
 
(Wroblewski 107) is the dog whose journey from captivity to freedom resonates most 
prominently in the narrative. After Edgar causes the accidental death of veterinarian and 
family friend Doctor Papineau, he flees the farm with the litter of seven dogs he raised; 
however, four of them cannot cross the river and so return to the farm. Three dogs, Baboo, 
Tinder and Essay remain with him as he spends an extended period living in the wilderness. 
One night while camping in the woods together, Edgar and Essay are sitting by the fire 
cooking fish when Forte appears. Not wanting Essay to rise from her position, Edgar “ask[s] 
her to stay with the pressure of his hand” (455). Wroblewski writes, “It wasn’t a command. 
He felt he hadn’t the right anymore...” (455). Considering that Edgar has not previously 
hesitated to command the dogs, his recognition that Essay has her own desires leads him to 
decide he can no longer control her. This passage in the novel questions human control over 
dogs that is largely achieved through training, which was previously presented in the novel as 
a necessary exercise to forge these dogs into desirable commodities. Edgar comes to realise 
training directly conflicts with allowing dogs freedom of choice, which he comes to recognise 
is something they deserve.  
Wroblewski has his primary protagonist Edgar question the way in which humans 
breed and control dogs in order to have them fulfil a particular function. He overtly questions 
his right to command them. Edgar’s realisation that the Sawtelle dogs – despite having been 
created to serve an anthropocentric purpose– should be given the choice to act and live as 
they wish arises again in the narrative’s climactic event. When Edgar returns to the farm to 
confront his uncle Claude over Gar’s suspicious murder, a barn fire breaks out during which 
all the kennelled dogs are set free for their own safety. As Essay, the ever-faithful disciple, 
attempts to follow Edgar into the barn, Wroblewski writes, “He took her ruff in his hands to 
shake her down, scare her away, then stopped himself. They were done with commands” 
(534). Once again, the reader is reminded that Edgar’s view of controlling these dogs has 
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evolved. He has come to consider that commanding the dogs is improper as it impinges on 
their rights to choose how they wish to act and respond in a given situation. He recognises 
they are more than just commodities. More importantly, this moment signals Essay’s 
transition from a dog who was bred to serve humans in a social role to a dog who is being 
freed from her role as a companion.  
Perhaps as a result of her relationship with Forte, or conceivably acting upon her 
volition, Essay’s final choice is to reject being a subjugated and dependent canine 
companion. It is with her decision to leave the Sawtelles and the Sawtelle farm along with her 
four remaining littermates, as well as two additional pups, that Wroblewski chooses to end 
his novel. She and her new pack depart the farm and cross over into the forest where Forte, 
“the missing link that will take [Essay’s] offspring safely beyond human plotting” (Copeland 
358), awaits them. Leaving their lives of domestication, captivity, conditioning and forced 
breeding behind, Essay and her pack choose freedom over living alongside humans. 
Wroblewski ends his novel with the sentence: “Essay stepped into the grass...She looked 
behind her one last time, into the forest and along the way they’d come, and when she was 
sure all of them were together now and no others would appear, she turned and made her 
choice and began to cross” (562). Wroblewski leaves the details of Essay’s ‘choice’ 
ambiguous, but perhaps the ‘grass’ in this passage is not merely foliage underfoot – or 
perhaps underpaw – but representative of a preferable existence on the far side of the dividing 
line between domestication and freedom. Freed of humans’ expectations of them, and given 
the freedom from providing companionship, they truly achieve liberation in this novel. They 
reject living as captives and refuse to be commodities on the Sawtelles’ dog-breeding farm.  
For as long as dogs have been cohabiting with humans they have appeared prolifically 
in cultural narratives. In this capacity, they are widely represented in accordance with the 
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roles they perform and as defined within certain categories. Categorising animals serves to 
bracket them together under a label that prevents us from viewing them as unique individuals 
rather than as generic members of a particular group (Taylor 60). Even on the most basic 
level, the category of ‘animal’, widely used to differentiate humans from other species, is 
“the product of a social construction” which, Taylor suggests, arises from humans’ need to 
classify and compartmentalise other animals, to attach meanings to them and give them 
identities, perhaps to “make sense of them” (Taylor 59). Yet, the labels nonhuman animals 
such as dogs tend to attract defines them in terms of their usefulness to humankind. Thinking 
about nonhuman animals in terms of their utility, and ascribing titles to them that reinforce 
their culturally ascribed roles, denies the animal inherent or intrinsic worth and suggests that 
their only value exists in relation to their value to us.   
Dog narratives are a particularly useful medium for exploring the meanings that are 
ascribed to dogs through the relegation of the various labels and social roles they are given. 
Many dog narratives, including Watchers, Timbuktu, Red, and The Story of Edgar Sawtelle, 
in various ways and to varying degrees, represent dogs as being a means to an 
anthropocentric end. In Watchers, Einstein unites two lonely individuals, provides Travis 
with companionship and fulfils this depressed man’s need to be needed. Details of Einstein’s 
personal and traumatic journey are clearly supplementary to the narrative arcs involving the 
two main human characters: Travis and Nora. Any expressions of his canine desires become 
secondary as a result of Koontz’s attempts to humanise or anthropomorphise him. His death 
is feared only insomuch as it would constitute a loss for science and humankind. While 
Einstein’s desire for a canine companion has the potential to represent him as being an 
emotional subject with intimate needs, the opportunity is immediately superseded by Travis’ 
scheme to breed Einstein, which, once again, relegates the dog to serve as a commodity in his 
capacity to replicate similarly idealised dogs through controlled reproduction.  
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Auster’s Mr. Bones is undoubtedly a useful tool for the exploration of human social 
exclusion in Timbuktu and similarly in Red, Ketchum utilises the death of his canine 
protagonist to facilitate an emotionally fractured man’s reunion with his estranged family. 
Both dogs are surrogates who provide their respective human guardians with companionship 
and emotional support. Wroblewski’s dogs are also devices in numerous ways; as substitutes 
for Shakespearean characters, which enables Wroblewski to reinterpret the famous tragedy 
Hamlet in a contemporary format, and in the case of Almondine, as a substitute sibling to 
Edgar who is a socially and geographically isolated boy. Most notably, they reflect the depth 
of instrumentalisation inherent to the companion role through in their depiction as ‘designer 
dogs’, through their extensive fashioning into commodities for sale to people who seek to 
adopt them: through their regimental conditioning designed to ensure they become intelligent, 
loyal, devoted and obedient canine companions.  
Yet, while the dogs in each of these dog narratives serves a human-centric purpose in 
at least two ways, the authors of Timbuktu, Red, and The Story of Edgar Sawtelle also elevate 
their canine protagonists from performing merely as narrative tools and represent them as 
being complex three-dimensional characters. This is achieved by extending to these dogs 
certain forms of subjectivity, and by presenting them as having complex motivations and 
desires. Mr. Bones remedies Willy’s loneliness yet Auster also shines a light on the loneliness 
felt by the dependent dog suddenly thrust into the unfamiliar realm of independence when he 
becomes an urban stray. Mr. Bones has desires, such as to find food, water, shelter and a 
human companion to care to him. He is motivated to avoid capture and probable 
extermination and he expresses complex emotional experiences such feelings of fear, shame, 
hope and eventually hopelessness. Mr. Bones does not cease to exist after Willy’s death. 
Furthermore, his experiences of life are not less intense or diminished in any way. Indeed, by 
telling the tale using Mr. Bones’ point of view, and dedicating the majority of the novel to the 
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dog’s itinerant journey, Auster produces a story about a dog whose life is brimming with 
profound and consequential experiences. Beyond his status as a ‘companion’, Mr. Bones 
emerges as a complex individual with a value outside of his value to others, evident in the 
reader’s investment in his journey and a positive outcome. 
Even after Ketchum’s canine protagonist Red is shot and killed, Avery’s memories of 
his dog and the fact these memories include subtle details, show Red to have possessed his 
own rich experiences, motivations and desires. Wroblewski’s Almondine supersedes her role 
as a surrogate device when her personal likes, dislikes and characterological idiosyncrasies 
are outlined in detail. She is granted subjectivity in the chapters that explore the world and 
her experiences of the world from her canine perspective. When Sawtelle dog Essay escapes 
the oppression and control on the family farm and exercises agency by choosing to live in the 
woods with Forte, she, like him, rejects submitting to human dominion. In various ways, 
using assorted techniques, these narratives demonstrate that the dog’s employment as a 
device or cultural categorisation as a ‘companion’ does not necessarily exist as mutually 
exclusive to the representation of a dog as a unique and complex living being in literature. In 
fact, as the novels produced by Auster, Ketchum and Wroblewski demonstrate, deploying a 
dog as a device can exist in symbiosis with an authentic, multilayered representation of the 
companion canine and the human-canine relationship, and in many ways, can serve to 
challenge our perception of dogs as simple, empty vessels who exist to fulfil 
anthropocentrically determined designations. 
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Conclusion 
No literary representation of a dog can offer an accurate representation of the canine mind 
because the canine mind is unknowable to anyone but a dog and because as human observers, 
our attempts to represent the canine experience will always involve some degree of 
anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism. However, as stated in the introduction of this 
thesis, what is most important about the examination of depictions of dogs in fiction is not 
whether these representations are accurate but rather what attitudes and assumptions they 
have the power to reveal. As shown throughout my examination of the nine novels I classify 
as dog narratives, a canine-centric analysis of fiction can reveal the various paradoxical ways 
we view dogs bred to provide us with companionship.  
To begin with, it is clear that dogs exist somewhere in limbo between nature and 
culture, humanlike and ‘animalistic’, and in many significant ways they remain our ‘other’. 
An important point of difference still used to disenfranchise dogs in Western culture involves 
our reverence for human language and the assumption that language is something that 
humans possess and dogs lack. In Watchers, Dean Koontz epitomises reductive perspectives 
that presume dogs to be dumb and this assumption is clearly linked to pervasive and 
problematic Western cultural beliefs stemming from science, Judeo-Christian religion and 
Greek philosophy. Descartes’ claim that animals are machines and his belief that they are 
soulless and unintelligent beings remains influential to this day. The ability to speak words is 
still valorised over gestural forms of communication, even when gestures prove to be more – 
or certainly no less – effective. Koontz’s exaltation of Einstein, who is genetically engineered 
to produce language, results in the devaluation of ordinary dogs, whose communicative 
abilities, even when gesturally based, are by no means simplistic or ineffective. Travis 
Cornell suspects he is anthropomorphising Einstein and so makes a common mistake when 
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he dismisses the dog’s behaviour as meaningless. This leads him erroneously to deny dogs 
the capacity for reason or the ability to practice deception. Indeed, Travis denies ordinary 
dogs the capacity for many complex intentions that in reality they possess.  
Other dog narratives imagine that their canine characters covet humans’ ability to 
speak using words and blame themselves for misunderstandings that arise during interspecies 
miscommunications. They often consider themselves to be voiceless or speechless, as is the 
case in Garth Stein’s novel in which Enzo wants to reincarnate as a man so he can speak with 
a human voice. In this case, however, Stein uses structural irony to undermine Enzo’s belief 
about the so-called exceptionalism of humans. The reader recognises that Enzo is not at fault 
in matters of interspecies miscommunication but the blame is often put on the dog and this 
leads to the dog being pathologised and corporeally punished. Stein makes a number of 
points about interspecies communication in his novel; but most importantly, he suggests 
humans lack insight and understanding into the nature of dogdom. Ironically, the times when 
communication occurs most fluently between dog and human in the novel are when gestures 
are used, which suggests that a dog’s life is not less significant because he or she cannot 
speak using words. 
Breaking through the perceived speech barrier is also focus of Carolyn Parkhurst’s 
novel The Dogs of Babel but in this dog narrative, the author challenges and undermines the 
power and proficiency of human language as a means of communication when she exposes it 
as overrated as a means of communicating, particularly when resolving disputes. Parkhurst 
has her human protagonist, Paul, come to recognise that his dog Lorelei can and does 
participate in human language as a recipient, and in addition to that, she possesses a unique, 
complex and effective vocabulary of her own. Furthermore, this novel shows how language 
based forms of prejudice can lead to victimisation.  
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The possibilities of gesture-based interspecies communication is laid bare in 
Wroblewski’s novel as Edgar, a mute boy, and his dog Almondine bond using only gestures. 
Indeed, the author portrays Edgar and Almondine as being able to communicate more 
effectively than any other two characters in the novel, even humans with other humans. 
Contrary to first impressions, this novel is not about silence but like Stein and Parkhurst’s 
novels, it is concerned with exploring different kinds of voices. What is clear in all of these 
novels is that our ideas and assumptions about language and the ways we value different 
forms of language require ongoing interrogation. What these narratives can show us is that 
there is more than one kind of voice, that the languages of humans and other animals often 
overlap, and perhaps, the human definition of language is simply too narrow. What my 
examination of these novels demonstrates is that dog narratives concerned with issues 
relating to language and interspecies communication offer us the opportunity to reflect on, as 
well as question, the kinds of prejudices that humans impose on dogs.  
The disenfranchisement of a nonhuman individual based on a perceived lack of a 
reasoning mind, consciousness, a soul or capacity for language is a common way that notions 
of human exceptionalism are reinforced. Lack is commonly cited as a justification to exclude 
other animals from the definition of personhood and categorise them as property or as things 
instead. Denying personhood to dogs facilitates their use, abuse and, too often, their killing. 
However, many dog narratives complicate the exclusion of dogs from personhood by 
representing them as possessing complex emotional traits more often associated with human 
beings. They often do this by exposing the paradoxical attitudes that exist in relation to the 
social status of dogs. Authors of dog narratives interested in exploring this paradox often 
include characters in their novels who embody the opposing views of dogs as objects or 
subjects and create tension and conflict between these factions. The suggestion that dogs 
better fit the category of property or object in many novels is challenged when the author 
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extends subjectivity by way of personal experience and a rich emotional life to the canine 
characters. Moreover, these dogs are portrayed as being cherished and valued unique 
individuals by the humans who care for them. In these cases, dog narratives challenge the 
claim that ‘lack’ should form the basis for exclusion from personhood but rather they suggest 
that inclusion and consideration should be offered to dogs upon the basis that they enjoy rich 
and complex emotional lives and possess inherent value, which means a value outside of their 
value to us.  
In Red, Julius Winsome, Timoleon Vieta Come Home: A Sentimental Journey and 
Dogs our paradoxical perceptions of dogs as existing partly in the domain of property and 
partly in the realm of personhood are exposed. These authors, however, all challenge the idea 
that dogs are merely things or property by providing rich accounts of dogdom. This paradox 
in perception and social classification is represented in the novels by the division of 
individuals and communities into those who view dogs as objects and those who consider 
dogs to be persons or subjects. The consequences of attitudes that cast dogs as objects are 
dire as depicted in these novels for in every instance where this attitude exists dogs are killed 
as a direct result. The categorisation of dogs as objects arises in many corners of Western 
society such as in legal and hunting discourses as well as in our responses to dogs as 
perceived threats to us as individuals or to humanity in general.  
In Julius Winsome and Dogs, breed stigmatisation is one form of prejudice that relies 
on the objectification, depersonalisation and demonisation of specific dog breeds such as the 
pit bull terrier. Indeed, what some of these novels suggests is that there is a direct link 
between the categorisation of dogs as objects or property and acts of violence being 
committed against them. Red, Hobbes, Timoleon Vieta and the many plague-infected dogs in 
Kress’ novel are all killed by humans who deny them personhood and view them as valueless 
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‘things’. What the novels featured in Chapter Two also show us is that there is no such thing 
as trivial violence. They each aim to present the human-canine bond as a valid and significant 
relationship. Whether it is achieved through the exposition of memories of the deceased dog 
or via implementation of the itinerancy trope or through the mockery of the Lassien ending, 
these novels all suggest in unique ways that dogs do not require validation from us to be 
significant or need to fit the legal definition of persons to have the right to exist.  
There is little doubt that dog narratives prove a valuable resource for examining our 
attitudes towards dogs kept as companions in Western culture. What they also provide is 
useful insight into the role of companion that is so ubiquitously given to dogs in the Western 
world. As I have argued, dogs fulfil many roles in life and literature and their fulfilment of 
these various roles highlights their adaptability as literary and literal devices. The use of dogs 
as narrative devices and literary depictions of dogs centring on their given role in human 
society are common in dog narratives. The employment of dogs as devices can be viewed as 
a reductive appropriation of the animal form just as the creation of dogs to serve in the role of 
companion to humans is noted by some to be just another form of nonhuman animal 
instrumentalisation. Yet, as illustrated in Chapter Three, using dogs as devices in fiction need 
not be limiting or limited because authors can represent canine characters as possessing depth 
of character and subjectivity. Canine characters often exist to assist with the telling of a 
human’s story, which in turn tends to result in them being depicted primarily as catalysts and 
surrogates, or as commoditised companions. Yet despite a novel’s primary anthropocentric 
focus, I have shown that dogs can appear in narratives in a capacity that does not render them 
necessarily secondary or subsidiary to the humans’ story.  
Of course, not all dogs to appear in fiction transcend their more practical relegations, 
such is the case with Einstein in Watchers, but many authors of dog narratives can and do 
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represent their canine protagonists as having autonomous desires, motivations and complex 
emotional experiences. Auster and Wroblewski achieve this by telling the story, in whole or 
in part, from the dog’s point of view. Canine characters such as Mr. Bones and Timoleon 
Vieta are shown to have experiences outside of the human gaze via the itinerancy trope. 
These dogs deal with inner conflict, their sense of loss and desperation and the representation 
of this psychological process occurs in no diminished capacity in the novels. Dogs like Red, 
Hobbes and Almondine are described in relation to their likes, dislikes, as well as being given 
personal idiosyncrasies. Wroblewski powerfully questions our idealised conception of the 
‘ideal’ canine companion, which in his novel comprises intelligence, obedience and loyalty, 
and invites the reader to consider if this kind of dog bred as a device to provide 
companionship can exist in communion with allowing dogs to have freedom and exercise 
volition. In exploring concepts such as command and choice, captivity and freedom, 
Wroblewski allows some of the Sawtelle dogs to exceed their role as a literary device as well 
as their position as surrogate for Edgar. As a result, his novel also functions as a kind of 
coming-of-age story about humanity as it reflects on the legitimacy of breeding and training 
dogs as commoditised companions. In short, he invites us to question the nature of human 
control over companion dogs.  
Examining depictions of nonhuman animals such as dogs in fiction is important 
because just as social attitudes influence these literary texts, dog narratives can affect and 
influence societal attitudes. From a canine-centric, Critical Animal Studies perspective, the 
dog must remain at the forefront of the analysis so that any prejudices and paradoxes in our 
thinking can be identified, discussed and potentially challenged. In the reading of fiction, at 
least, the accuracy of an animal representation is less important than determining the potential 
consequences of the ways in which we think about dogs as a result of the depiction. Clearly, 
while our first thought of dogs might relate to roles that they fulfil in our lives and in human 
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society and while dogs might in some ways remain more objectified than subjectified, more 
dependent than independent and are still perceived to be lacking in many ways, we seem to 
recognise that they possess a unique individuality that warrants their emancipation from the 
double bind that sees them misunderstood, diminished in capacity, objectified and 
instrumentalised in many facets of Western culture.  
Dog narratives are important cultural narratives that make numerous significant 
contributions to our understanding of the human-canine relationship as well as help us to 
understand what the literary emphasis on animals can tell us about people. There are also 
other important reasons to read and critique dog narratives, such as to explore the ways in 
which authors experiment with dog characters, and narrators and even the literary form. They 
enable us to observe the ways that authors address ideas about human exceptionalism, 
language, narrative, perception and subjectivity. In these and other ways, authors of dog 
narratives can extend the role and function of the novel as a medium for expression in itself. 
The literary emphasis on dogs in dog narratives, it seems, tells us a great deal about our 
contradictory perceptions and paradoxical treatment of dogs. Perhaps, moving forward, they 
can offer us a way to re-evaluate and enhance our relationships with this extraordinary and 
captivating species.  
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